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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
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This dissertation illustrates how contemporary policy responses to homelessness
in Tokyo, Japan and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia have tapped into historically-entrenched
policy ideas and institutions and been shaped by varied experiences with transnational
policy networks from the mid-19th century. Using archival and ethnographic methods, I
trace practices and policies pertaining to homelessness management while underscoring
the unique yet globally-connected nature of local policy variations and impacts, including
street-level experiences. I take a distinctly broad view of homelessness regulation to
consider the criminal justice, welfare, and urban development policies that authorize
street-level interventions by government and non-government actors. By focusing on
Asian cities of varied developmental statuses, this research contributes to knowledge of
—and reckoning with—the legacies of imperial and colonial politico-legal cultures in
neoliberal governance beyond Euro-American contexts.
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This dissertation reveals the locally-situated ways in which homelessness has
been (re)constructed across time and space as a problem of social and spatial disorder,
ostensibly threatening spiritual and material modernity, defined differently across
(post)colonial and (post)imperial contexts. This policy re/construction upholds what I
identify as the legacy of vagrancy law: a delegitimization of homelessness across
multiple policy fields, rendering it grounds for criminalization, eviction, public assistance
disqualification, and political disenfranchisement. In highlighting street-level effects, the
dissertation underscores how policy innovations across time, including welfarist
approaches, incorporate terms constraining rights and socio-spatial mobility justified
under legal frameworks classifying homelessness as an illegitimate and, hence,
unprotected state of existence. I argue that truly democratic, humane solutions would
require full legalization and public recognition of homelessness as not an aberration but
an unexceptional variation in modern distributions of wealth and power.
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INTRODUCTION
Background
Before starting dissertation fieldwork in 2017, I knew the policy landscape of
Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur well. I first developed an interest in homelessness as a matter
of human rights after I first traveled to Tokyo as an exchange student in 1995. In late
January 1996, I watched protests broadcast live on TV showing over 100 people from an
underground encampment at Shinjuku Station resisting eviction by Tokyo metropolitan
government officers and police. Three years later, when I returned to Tokyo for work, I
consulted the Tokyo Resource Center for Human Rights of the Homeless to learn more
and they suggested I spend time volunteering with the Sōgidan day laborers’ union in
Sanya, Tokyo’s old day labor district—or yoseba.
Although Sōgidan started as a day laborers’ union in 1982, once homelessness—
already common among day laborers—became a more protracted problem across Tokyo
in the 1990s, they shifted their focus to homelessness. Sōgidan organized a weekly kyōdō
suiji (lit. collective kitchen, usually held outdoors) where people of mixed backgrounds—
including yoseba activists, unemployed and unsheltered laborers, university students, and
other volunteers like myself—spent 5-10 hours each Sunday cutting vegetables, tending
open fires, and chatting while preparing and distributing food for around 2000 people.
Over my 10 years of engagement, I saw the introduction of new national regulations and
metropolitan programs pertaining to homelessness, as I also learned in Sanya from a wide
range of views on these policies and their mismatches.
I moved to Kuala Lumpur in 2011 to attend a master’s program in public policy
as my experience with Sōgidan and other civil society organizations (CSOs) inspired me
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to learn more about how policy was made. In Kuala Lumpur, I found little in the way of
rights-based or community-based movements addressing homelessness. Numerous CSOs
distributed meals or ran drop-in centers, but these were almost exclusively charitable or
altruistic in design, which is to say they were purposefully apolitical. I did, however, find
Food Not Bombs-Kuala Lumpur, and began participating regularly in early 2011. Later
that year, we launched an “outdoor kitchen” modeled after Sanya’s kyōdō suiji based on
interest in creating an open space for people to spend more time together. At this time,
homelessness was gaining salience, especially since a recent government count indicated
nearly 1400 people were homeless in central Kuala Lumpur, which led Malaysia’s Prime
Minister to announce that his office would fund Malaysia’s first transitional shelter. As a
graduate student, I was able to develop research projects exploring federal policy like the
Destitute Persons Act (DPA) and newly instituted models for aid like transitional
shelters. I spent months observing programs at Malaysia’s first shelter and wrote my
thesis on the DPA-based practice of conducting mass roundups, or “rescues”, in place
since 1965. Therefore, when government “rescues” became the subject of public scrutiny
in 2014, Food Not Bombs and I were ready with information to share.
Over fifteen years in two cities, I witnessed the response of homeless and nonhomeless publics to the launch and implementation of various policies. In retrospect, I
can see more clearly how political and economic interest in urban renewal and
redevelopment had played a key role in the sustained interest of government agencies in
tackling homelessness. I can also see more clearly the malicious effects that the
manipulation of public interest has for democracy. Wherever public responses to
homelessness have appeared punitive or insensitive in terms of rhetoric or action, public
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figures faced a backlash, particularly from organized groups in civil society. As a result,
public officers and agencies have worked hard to distance themselves from
unsympathetic stances and embrace supportive measures offering, for instance, free or
low-cost shelter and housing. Moreover, public agencies have made way for civic groups
to design, implement, oversee, or otherwise exercise power at the frontiers of policy.
These policies, however, have also ferried less altruistic—and more dubious—ends, as
public order measures and new modes of securitization tend to accompany changes.
Consequently, the proliferation of material and economic aid has corresponded with the
rise of anti-homeless urban architecture, such as the installation of “hostile” benches but
also “green-washed” or “art-washed” landscaping planters and sculptures, and
prohibitions against can-collecting and food distributions in both cities. At the extreme,
there has also been a near-total eradication of tent cities in Tokyo and a doubling-down
on programs of “rescue” and detention in Kuala Lumpur. Why exactly is this so?

Statement of Problem and Methods
Over the past two decades, Japanese and Malaysian government agencies have
enacted new housing, welfare, and public order initiatives to achieve “zero
homelessness” in their capital cities of Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur, respectively. Growing
literature on homelessness regulation explores the influence of neoliberal strategies on
measures like these (Beckett and Western 2010; Willse 2015), often attributing their
spread to the political and economic influence of Euro-American hegemony (Wacquant
2009). However, few studies have investigated how historical processes have shaped
contemporary homelessness governance, while fewer still look at countries beyond
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advanced Western contexts. Although both Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur adopted Britishinfluenced vagrancy laws in the 1880s, their regulatory regimes today operate in starkly
different ways—from each other and Euro-American models. How and why did different
policy trajectories emerge? How have past policies and practices contributed to today's
regulation? What do these trajectories mean for unsheltered persons and society more
broadly today?
I answer these questions through global historical and ethnographic research on
homelessness regulation in Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur from the late nineteenth century to
the present. Owing to common origins, regulation in both cities incorporates Westerninfluenced penal and welfare strategies for managing homelessness. However,
differences in the logics and institutions of these regulatory regimes also exist, thereby
providing rich ground for exploring the legacies of global and local historical forces in
regulation today. I argue that policy differences: 1) stem from ideational and institutional
shifts reflecting particular (post)imperial and (post)colonial trajectories, and 2) are crucial
for understanding contemporary policy change and experiences of homelessness.
This study will investigate four key empirical questions:
Q1. What changes emerged in policy codes and institutions governing homelessness in
each city?
Q2. What conceptions of homelessness underpin such policies, and how do they shift
over time?
Q3. How have conceptual frames, policy codes, and government institutions affected
individual and collective experiences of homelessness in each city?
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Q4. What do these transformations reveal about socio-political drivers of homelessness
regulation at global and local scales?

I collect data using ethnographic and archival research methods. The former
centers on sites located near Chinatown in Kuala Lumpur and Sanya in Tokyo, which I
have chosen for their significance as spaces of survival for unsheltered persons since the
late nineteenth century. The latter concentrates on data illustrating ideas and institutions
in homelessness governance. This includes archival materials like policy documents,
legislative debates, and non-public communications to examine policy change and the
influence of global and local forces therein at each locale. I take an ethnographic
approach to archival research and treat the “archive as subject” (Stoler 2002). This
approach supplements “hard” data on laws, practices, and institutions with the “soft”
context of values, beliefs, and ideas that cohere these artifacts into a working system.
Ethnographic fieldwork builds on and extends archival findings by evidencing
how past views and practices are, or are not, carried into contemporary policy. For
example, I investigate how residual policy logics and structures shape policy changes and
street-level experiences as they govern conditions for social inclusion via aid. I achieve
this by spending time with people experiencing homelessness at each of my sites to
observe interactions with enforcement officers and the artifacts of policy. I then expand
on this by interviewing public officers responsible for policy formation and
implementation, as well as people experiencing homelessness, to gain their insights on
the objectives and effects of various policies. I take inspiration from scholars who have
enriched homelessness studies by bringing to light “street-level” views of public policy
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through ethnographic research, combined with historical (Gill 2001; Gowan 2010; Stuart
2016) and comparative analysis (Marr 2015).
As I look into the form and effect of policy ideas and institutions in each city,
historically and today, my aim is twofold. First, I aim to explore how raced, gendered,
abled, and otherwise hierarchical conceptions of modernity have or have not been carried
across time to the present, and whether and how such hierarchical conceptions underpin
inequalities today. This is because both the realities of homelessness (i.e. demographics
of people most vulnerable to homelessness) and implementation of policy are shaped by
raced, classed, gendered, and otherwise inequitably ordered processes and structures of
dis/advantage. In other words, I explore whether and how structural inequities exist in
remedies to homelessness—itself an expression of inequities in society—and what their
impacts are over time. To achieve this, first, I trace shifts in policy ideas, institutions, and
street-level impacts in each city across political-economic changes over time. Second, I
also identify legacies of empire in regulation, that is, the propagation of unequal power
relations through policy and their relation to socio-political inequalities. My objective is
to illustrate how social inequities can be propagated through policy over time.
For over a century, agencies in Japan and Malaysia have sought technical policy
fixes for reducing or eliminating homelessness in their capital cities. In this dissertation, I
offer a critical study of homelessness policy that underscores the central role of nonhomeless actors in creating and propagating problems through policy. As someone whose
engagement with homelessness is limited almost exclusively to the streets, my concerns
regarding the street-level effects of policy are in fact somewhat narrow. That is, by virtue
of my focus on homelessness, I necessarily fail to include instances where people have
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exited or averted homelessness. My study is, in this regard, one of policy failure—and,
more specifically, the myriad and specific ways in which homelessness policies fail users.
To date, conventional knowledge often pins the blame for policy failure—such as
refusal to use shelters, remain employed, or sustain housing—on policy users. I aim to
not only provide historicized insight into the roots of this bias, but I also aim to correct it.
To start, I outline below how policy and law relate to homelessness in the context of each
of my cities. I also explore each city’s history of homelessness regulation, and why those
histories remain relevant today.

The Constitution of Homelessness Regulation
Policy ideas and institutions
Policy is an instrument that renders particular ideas, events, and processes visible,
while simultaneously casting a shadow on others. This can be seen in policy narratives,
which are discursive strategies outlining the responsibility of public agencies and
intended effects on target groups. The power of policy is also visible in how policy
narratives emerge from and shape conventional thinking. I first recognized the influence
of narratives in 2015, when I began to research the history and use of vagrancy laws in
Japan. I was already aware that vagrancy statutes had been embedded in Japan’s penal
code by Taishō (1912-1926) and so I visited the Penal Archives in Nakano to search for
more information. After entering the one-room library and presenting my research subject
to the archivist, I was nearly turned away by a response I am now accustomed to. Once I
stated I was interested in homelessness and its historical treatment, I was told I was in the
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wrong place: that homelessness in Japan is a matter of welfare so I should go look into
welfare policy.
Over the coming weeks and years, as I looked into not only the history of
vagrancy laws and arrests, but also interventions into homelessness by transportation,
sanitation, and parks management departments, I heard this narrative repeatedly,
including from senior public officers at national and metropolitan agencies and from
young part-time staff at public libraries. In most cases, I have no reason to believe that
people were trying to dissuade me from looking into policy outside of welfare. Also, the
fact that I am both foreign (i.e. not Japanese) and a woman likely influenced people to
think I would benefit from impromptu correction or advice. However, the predictability
and uniformity of this response across multiple institutions underscored for me the effect
of policy narratives on what we see and how we see it.
In Japan and Malaysia alike, policy narratives categorically identify homelessness
as a matter of public welfare, and this necessarily deflects attention from its relation to
other agencies and agents. This may even occur in spite of a narrator’s good intentions,
such as in advocating for better welfare provisions while failing to highlight concrete
strategies for other fields. Moreover, the practice of collectively recognizing
homelessness as a matter of humanitarian concern only in the context of welfare
necessarily contributes to the objectification, or dehumanization, of people experiencing
homelessness in other contexts addressed by non-welfare agencies.
Based on my experiences, I have deliberately taken a distinctly broad view of
homelessness regulation to consider not only criminal justice and welfare but also urban
development policies that authorize interventions by governmental and quasi-
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governmental agencies, including transportation, sanitation, and parks management
departments. While I find that government agencies have been unanimous in presenting
welfare and labor policies as instruments of singular importance in addressing
homelessness, this narrative is both unhelpful and untrue. In actuality, the lives of people
experiencing homelessness are profoundly impacted by decisions made across multiple
agencies. Naturally, the full range could span policies as broad as education, immigration,
credit and bankruptcy, urban planning, environmental conservation, and more. For the
purposes of my research, I limit the scope of agencies and policies to those directly
connected to interventions in public spaces by my fieldwork sites in the Taito and
Shibuya Wards of Tokyo and the area spanning Central Market and Chow Kit in Kuala
Lumpur (see Table 1, next page). I do this to offer a fuller record of how government
responses to street homelessness in each city may or may not work together on the
ground, along with the social, political, and material effects of particular policies and
practices.

Neoliberal imperatives of social and spatial order
Policy narratives, or the rationale justifying interventions on the ground today,
vary according to their local contexts—even where policies implemented appear identical
to those elsewhere. When I returned to Tokyo in 2017, for example, the 2020 Tokyo
Olympics featured prominently in explanations for various projects and programs under
central, metropolitan, and ward-level agencies. This included Shibuya Ward’s sudden
decision to close Miyashita Park for redevelopment—thereby pushing through tens of
evictions—with a promise to reopen the park in the spring of 2020. Tokyo’s Summer
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Olympics have also been used to justify changes to zoning and use regulations, including
those governing use of public and quasi-public land, to facilitate the development of

Public, Quasi-public, and Private Agencies Involved in
Public Space Interventions
Tokyo
Kuala Lumpur
Public Agencies
Ministry of Land,
Ministry of Women, Family, and
Infrastructure, and
Community
Transportation
Development (MWFCD)
Tokyo Metropolitan
Social Welfare Department of
Construction
Kuala Lumpur
Department
(also under MWFCD)
Shibuya/Taito/Arakawa
Kuala Lumpur City Hall
Ward Welfare
(Ministry of Federal
Office
Territories)
Shibuya/Taito/Arakawa
Dang Wangi Police Department
Ward Parks
Management Office
Metropolitan Police
Immigration Bureau
Department
Quasi-public
Tokyo Parks Association
RELA / JAIS
Organizations Japan Sports Council
National Welfare Foundation
Civic Organizations Orange / Sanyukai
Kechara Soup Kitchen / Pertiwi
Private Agencies
Mitsui Fudosan
Alam Flora
Table 1. List of public, quasi-public, and civic organizations at my field sites.

luxury hotels and high-rise residential suites across the city. National and metropolitan
agencies assert that these developments offer short- and long-term benefits to the national
economy by not only attracting Olympic visitors, but also increasing residential tourism
and foreign direct investment into the future. In this way, the Olympics have acted as
leverage for bolstering and often accelerating pre-existing ambitions for tackling
homelessness in the interest of advancing economic growth via urban development and
tourism.
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Consequently, although Shibuya’s landscape has been continually in flux, large
patches of the city have quickly become unrecognizable in just the last decade. Massive
swathes of land are regularly cordoned off for construction, sometimes overnight, or
unveiled as new streets, theaters, and shopping centers. The impact of this rapid, farreaching change on Shibuya’s public space, and people relying on that space for survival,
has been profound: in less than a decade, hundreds have been displaced from Miyashita
Park, Yoyogi Park, and areas around the ward office and Shibuya Station. In Sanya, the
pressures of development have manifested in a much slower, more circuitous fashion.
Over this same span, neighborhoods surrounding the yoseba district are increasingly
rebuilt or sporadically interrupted with new infrastructure like high-rise apartments,
shopping centers, medical institutions, hotels, and new “green” park infrastructures. The
neighborhood I resided in between August 2017 to February 2019 in Minami Senju sat
next to a new high-rise premium residence for young families. Moreover, the high-rise
was a ten-minute walk from a new three-story shopping center, but both buildings were
still tucked into blocks of quaint one- and two-story homes inhabited by senior citizens
who spent much of each day socializing in the street. Similarly, the nearby Asakusa
area—home to Tokyo’s historic Sensōji Temple, a patchwork of downtown streets, and
scenic riverside parks—is being rapidly rebuilt for tourism. This bustle contrasted the
lack of even a moderate push to invest in yoseba district infrastructure, as epitomized in
late 2017 by the removal, rather than repair, of the awning on the old Iroha Shopping
Arcade. The Arcade was once the commercial center of Tokyo’s yoseba frequented by its
thousands of laborers through the late twentieth century. However, as shops have
gradually been shuttered and closed over the last two to three decades, the arcade
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primarily served as an evening resting spot for tens, if not over 100 people, who found
themselves without shelter in the neighborhood. Now, without the awning, Sanya’s rough
sleepers have lost their last defense against inclement weather.
My return to Kuala Lumpur—also after a 5-year absence—presented me with
similar changes. The downtown area where I once coordinated the outdoor kitchen—
known for its landmark: the Segi College building on Hang Lekiu Street—had changed
little except for two new cafes about 100 km away on a parallel street. In the evenings,
after the College and its surrounding businesses began to close, over 100 persons would
gather in the area before CSOs came each night bringing food, clothes, and other aid. The
two new cafes seemed to have young owners whose affluent taste contrasted the
neighborhood’s gritty nature. That is, the area’s prewar-era Chinese shoplots were
picturesque but overrun by cockroaches, rats, stray cats, and aggressive vegetation
covering the buildings. In fact, the smell of death hugged the buildings as the small
bodies of feral animals and pests rotted in the nooks of crumbling infrastructure. The
older generation of shoplot owners have repurposed building for two enterprises: on the
ground floor, they keep simple diner-style restaurants or print shops catering to college
students, and partition second-floor space into bed-sized rooms, which can be rented for
20 Ringgit per night to single parents, migrant laborers, and other people working—or
seeking work—in minimum-wage or illicit jobs. The new cafés, located at the
neighborhood’s edge, have been renovated so that brick fabrics still look decayed, but are
in fact cleaned and stabilized. This aesthetic of sanitized dilapidation is now popular
among leisure-class aficionados of authentic urbanism and KL’s cultural heritage. Inside,
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customers easily spend 30 Ringgit each on drinks and delicacies like roselle-infused
coffee and chocolate-hazelnut cake.
However, the gamble made by the café owners is a fair one. On either side of
Hang Lekiu Street is Chinatown to the east and Kuala Lumpur’s oldest mosque and
famed attraction Masjid Jamek to the west. Also, there are historic museums, colonial
buildings, and Merdeka (Independence) Square just a ten-minute walk away. That is,
considering Kuala Lumpur’s compact size and remarkable history, all tourists end up
here. All a café would need is a strong online presence to attract presumably endless
streams of new customers—and the new cafes seem to be doing well so far.
Moreover, the names of transnational companies, including Mitsui Fudosan—
known for redevelopment of Shibuya’s Miyashita Park—are highly visible throughout
central KL as they appear on billboards and construction sites that are now popping up
throughout the central district. Advertisements promise condos, shopping centers, office
towers, hotels, and other buildings destined to bring more wealth to the capital. Against
that background, the new sidewalks, bridges, bus stops, and mist machines installed by
my fieldwork site appeared quite modest. In both Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur, the drive to
bring in foreign business and investment, including tourist activity, has visibly
accelerated development throughout each city—and I was stunned by how this “boom”
contrasted the inertia or inactivity of even just upkeep for spaces in by each city’s
homeless hub.
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Supportive, ambivalent, and punitive policy—versus freedom?
Policies that typically govern public and social order have an array of supportive,
ambivalent, and punitive effects rooted in imperial and colonial systems of treating
offenders with punishment or care (Garland 1985, 2001; DeVerteuil 2006). After I
reacquainted with Kuala Lumpur in my first weeks, I suddenly realized that conditions in
Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur had flipped—at least relative to my earlier stays. Between
2001 and 2011, I thought of Japan’s approach to homelessness as predominantly
supportive, owing to its relatively generous welfare-state infrastructure and the absence
of criminal treatment 1 of homelessness (both unlike the US). Consequently, in Tokyo,
people experiencing homelessness were able to erect and/or stay in tents and other
makeshift abodes in some public spaces. However, during my stay in Kuala Lumpur
between 2011 and 2014, I thought of measures addressing homelessness as more harsh
owing to the meagre extent of state aid and the use of regularly scheduled mass roundups
and compulsory detention to clear the streets. Intuitively, I once thought that people
experiencing homelessness in Tokyo had more options, autonomy, and resources
available to them; this is, I think, what many people presume the function and effect of
welfare systems would be. However, by the end of 2019, I no longer felt the same way.
In late 2018, prior to my arrival in Kuala Lumpur, the Kuala Lumpur Welfare
Department and Kuala Lumpur City Hall had halted their night-time anti-vagrancy
roundups—albeit unannounced—likely owing to the entry of a new ruling party into
government. Over time, as people sleeping rough sensed that roundups had stopped, at

1

Anti-vagrancy statutes in Japan’s Minor Offenses Act remain in effect, from 1948 to the present.
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least for a short while, they began congregating more openly on the streets and
socializing without as much self-consciousness or fear. Seeing people come together in
large numbers and freely use public space reminded me of how encampments once
existed and felt in Tokyo. When I first started living in Tokyo, until policy designed to
eliminate encampments was enacted in 2004, anywhere from five to 20 to over 100 tents
could be easily found in open areas, especially large parks. Today, however,
encampments have largely disappeared as regular patrols and other forms of rigid
security prohibit settlement, while street homelessness too is rendered less visible by antihomeless measures, such as the criminalization of can-collecting and the installation of
‘hostile’ benches and landscaping planters to reduce space for rest.
While I initially interpreted the visibility of encampments and homelessness in
Tokyo as a sign that the broader public had greater understanding or empathy regarding
homelessness relative to the United States, I now believe that this quasi-liberation of
homeless life, similar to what I saw in Kuala Lumpur, may just be a sign of a policy
system changing gears. In Tokyo in the late 1990s, public concern for homelessness had
mushroomed as visible protest against evictions received positive media attention; this
empathy triggered a gradual slowing down of public order enforcement, just like Kuala
Lumpur’s, for the purposes of minimizing controversy while agencies regrouped for the
development of new policies.
Tokyo’s relative freedom, therefore, was short-lived. Government enacted a new
national policy on homelessness in 2002, which signaled its intent to more keenly govern
the relationship of people experiencing homelessness to public spaces through a statute
aimed to ensure “appropriate use” of public facilities. Soon after, in 2004, a new program
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offering low-cost housing was enacted to reduce encampments throughout Tokyo—and
this inspired new policies 2 and agencies governing public space. When I returned to
Tokyo in 2017, I learned that public and civic sector agents, now obliged by various
policies to conduct weekly outreach patrols, regularly approach people experiencing
homelessness. Such intervention is not unjustified as it serves the purpose of informing
people of public assistance options, such as entry into the self-reliance shelter system or
applying for welfare aid.
At the same time, under current law, outreach is designed to double as a mode for
informing people of the parameters of “appropriate use” and, depending on the manner
and discretionary intent of the agent, urge the uptake of welfare options and/or relocation.
I met several people who felt policed under the current policy regime—albeit by officers
not affiliated with police but instead more “friendly” or dispassionate agencies like
welfare or transportation. By this legal framework, welfare is increasingly framed as
compulsory for all citizens. Hence, while this is not equivalent to, for example, the mass
roundups and detention I witnessed in Kuala Lumpur between 2011 and 2014, the
difference between the two is, in my view, only one of degree. Once I recognized a
liberation of sorts taking place in Kuala Lumpur after the toning down of rescue
operations, I also recognized in Tokyo a gradual loss of freedom by virtue of its enhanced
public order measures.

2

Tokyo metropolitan’s last formal count in 2016 shows a reduction of over 90%.
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Modern spatial and social development—and imperatives of order
At the end of the nineteenth century, public policy was largely comprised of
public order systems that regulated people through spatial segregation—often through
arrest and imprisonment—to protect “good” members of society. Scholars such as
Garland (1985) have underscored the largely punitive nature of past measures, but they
were not exclusively so: interest in rehabilitating people also grew across the nineteenth
century. Over this century, as new technologies facilitated the rapid expansion of colonial
rule and information exchange, policy practitioners began experimenting in rehabilitative
reform and associating it with “civilized” society, while distancing themselves from penal
practices such as confinement and corporal punishment, increasingly characterized as
barbaric. As David Garland (1985, 2001) details this history, he highlights two major
policy shifts over time: first a welfarist turn inspired by the ethos of social development
and investment in productive and reproductive labor and life in the early twentieth
century, and a punitive turn towards neoliberal austerity and penalty in the late twentieth
century.
In decades since Garland’s “punitive turn” thesis, additional scholarship (Cloke et
al 2010; DeVerteuil et al 2009; Johnsen and Fitzpatrick 2010) has presented how this turn
has been more nuanced. For instance, while heavy-handed evictions did recur in Tokyo in
the 1990s and early 2000s, civic protest and public opposition led to the incorporation of
new policies that have led to the more neutral, or even helpful, managerialism of
“outreach” systems today. Policies that appear to carry exclusionary objectives are often
infused with caring aims and compassionate rhetoric, which “blurs” (Hennigan and Speer

17

2018) the actual directionality of policy. Stated differently, the punitive nature of the
punitive turn has been arguably diluted—or perhaps the turn itself was not purely
punitive.
While I do adopt compassionate, ambivalent, and punitive frames where they are
useful in describing policy aims and effects, I have come to view the broader shift as one
moving between preference for spatial or social objects of control. At present, I believe
that what has been summarized as a trajectory of welfarist and punitive turns over the
modern history of advanced capitalist nations may be better read as an alignment of
policy: 1) from imperialist material and economic interest in expanding capitalist markets
through spatial development across the latter-half of the nineteenth century, 2) to
post/imperialist political-economic interest in gains accrued through social development
(and control over divisions of labor) for much of the twentieth century, and 3) to today’s
neoliberal financial interest in land and the consolidation of power accrued through
spatial development and control. Moreover, it appears to me that Global South countries
like Malaysia have not necessarily followed the same course as the Global North. For
instance, my research suggests that interest in social development in Malaysia has grown
in recent decades—despite neoliberal austerity rhetoric—with roots in labor shifts
sparked under the New International Division of Labor.
Fundamentally, the compassionate, punitive, and even dispassionate managerial
aims that punctuate each city’s history of homelessness regulation are expressions of
political strategies and instruments for asserting power. Plainly stated, they justify and
serve global and local capitalist interest in spatial and social development (i.e. land and
labor) and—by extension—spatial or social control. The ways in which spatial and social
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control are exercised over individuals—regardless of whether they are punitive,
supportive, or dispassionate and managerial—has profound ramifications for social
existence itself, as seen in both Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo today. These forms of
regulation can and do impinge on people’s liberties and rights and, by extension, the very
foundation of our democracies.

Global history, compassionate acts, and power
As noted above, understanding homelessness regulation today requires
understanding regulation in the past. Homelessness has been seen—or framed—as a
metonym for social and spatial disorder since the mid- to late-nineteenth century, when
Euro-American imperialist agents became increasingly fixated on comparatively
assessing each society’s level of civilization by its spatial and social order. Policy tools
since developed to manage perceived socio-spatial disorder necessarily express each era’s
particular anxieties. For instance, prior to the welfarist turn in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, policies addressing homelessness were used to spatially contain
populations deemed dangerous on account of their supposed criminality, (biological)
contamination, and/or political insurgency. This was also true in Tokyo and Kuala
Lumpur, where the Meiji state and the British colonial administration, respectively,
managed social and spatial order almost exclusively through police. At this time, state
measures relied heavily on forced clearance and containment, including policies centered
on providing care, including through Japan’s Sick Traveler’s Law, the Tokyo Poorhouse,
and Kuala Lumpur’s Pauper Hospital. However, anxieties and expressions of care shifted
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as political and economic players developed greater corporal interest in uprooted and
impoverished people in each city.
As explained in the subsection above, homelessness regulation underwent a more
compassionate, welfarist turn in the early twentieth century as resource extraction,
industrial production, and transnational commerce quickened over capitalism’s global
expansion. The incorporation of care into policy, also expressed through the reduction
(but not elimination) of segregation and clearance, had everything to do with the political
and economic value of labor and loyalty among imperial and colonial subjects. In the
mid- to late-nineteenth century, allocations for housing, food, and transport granted to
imperial officers dispatched to colonial territories like Kuala Lumpur were standardized
and served as a precursor to what later took shape in metropoles as social assistance for
the “uplift” of the poor. For instance, in Kuala Lumpur, high-ranking British officers
would receive houses with allowances for their wives and children, whereas middleranking officers—often unmarried—would receive more modest accommodation but
with subsidized domestic help, and the lowest classes of workers would generally get
shared quarters (not unlike today’s shelters) with migrant “coolies” receiving the worst—
often located next to livestock or in tents. In this way, the quality and quantity of aid for
public service was typically determined in line with nationality, race, gender, age, marital
status, and class. Over time, government agencies became more conscious of the stability
that material and economic provisions brought to laborers and, by extension, political and
economic security for the colony and empire. These systems of public investment in
labor—including its reproductive needs was then slowly adapted over time from colonies
into the metropoles.
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At the same time, however, the British colonial administration was not willing to
carry responsibility for the social well-being of society at large, comprised in Kuala
Lumpur of European and Chinese entrepreneurs, British colonial public servants, and
Indian and Chinese migrant laborers. Therefore, state actors chose to operate through
nodes of power organized around racial, religious, geographic, linguistic, and genderbased categories that enabled them to entrust management of fractious publics to
devolved networks of lower-level agents through legal pluralism (Benton 2002) and other
systems. This divide-and-rule methodology, by definition, precluded any kind of
universal or comprehensive programmatic approach 3 to resolving problems as each
nationality and class had to be managed separately. Thus, colonial governance
necessarily produced piecemeal social policies (Midgley 2011) that structurally required
individual subjects to seek aid for immediate problems through race-, class-, and genderspecific networks of social belonging. For instance, while British colonial administrators
determined the general direction of policy for so-called vagrants—they left funding and
implementation to separate institutions, each operating by different standards and rules
for people of varying race, class and, gender—resulting in widely divergent outcomes for
vagrants of different class backgrounds and nationalities, including European, American,
Indian, Chinese, and Japanese women, men, and children.
In metropoles, public agencies managed minimal social infrastructure through the
late nineteenth century, as they largely left matters of public welfare to private-sector

3

For instance, decrepit camps only existed for Indian and Chinese persons and, once inside, their prospects
for repatriation versus Malayan residence was largely left to the discretionary judgement of multiple
agencies. Moreover, no formal policy existed for European vagrants and, as one would suspect, those from
upper-class backgrounds were granted more liberty in determining their own outcomes.
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philanthropists. Japan’s civic agents—inspired by the Salvation Army and other
European reformists seeking to uplift and enlighten the “savage” urban poor—opened
free and low-cost shelters and employment referral centers in Tokyo’s most impoverished
districts. Before long, Japan’s public agencies began utilizing and working these private
institutions into public systems. This switch hinged on the growing efficacy of these
institutions and an ethos of benevolent state care in enforcing particular modes of social
and spatial organization advantageous to industrial capitalist development. Social
programs acted as a bond for keeping subjects “invested” in the status and economy of
the empire, while care became the basis upon which state agents could exercise power
over individual conduct.
Moreover, as social movements grew stronger over the early twentieth century,
state-provided assistance and, gradually, the expansion of democratic suffrage proved to
be valuable instruments for bringing marginalized groups—such as women, propertyless
men, outcaste burakumin 4, Chinese laborers, and Korean students—on board with the
empire’s agenda. That is, state and society were brought closer together within the
boundaries of an imperialist and limited democratic system while social programs tied
their security to the present and future of the polity. Hence, social and political rights and
protections—necessarily distributed in line with raced, gendered, and classed norms
facilitated specific modes of social organization—served as currencies for securing the
economic labor and political loyalty of individuals in the imperial/colonial state.

4

Burakumin are descendants of a feudal caste-based group associated with impure or tainted occupations,
and thus deemed (according to the feudal caste system) to exist outside of human society.
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Under this early twentieth century shift, policies conveyed new anxieties, which
emerged from desire to preserve and even elevate industrial economic growth (i.e.
idleness), a civil social order (i.e. deviance) and collective status or prestige (i.e. disgrace)
now that policy aims of integration rather than segregation ostensibly took precedence.
People grappling with social and economic insecurity—whether they were extracting
resources in colonies or underwriting industrial production in metropoles—were offered
limited protection and compensation for their contribution to empire, but these were
implicitly and explicitly calculated in line with raced, gendered, and classed systems of
valuations. This often opaque and irregular distribution of resources and power meant
that individuals were compelled to appeal to, or appease, only proximate nodes for
survival. Under such a structure, elites gained political legitimacy not from the public per
se, but from their relations with each other—in networks external to the public.
Consequently, these paternalistic systems of aid and compassion were necessarily
entangled with views and valuations that ultimately upheld and affirmed, if not
exacerbated, inequalities. Because government agencies calculated different standards of
care for people based on race, gender, class, and ability, social policy systems were
marked by inconsistencies in the quality of care delivered to communities, households,
and individuals both inside each of the metropole and the colony, as well as between
them.
After World War II, Japan and Malay(si)a were each occupied by Euro-American
imperial powers that guided them to independent governance, lasting through 1952 and
1957, respectively. Over this span, groundwork for a new international order was also
being laid. Within this order, headed largely by British and American experts, supportive
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welfare-state programs were deemed quintessential markers of advanced capitalist states.
The welfare state formed in Japan ensured most citizens relative housing and income
security through universal programs as well as specific aid disbursed to senior citizens,
persons with disabilities, and persons grappling with unemployment or illness. These
programs bolstered intergenerational security for normative households who, in turn,
became Japan’s middle class. However, because of the overall system’s sociallyconservative orientation, that is, built-in mechanisms for offering people different
standards of aid based on their nationality, gender, occupation, marital status, and so on,
particular groups such as resident (zainichi) Koreans, single mothers, formerly
incarcerated persons, casual laborers, and people experiencing homelessness were
rendered more vulnerable to exclusion from protection and, by extension, financial and
material insecurity.
Conversely, international experts argued that welfare-state systems were not
suited to former colonies as they believed them to be insufficiently developed socially,
economically, and politically. British experts in particular argued that, in an independent
Malaya, programs of social restraint and austerity carried greater feasibility, particularly
because they would preclude problems of public expense and mass dependency. Hence,
in postwar Malay(si)a, social insurance systems were organized into two tiers—both of
which preceded the postwar era. First there were credit and thrift societies, re-introduced
in 1948 for poor households in fishing, agriculture, and other domestic industries. These
organizations provided relative collective security, and tethered individuals to geographic
communities and industries. Second, from 1951, labor and social insurance systems
providing pension, health care, and other benefits and transfers brought intergenerational
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economic security to households with enough social, political, or economic capital to
enter middle- and upper-class jobs. Consequently, homelessness primarily affected
people thrust into gaps between these systems, like those who lost ties to community and
family or access to social insurance. Most often, however, this meant foreign-born or
rural-urban migrants who were injured, ageing, or displaced from rapidly modernizing
industries, as well as women, men, and children seeking an exit from community and/or
family.

My main fieldwork sites in Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur—that is, Sanya in Tokyo as
well as the area between Central Market and Chow Kit in Kuala Lumpur, each known as
slums throughout their histories—originally formed in the late nineteenth century as
spaces for displaced persons and migrant laborers to find employment and
accommodation. In the early twentieth century, as private- and public-sector agencies
began investing in infrastructure in these spaces, they developed into enclaves (Tokyo’s
yoseba and Kuala Lumpur’s Chinatown today) for marginalized laborers and, from the
perspective of government, served as a fixed point for organizing and managing labor
power.
These districts were not only disproportionately populated by people from
marginalized backgrounds—such as the burakumin, Korean, and Ryukyuan individuals
in Tokyo and Chinese and Javanese migrants in Kuala Lumpur—but also located next to
neighborhoods that historically served as sites for the spatial containment of other marked
communities. Hence, there has been layer on layer of stigma associated with these zones
and their residents for over a century, including associations with crime, vice, and
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poverty. The need for labor throughout wartime, interwar, and postwar eras guaranteed
the maintenance of these spaces for their productive and reproductive purposes—
especially because the geographic area itself was so well-linked into global capitalist
systems by virtue of its proximity to railway and waterway transportation hubs and
infrastructures.
From the late 1960s and 1970s, in Japan, yoseba spaces began to manifest more
visible suffering and death as the middle- and upper-classes increasingly distanced
themselves from city centers and urban life. At the same time, anxieties linking yoseba
neighborhoods and homeless people to filth, violence, and depravity bolstered policy
action designed to protect the public from physical proximity by ramping up policing in
the so-called slums of Sanya, and practices of taraimawashi (moving people along)
outside Sanya to ensure their containment within the yoseba. Public works programs and
emergency winter shelters were sustained, but other than these, imperatives of social care
appeared to ease with enhanced spatial management.
In Kuala Lumpur, however, care appears to have been somewhat ascendant. In
1965, the Parliament passed the Vagrants Act, which created an avenue for police to take
people into custody, not for the crimes of homelessness or begging but rather compulsory
(and indefinite) rehabilitation for the same provided in remotely located institutions run
by the welfare ministry. At this time, spatial interest in the city center due to increased
tourism and international events in the 1960s lead to increased action and calls for more
compassionate policy. Hence, in 1977, the Vagrants Act was revised to replace police
with welfare officers at the frontlines conducting “rescues” and renamed to the Destitute
Persons Act. Thus, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia’s most densely-populated labor market
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area during the Global North’s internationalization of industrial production—primarily to
Southeast Asia—the positive pursuit of social and spatial development went hand in
hand.

Homelessness Today and Related Policy Regimes
Japan's prewar trajectory as a rapidly industrializing capitalist economy—guided
by clear programmatic agendas for social and spatial governance—served as the
foundation for its postwar multi-level regulatory frameworks that established and
continued to guide formal land and labor markets over much of the twentieth century. By
this system, homelessness in Tokyo’s 23 wards is governed by over 50 agencies at
multiple levels 5, or approximately 20 agencies for each ward, spanning four levels of
government in line with roughly as many laws, policies, programs, and by-laws (Table 2,
left – example of Taito Ward).
In Kuala Lumpur, where post/colonial governance has been highly centralized,
autocratic, and responsive to external political-economic interests over domestic
democratically-determined ones, both the state and the public have relied on informal
markets to temper material insecurity—symptomatic of a lack of social policy. In the
eyes of the state, informal markets have served two purposes: 1) to ensure domestic labor
and land markets can flexibly respond to external demands and 2) to ensure social
burdens such as welfare, health care, and housing are largely managed through sociallyconservative—or so-called traditional—institutions such as "self-help", community and
5

Such as, with regard to welfare, the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare; the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government Bureau of Welfare and Insurance, the Special Ward Human Resources and Welfare Bureau,
and a ward-level Livelihood Assistance Office.
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family. Consequently, homelessness in Kuala Lumpur is governed by just three laws
under ten agencies, all federal (Table 2, right).
Agencies
involved in
development
and
enforcement
of
homelessnessspecific
policies, as
verified
through
interviews
(Legislative
not included)

Laws/Policies

Tokyo (Taito Ward)
Central
 Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
 Kanto Regional Development Bureau at
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and
Transportation
 National Police Agency
 Parks Association (Quasi-Government)
 Japan Sports Council (Quasi-Government)
Metropolitan
 Fire Department
 Welfare and Insurance Bureau
 Industrial Labor Bureau
 Urban Development Bureau
 Construction Bureau
 Metropolitan Police Department (governs
local station and sub-stations, e.g. Asakusa
Station, Nihontsudumi Police Box)
Special Ward
 Special Ward Human Resources and
Welfare Bureau
Ward/City
 Parks Office
 Livelihood Assistance Office
(Enforcement governed by Administrative
Procedures Act)
Central
 National Constitution
 Act concerning Special Measures to Assist
Self-Support among the Homeless Act
 Urban Parks Law
 Roads Act
 Livelihood Assistance Act
 Minor Offenses Act
 Administrative Subrogation Act
(Evictions)
Metropolitan
 Tokyo Metropolitan Park Ordinance
 Tokyo Metropolitan Park Ordinance
Enforcement Regulations
 Tokyo Metropolitan Implementation Plan
for Special Measures to Assist SelfSupport among the Homeless
 Sanya Measures
 Metropolitan Roadside Environmental
Cleanup Measures
Special Ward
 Special Ward Measures for Street Sleepers
Pilot Program
 Supportive Transition-to-Community-Life
Program (from 2020)
Taito Ward
 Ward Parks By-laws
 Children's Recreation & Sports Parks Bylaws

Kuala Lumpur
Federal
 Ministry of Women, Family, and
Community
 Federal Territories Department
 Ministry of Health
 National Police
 National Anti-Drugs Agency at the
Home Affairs Ministry
 Malaysian Volunteers' Department
(RELA) at the Home Affairs Ministry
 National Welfare Foundation (QuasiGovernment)
 Alam Flora (Government-linked)
Federal Territories (Kuala Lumpur)
 Social Welfare Department Kuala
Lumpur
 Kuala Lumpur City Hall
 Federal Territory Islamic Religious
Council (MAIWP)

(Limited by Government Proceedings Act)
Federal
 Federal Constitution
 Destitute Persons Act
 Penal Code
 Child Act

Table 2. Government agencies and laws used to govern street homelessness.
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Tokyo’s neoliberal policy regime
Homelessness surged in the 1980s and 1990s. At the time, it was perceived and
reported as being “new” because of how it increasingly affected blue- and white-collar
regular workers throughout Tokyo, rather than just the yoseba and its casual laborers as
before, due to mass retrenchment during recessionary corporate restructuring. Although
universal welfare is guaranteed to all via Article 25 of Japan's constitution, men—and
particularly those without families—were often deemed fit to work by street-level
bureaucrats and turned away at welfare offices for decades. In addition, many people also
opted to avoid the stigma of welfare by not applying for aid. Ultimately, over the 1990s,
homelessness increased tenfold in Tokyo alone.

Figure 1. Article on homelessness: Mr Vagrant, Sir, you can't stay here
Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, Sept 14, 1982
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In the mid- to late-1990s, the Tokyo Metropolitan government devoted itself to
the cause of urban renewal (toshi saisei) as a solution to Tokyo’s economic slump, often
attributed in part to its declining international status (Shima et al 2007; Waley 2007).
Early projects revolved around the development of urban underground thoroughfares,
often for commercial and recreational use in proximity to subway stations, where
swelling numbers of people experiencing homelessness already tended to congregate,
particularly during winter and summer months (see Figure 1). In response, local
governments extended patrols to clear underground spaces, but this, in turn, lead to a rise
in the number of settlements outdoors. As a result, ward and metropolitan governments
sought other solutions (Hasegawa 2005; Shima 1999; Tokubetsu-ku Kyōgikai 2017). In
2002, Japan's Diet passed the Self-Reliance Support Act formally recognizing the central
government's responsibility to address homelessness by bolstering self-support (Article 1)
and the authority of public agencies "to ensure appropriate use” of waterways, roads, and
parks (Article 11).
As metropolitan self-reliance shelters were inaugurated under the 2002 Act, state
agencies noted that people living in tents—approximately 60% of Tokyo’s homeless
population (Shinjuku Ward 2006)—were the least likely to enter temporary shelters and
work search programs because many had secure accommodation and an income stream
(Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare 2003; Shinjuku Ward 2006). The metropolitan
government, however, was determined to address “the lack of reduction in numbers of
tents, representing approximately 2400 persons 6" (Housing First Kenkyūkai 2013:16;
In Japanese, "heranai burū tento = koremade no torikumi ni kuwaete aratana torikumi ga hitsuyō na sō,
yaku 2400 nin."

6
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also TMG Construction Bureau 2004:30), which it did by launching its Transition-toCommunity-Life Program in 2004 targeting tents near commercial districts like Shinjuku,
Shibuya, Taito and Sumida (Figure 2). The Program began in Shinjuku, Tokyo's
administrative district, and brought an over 50% drop in numbers of tents between 20032004 7. Two-thirds (420 people) of people relocated received a two-year contract for
subsidized housing under the Program (Kubota 2009). People who refused metropolitan
aid were allowed to remain in parks, while government agencies introduced new security
measures to make any future re/settlement of abandoned park space impossible.
Number of homeless persons in Tokyo’s 23 wards according to an August 2005 survey

⓵②③④⑤⑥⑦⑧⑨⑩⑪⑫⑬⑭⑮⑯⑰⑱⑲⑳㉑㉒㉓
1. Chiyoda
2. Chuo
3. Minato
4. Shinjuku

5. Bunkyo
6. Taito
7. Sumida
8. Koto

9. Shinagawa
10. Meguro
11. Ota
12. Setagaya

13. Shibuya
14. Nakano
15. Suginami
16. Toshima

17. Kita
18. Arakawa
19. Itabashi
20. Nerima

21. Adachi
22. Katsushika
23. Edogawa

Figure 2. Results of 2005 survey showing highest concentrations of homelessness.
Source: Shinjuku Ward (2006:11) (Translated by author)

Over this same span, ward governments also adopted more expedient means of
clearing open spaces. Following September 11, 2001, government agencies began
restricting public access to parks and facilities, underscoring security concerns, and often
7

From 1102 to 463 tents according to Shinjuku Ward (2006:6).
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installing enclosures, locks, and cameras after evicting encampments (Haraguchi 2016;
Hayashi 2015; Murota 2017; Sasanuma 2008). Similarly, after the 2011 Tohoku
Earthquake, Shibuya and other ward offices began closing public spaces ostensibly for
earthquake-proofing and structural upgrades, thus justifying additional evictions
(Shimokawa 2013). In 2013, once Tokyo won its bid for the 2020 Olympics, pressure to
commodify and improve Tokyo's image has reached a fevered pitch. As part of this,
Japan's central government and the International Olympics Committee have become
embroiled in a lawsuit after the former pushed through an unlawful eviction of just under
10 people from Meiji Park in January 2016. Government surveys indicate that street
homelessness in Tokyo is at an all-time low, a data point often credited to welfare
measures 8. Yet, security measures have also comprised a sizeable portion of work
undertaken, with their own unique effects. In Taito Ward, for example, ward level
officers from the Park and Welfare Offices conduct 156 and 48 patrols, respectively, each
year with authority to engage people experiencing homelessness 9.

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
The 1980s and 1990s were decades of profound transformation. Prime Minister
Mahathir took charge of the capital as part of his plans to transform Malaysia into a firstworld economy while also pushing neoliberal change including deregulation, financial
liberalization, public spending cuts, and “mega-projects” to attract global finance. As

8

Such data excludes, however, rising numbers of "internet café refugees" or unsheltered persons sleeping
in business establishments like restaurants, saunas, and internet cafes.

9

Email correspondence with Officer Kurita of the Parks Office at the Taito Ward Urban Renewal Bureau
(Taitō-ku Toshi-Dzukuri-bu Kōen-ka) October 18, 2018
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manufacturing and service industries expanded rapidly, demand for labor grew in the
capital, which drove in-migration from East and West Malaysia and beyond. Government
agencies managed pressure on the capital by more stringently regulating urban poor
communities including so-called vagrants and beggars who, according to the welfare
minister, “mak[e] a nuisance of themselves [so we must] round them up and put them in
rehabilitation centres” (Minister orders checks 1996). To maximize efficiency, the Kuala
Lumpur Social Welfare Department began incorporating officers from the National AntiDrug Agency, the Immigration Bureau, and police forces into its anti-vagrancy
operations (see Figure 3), thereby forming multi-agency enforcement teams.
Concurrently, as Malaysia's middle class grew, so did the number of CSOs and their
willingness to challenge state policies. One early critic noted, “authorities say the
operations will continue until the city is free of its homeless people… [but a] true
solution requires a far greater social undertaking.” (Ramlan 1993)

Figure 3. Newspaper article on Operasi Kutu Rayau, or vagrant operations.
Source: The Star, November 11, 1993.
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In 2010, Prime Minister Najib announced the launch of one such social
undertaking using federal funds: a pilot transitional “home for the homeless”, according
to government and press materials. Once established, this shelter—named Anjung
Singgah—was entrusted by the federal government to the National Welfare Foundation, a
quasi-governmental organization chaired by the Minister of Women. While federal
funding continued through 2013, covering the launch of six new Anjung Singgah
facilities nationally, it formally remained a one-off allocation renewed only intermittently
in years since. However, state-orchestrated fanfare surrounding Anjung Singgah starkly
contrasts the discreet federal expansion of DPA detention infrastructure under the
Ministry of Women, Family, and Community Development. Between 2010 and 2014, the
Ministry opened two new rehabilitation centers and instituted statutory and organizational
reforms bringing DPA enforcement to more closely resemble law-and-order models (i.e.
policing with powers of arrest). When federal agencies announced new stringent
regulations in 2014, protest from CSOs forced them to backtrack 10 and, instead, develop
plans for two new transitional shelters—opened in 2016 and 2017—that include
“integrated” CSOs offering meals, clothing, medical care and other aid on-site.
While Anjung Singgah is still administered under the National Welfare
Foundation, KL’s two new facilities have been handed over to Kuala Lumpur City Hall,
the new face of homelessness management. City Hall also patrols the River of Life
district and other tourist areas to ensure that, in their words homelessness does not remain

10

Although clearance measures were indeed implemented, albeit at a smaller scale than initially planned.
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"unchecked… with regards to the image of the capital city" 11. Notably, DPA operations
have doubled nationally between 2013 – 2017 12. These include, since 2016, new antibegging campaigns and anti-begging operations that structurally replicate multi-agency
operations used to tackle homelessness since the 1980s. As in Tokyo, state duties vis-avis welfare are being increasingly delegated to CSOs, private sector actors, and locallevel authorities, while non-welfare agents take up less touted positions as foot soldiers
directly engaging people as part of public order interventions.
In light of these and other changes over the last several decades in each of Tokyo
and Kuala Lumpur, I answer the following questions:


How have these changes impacted people experiencing homelessness?



What do they say about the past and present formation of homelessness
policy?

Narrative Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation explores the institutional framework and street-level impacts of
homelessness regulation in Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur from the mid-nineteenth century to
the present, while considering how global historical political-economic shifts have
shaped contemporary policies in each context. In Chapter 1, I provide an outline of
literature on governance and policies related to social and spatial control as well as
homelessness across the modern era. I also provide an overview of my methodology for

Email correspondence with the Policy Planning Division at the Ministry of Federal Territories’
Town Planning Section, June 3, 2019.
11

12

Moreover, numbers nearly sextupled in KL in 2017 from 348 to 2310 persons (Jabatan Kebajikan
Masyarakat 2018:132, 2017:136)
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dissertation research. Chapters 2 and 3 detail the locally-situated ways in which
homelessness has been (re)constructed as a problem of social and spatial disorder across
modern history, ostensibly threatening spiritual and material modernity, defined
differently across Kuala Lumpur’s post/colonial (Chapter 2) and Tokyo’s post/imperial
(Chapter 3) context. This policy construction upholds what I identify in Chapter 3 as the
legacy of vagrancy law: a delegitimization of homelessness across multiple policy fields,
rendering it grounds for criminalization, eviction, public assistance disqualification, and
political disenfranchisement. Chapters 4 and 5 are ethnographic chapters offering insight
into how this and other imperial legacies shape contemporary policy governing street
homelessness (Chapter 4) and related institutions of labor, welfare, and care (Chapter 5).
Specific material explored in each chapter is as follows.
In Chapter 1, I introduce in a literature review how particular modes of social and
spatial organization have been bound up in policy ideas and institutions over the course
of modern capitalist expansion as mechanisms for preserving the relative privilege of
particular people. In Chapter 2, I review from a global historical perspective the
regulation of homelessness in modern Kuala Lumpur (1970s-2018). Therein, I identify
commonalities and differences between Malay(si)an paradigms of regulation and those
commonly attributed to Global North contexts. In Chapter 3, I similarly review the
regulation of homelessness in modern Tokyo (1868-2019) while also identifying the form
and effect of imperial formations, or uneven relations of power, in homelessness-related
policy across its history. In Chapter 4, I explore the role of compassionate actors, that is,
the interest of public- and private-sector organizations in the neoliberal-era adoption of
compassionate rhetoric and supportive policies surrounding the socio-spatial governance
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of street homelessness in both cities. Here, in addition to highlighting each city’s
changing policy landscapes, I also explore enhanced CSO participation in policy
processes and its implications for democracy. In Chapter 5, I explore the social and
geographic im/mobilities experienced by people who enter institutions of welfare, labor,
and care and the relation of these im/mobilities to the political and economic interests of
middle- and upper-class organizations and interests. Last, in my concluding chapter, I
explore the significance of these findings to underscore that a democratic, humane
solution would require full legalization and public recognition of homelessness as not an
aberration but an unexceptional variation in modern distributions of wealth and power.

Value of Research – Legacies and Democracy
By illuminating how past trajectories of homelessness regulation have shaped
contemporary regimes and their street-level impacts using the cases of Tokyo and Kuala
Lumpur, this dissertation offers insight into policy ideas, institutions, and processes of
diffusion that are of critical importance for understanding contemporary regulation
globally—particularly in light of shared global histories and related policy networks.
More specifically, I identify legacies of imperial and colonial politico-legal cultures in
contemporary policy configurations and processes that not only reproduce structural
inequalities but also systematically undermine democracy.
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CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
Social and Spatial Order in Global History
Homelessness has long been a matter of distinct state concern. At the foundation
of homelessness regulation historically and today is anti-vagrancy law, or legal statutes
that emerged in mid-fourteenth century Europe to control the movement of people
uprooted by expanding systems of private property. This “bloody legislation against
vagabondage” (Marx and Engels 1996:732) did not assume a position of major
importance 13 until traditional European economies transitioned into wholly capitalist
ones at the turn of the sixteenth century. This shift began with England’s Enclosure
Movement, or the consolidation of open fields into private holdings, which occurred
alongside a new boom in industry and the proliferation of roadways facilitating migration
and commercial exchange (Beier 1986; Kiddey 2017). Because modern capitalist systems
have necessarily triggered profound social and spatial effects through expropriation—or,
land seizure and mass dispossession—vagrancy regulation historically served as a crucial
instrument for protecting capitalist territories against threats posed by “idle” and
“wandering” persons. The enforcement of vagrancy regulation—intended to suppress
social and spatial disorder—continued as industrial capitalist systems were extended
throughout Europe and much of the world over the next five centuries of colonial and
imperial expansion and governance.

13

For more on debates regarding the role of the Enclosure in the formation of modern capitalist systems,
see Lazonick, W (1974) Karl Marx and Enclosures in England. Review of Radical Political Economics
6(2):1-59.
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History is not linear and, similarly, the effects of multiple centuries of capitalist
globalization have been neither singular nor homogenous. Although globalization is often
characterized as a “homogenizing” or “flattening” (Friedman 2005) force—one presumed
to have at its endpoint the ubiquity of Western capitalist modernity (Krishnaswamy
2008)—its course has been far more complicated, and outcomes tend to produce
divergences, conflicts, and contradictions as often as they unify. In the following
chapters, I look at modern homelessness regulation in Tokyo, Japan and Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, from the integration of each city into the world economic system in the midnineteenth century to the present. While vagrancy laws mark the early decades of
capitalist transformation—and remain in force to this day—their role and effects have
changed, as have related ideas and institutions still bound into the fabric of our political,
economic, and social lives (Garland 1985; Lowe 2015; Stoler 2008). Although I discuss
laws, organizations, and practices that may technically exist in both cities, or one city
across time, (including vagrancy laws, welfare departments, and outreach patrols) there
should be no presumption that any single instance is substantively or effectually the same
as another. Across time and space, the ideas and institutions underlying policy
infrastructure carry within them multiple legacies of the global and local past as well as
reflections of demands imposed by the present (Bhabha 1984; Comaroff and Comaroff
2006; Go 2008; Halperin 2015; Stoler 2006, 2008).
For much of its global history, homelessness regulation has been designed
primarily to remedy “what officials saw as the disintegration of social order at the hands
of urban life and capitalism” (Burton and Ocobock 2008:271). In this dissertation, I aim
to trace varied forms of regulation across generations of political economic change in—
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and beyond—each city from the mid-nineteenth century to the present (2019). As I do so,
I explore policy ideas and institutions that have served as mechanisms for preserving
social and spatial order and, by extension, the relative privilege of elite groups by: a)
politically and economically limiting the powers of people experiencing homelessness to
ensure, b) conformity to continually-shifting-yet-rigid social divisions of labor and
welfare, as well as conformity to the spatial organization of dominant modes of capitalist
growth.

The Role of Social Science
A sociological study of global history must begin with recognizing how sociology
itself has emerged from, and been complicit in, the same systems and networks that
propagated imperial rule globally. Social sciences as we understand them today 14 took
shape over the course of nineteenth century imperialist projects driven by the “great
powers” of Europe and the United States. The political and economic ambitions of these
empires produced demand for knowledge of social, cultural, and geographic difference as
captured in studies of language, religion, social and economic organization, and natural
environment (Connell 2007). Similarly, principles of objectivity, self-discipline, and
epistemic virtue—each heralded by the mid-nineteenth century as essential for true
scientific inquiry—necessarily ensured that science itself could only be conducted by the
so-called “civilized” or “modern” people who were not objects of study and sustained

14

This is not to say that all of science itself is inherently Eurocentric. Sciences developed from other
paradigms have, of course, co-existed and traveled continents for centuries. As Bhambra (2010) explains,
scholarship that became the foundation of modern Eurocentric science merely produced the narratives and
other structures of knowledge that produced and shaped the Eurocentrism itself.
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distance from objects of study; as such, they were wholly invested in the superiority and
centrality of Western civilization (Blaut 1970; Daston and Galison 2007). For this reason,
scientific methods, theories, practice, and other fundamentals of “objective” knowledge
have, in fact, been built from Eurocentric biases (Bhambra 2010; Steinmetz 2013)
intended to justify particular modes of social, political, and economic domination through
the proliferation of normative ideas and institutions (e.g. Connell 1997; Magubane 2005).

At the turn of the twentieth century, sociology was inextricably intertwined with
the “social turn” of imperialism, by which colonial agencies began advancing social
research 15 to “uplift” colonial populations through social “development” (Aspengren
2013; Duffield and Hewitt 2013). In the post-war era, this was replaced with the idea of
modernization, which fundamentally held that societies could be guided along a linear
trajectory from an impoverished and weak “traditional” state to a free and affluent
“modern” state, based on evolutionist notions of social progress that upheld capitalist
industrial societies as an ideal. As modernization theory developed throughout the 1950s
and 1960s, its proponents generally took a “positive view of the imperial legacy”
(Midgley 2011:2) as it was presumed to have provided former colonies with
advantageous legal, educational, and administrative infrastructure for rational governance
and economic growth. Modernization theory quickly proved influential because it was
essentially an extension of the sociology that had already long-served as a “methodology
and an ideational framework for action-oriented policy” in colonial development globally

15

Only in particular colonies, rather than uniformly.
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(Aspengren 2013:47; Duffield and Hewitt 2013). Thus, discourse of “uplift” and social
reform became in the post-war era “the discourse of development” (Escobar 1995).
In recent decades, postcolonial studies have transformed social sciences and
humanities by calling attention to Eurocentricism and related normative bias in
foundational ideas, institutions, practices, and norms while offering critical approaches to
identifying these in enduring systems of Western dominance. Said’s Orientalism offered
a ground-breaking introduction to the ways in which Eurocentricism pervades popular
and scientific knowledge and creates Orientalist ideas that enable people in positions of
power “to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily,
ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively” (Kapoor 2008; Said 1977:12). Similarly,
Mbembe (2001) underscores that embedded cultural biases such as these, entangled in
political and economic ideas and institutions, have facilitated the propagation of uneven
relations of power after decolonization.
Postcolonial theory underscores how culture and society, including structures and
relations, are dialectically shaped from the “ground up” through cooperation, opposition,
negotiation, and subversion amongst actors. Bhabha (1984) identifies binary oppositions
inflecting modern global culture—such as ideas of East and West, lazy and productive,
objective and subjective, or deviant and proper—as uniquely fertile. Such binaries, he
explains, serve to organize colonizing and colonized actors into discrete categories of
difference while also discounting any convergence or overlap while, at the same time,
dialectical interactions between parties necessarily produce new hybrids. Social science
as it stands today still tends to distill objects, knowledge, and events into binaristic
categories and, to the extent that we perpetuate this tradition, we become complicit in
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cloaking structures that justify inequalities by affirming the strength and glory of
modernity (e.g. law and order), affirming the weakness of what opposes it (e.g. anarchy),
and erasing the colonial wounds (e.g. genocide) (Mignolo and Tlostanova 2008).
However, by “decentering” normative narratives and practices that underpin traditional
science, we may make space for plurality—and better scholarship (Chakrabarty 2000).
Scholars working in feminist, critical race, queer, (dis)ability and intersectional
theory also share similar aims of decentering dominant discourses to better recognize and
incorporate plurality. Such scholarship complicates and debunks notions of the universal
subject (i.e. “the worker”) and universal experience (e.g. marriage, or poverty), among
other things, by highlighting how social, political, and economic processes are shaped by
the socially-constructed roles assigned to individuals and, by extension, their access to
resources and power. Willse (2015:170) gets at the heart of such analysis as he states that,
“It is not true that ‘anyone’ could be homeless. Far from it”. Rather, he notes that
colonialism and related traditions of biased thought and practice in American society
have produced an implicit social truth of the disposability of particular “surplus”
populations. Willse (2015:30) notes that to take accurate account of such processes, we
do not need to “add…back in” processes of racism and exclusion to our investigations
because “they are there already, submerged under universalist accounts…we [must] draw
them back forward.”
In this dissertation, I aim to make explicit the raced, gendered, classed, and
otherwise biased forces of exclusion and their effects so as to include, rather than
passively discount or omit, variation in individual experience with homelessness and
related policy. Hence, in the following chapters, I aim to elaborate experiences,
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processes, and phenomena typically subject to exclusion based on their non-normative
“difference”, including by methodologically embracing plurality. For example, this can
be seen in my choice to conduct a global historical analysis of two cities of differential
developmental status—taking each as “ordinary cities” (J Robinson 2011)—as well as in
exploring the relevance of diverse personal backgrounds, circumstances, and experiences,
without seeking representative cases or generalizeable findings.

The Neoliberal Present
Sociological and geographical literature on neoliberal-era homelessness
regulation tends to focus on the mechanisms and impacts of punitive and supportive
tendencies in policy—often organized into binaristic categories. This would include the
expansion of public space laws and security measures in recent decades, as epitomized by
Smith’s (1996) “revanchist city”, or the promise of more compassionate responses in
social policy, exemplified by the popularization of Housing First models and more vocal
movements for rights. This focus is rooted in what Garland (1985, 2001) has termed a
“punitive turn” in governance in advanced capitalist countries like the US, characterized
as a retreat from universalist liberal principles and welfare-state systems towards “penal
treatment of urban marginality” (Wacquant 2009:21). While critical scholarship on
homelessness regulation has primarily adopted the punitive thesis (e.g. Amster 2003;
Haraguchi 2016; Mitchell 2001), growing scholarship has directed interest in the
interplay between punitive, supportive, and ambivalent strains (DeVerteuil 2006, 2012;
Laurenson and Collins 2007; Marr 2015; Murphy 2009), also recognized by Garland
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(1985) in his conception of punitive welfarism. DeVerteuil, Mays, and von Mahs (2009)
use the framework of “poverty management” (Wolch and DeVerteuil 2001) as a vessel to
capture these various approaches in policy, and argue that a highly nuanced homeless
regime birthed at the turn of the twenty-first century has rendered homeless spaces more
complex. Few studies, however, have mapped complexities across time.
Complexity as expressed through punitive, supportive, and ambivalent tendencies
in policy is visible alongside a global wave of re-urbanization that, as raised in Smith’s
(1996) work on revanchism, displaces working class and poor residents. Smith
(2002:446) indicates that contemporary gentrification, unlike that of Glass’s (1964) era,
has become generalized as a new global urban strategy “ambitiously and scrupulously
planned” and enacted through the collaborative efforts of private and public actors who
have produced a dangerous neoliberal urbanism that “mobilizes individual property
claims via a market lubricated by state donations.” Recent literature on Japan draws
attention to similar gentrification processes that incentivize exclusion of homeless
persons from public spaces and the reconstruction of yoseba neighborhoods (Haraguchi
2016). In Malaysia, too, state involvement in urbanization processes and exclusionary
pressures targeting urban poor communities—especially in Kuala Lumpur—have been
the subject of sustained scholarly interest since the 1990s (Bunnell 1999, 2002; Bunnell
and Nah 2004; Lepawsky and Jubilado 2014; Sabri and Yukuup 2008). In order to better
understand relationship of homelessness regulation to urban re/development in each of
Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur, I review the formation of current policy using archival and
ethnographic data and a global historical view of policy mobilities (Kennedy 2016;
McCann 2011; Peck 2003, 2011).

45

Although neoliberal restructuring does play a large role in molding contemporary
events, attention to its effects should not diminish our ability to recognize the legacies, or
vestiges, of the past. Sparks (2012:1512) and Gowan (2010) offer rich illustration of how
historically entrenched ideas of “homeless deviance and dependence work alongside and
through” neoliberal policies in a “mutually constitutive” relationship. Such works show
that contemporary state forms and governance are far from “historically unprecedented”
(Halperin 2015: 69) but, instead, extend from past structures, practices, and ideas.
However, the focus of leading scholarship tends to center on affluent, global North cities
(Davis 2005) without considering relations to “'other' cities in 'other' places” (Oncu and
Weyland 1997) or “ordinary cities” traversing the same networks (J Robinson 2006).
This spatial and temporal myopia is indicative of imperial legacies that uphold and
reinforce Euro-Americentric systems of knowledge, social practice, and cultural
representation as paragons of truth and conventionality (Blaut 1970).
Additionally, considering the role of empire, and especially recent forms of EuroAmerican imperialism, in connecting much of the globe historically, greater attention is
due to these “complex, multiple, and multi-directional cross-border colonial processes,
circuits and formations” (Patil 2017:143) and their non-neutral lasting effects (Bhambra
2010) across multiple regions and scales. Therefore, I apply postcolonial theory to social
science methods in an effort to decolonize Eurocentric paradigms by resisting traditional
classification processes and “globalize” social (Go 2016) and spatial (J Robinson 2011)
inquiry. As described above, this involves thinking across different experiences and
allowing for pluralities (J Robinson 2011), rather than adopting essentialist, hierarchical
constructs. Therefore, as I look at the global historical course of homelessness regulation
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in and across both cities, I also aim to make visible the webbed connectivities (Patil
2017) shaping regulatory regimes across time and space. I argue that ways of thinking
about homelessness in policy and society—including the use of care and control—
emerge from and are essential to imperial formations (Stoler 2008), defined as
asymmetrical relations of power that, in homelessness regulation, propagate antidemocratic governance of people and places deemed disorderly.

Methods
In Colonialism in Question, Frederick Cooper (2005:4) raises the ethical dilemma
of: “How can one study colonial societies, keeping in mind—but not being paralyzed
by—the fact that the tools of analysis we use emerged from the history we are trying to
examine”. I introduce this dilemma here because it also pervades research on
homelessness—and particularly that relating to government intervention—because, by
the turn of the twentieth century, knowledge and practices that emerged from governance
of colonial territories was being applied to the management of poverty by public and
private sector welfare agents in metropoles. For instance, as William Booth explained in
the case of London, the poor were the “savages” of the “urban jungle” (McLaughlin
2000). This is to say that policies historically designed to address homelessness—and
particularly those seeking to uplift and enlighten people through social work—emerged
as technologies for managing populations perceived much like colonies were: incapable
of self-governance.
Mignolo and Tlostanova (2008:112)—after positing that modern achievements
necessarily engender colonial wounds—identify mechanisms in Eurocentric science
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designed to create ignorance by glorifying modernity and its perceived progress, on the
one hand, while overshadowing—or even erasing—colonial wounds (i.e. contradictory or
uncomfortable truths) (Bhabha 1984; Cooper 2005; Halperin 2015), on the other. This is
captured, to give a basic example, in rhetoric of how Great Britain introduced law and
order to its colonies. Homelessness itself—in the context of Eurocentric science—has
long been conceptually understood as a mark of social and spatial disorder. So, how does
one challenge Eurocentric conceptions of homelessness—those that deliberately define it
as a hindrance to a glorified social and spatial order achieved under modernity—while
also making visible the colonial wounds that these conceptions of order hide? How could
we best understand the ideas and institutions we have for managing homelessness as an
extension of our imperial and colonial pasts, and a product of our contemporary global
political economy and culture? How could understanding homelessness and related
policies in this way improve our systems for addressing homelessness in Kuala Lumpur
and Tokyo, or Malaysia and Japan, or other “ordinary cities” globally today?
Moreover, under contemporary neoliberalism in Malaysia and Japan, depressed
wages, rising costs of living, and increased responsibilization of individuals and families
have propelled larger numbers of people into socioeconomic precarity and homelessness.
Yet, the fundamental conception of what homelessness is and how it ought to be
addressed has changed only marginally over the last 150 years. Fundamentally, welfare
policies, in particular, seek to adapt people to capitalist markets—by encouraging new
labor skills, “motivating” workforce participation, ensuring financial literacy and proper
household formation, as well as “enlightened” embrace of modern responsibilities. In my
research, I will illustrate how current trends in homelessness policy tap into historically
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established institutional arrangements and their ideational underpinnings, all-the-while
driving unique policy variations and street-level experiences in Kuala Lumpur and
Tokyo.

Research objectives
As I explore shifts in the configuration of homelessness regulation in Kuala
Lumpur and Tokyo, I am also mindful of the relation of change from the mid-nineteenth
century on to global governance networks and strategies. In conducting such research, I
take into account the influence of ideas, institutions, and uneven power relations at the
transnational scale, and thus aim to bolster both policy scholarship and urban scholarship
“at a world scale” (J Robinson 2011: 1) by considering city strategies beyond EuroAmerican contexts. The field of policy mobilities—albeit concentrated on contemporary
neoliberal matters—takes a similar approach to studying agents and processes that
produce ‘local globalness’ (McCann 2011) in policy at any given site. However, here too
scholarly attention is focused on liberal welfarist structures and Euro-Americentric
frames. Ananya Roy (Baker et al 2016) makes the point that, because of differences in
structures across First and Third World states, comparative policy studies must
incorporate more historical analysis for illustrating the shifting geographies of each
region’s statecraft. Without templates of prior state forms and functions, she explains, we
cannot fully gauge forces transforming governance. Hence, understanding neoliberal
transformation requires consideration of prior assemblages of governance to measure
policy uptake on its own terms (Bunnell 2015).
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In my dissertation, I achieve this through examination of three central questions:


What idea and institutions shape policy development and how does their
application differ across post/metropolitan and post/colonial contexts?



What are past and present street-level impacts of such policies, particularly on
persons experiencing homelessness?



What implications do policy structures have for individual and collective human
securities?

I investigate and answer these questions using global historical and ethnographic research
methods including archival ethnography, participant observation, interviews, historical
process-tracing, and action research as described below.

Research design and methods
To answer the above questions while achieving my stated objectives, I look at the
production of homelessness and its regulation in each country by adopting postcolonial
concern for understanding structures through subjects (Bhabha 1984; Mbembe 2001),
including a view of the city as a subject of history. At the same time, I adopt global
historical methods for analyzing processes, policies, and urban environments (read:
cities) as constructed on their own localized terms while acknowledging wider global
conditions (Bhambra 2010) and the global field (Go 2008) influencing political,
economic, and cultural changes. This includes seeking “connected histories” (Bhambra
2010; Chakrabarty 2000; Patil 2017) that trace the links between imperial and colonial
era formations and their re-formations as mediated by global and transnational circuits.
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Research design and methods involve interdisciplinarity to facilitate study of processes
that are simultaneously historical yet also contemporary, global yet also local,
transnational yet also socio-spatially-specific, social yet also political-economic,
scientific yet also cultural, and so forth.
Archival research is the foundational component of my research design. The
archives are an important source for data; archival records offer views into past
knowledge—and knowledge production—pertaining to homelessness and its regulation. I
adopt an ethnographic approach to archival research that involves methods of treating the
“archive as subject” (Stoler 2002) by reflecting as I read material both with and against
the grain (Stoler 2009). Data have been collected from materials ranging from policy
documents, legislative debates, agency reports, non-public communications, and
demographic surveys. An ethnographic approach supplements “hard” data on specific
policy-related laws, practices, and institutions found in such materials with the “soft”
context of values, beliefs, and ideas that cohere these artifacts and practices into a
working system. The combined use of descriptive and inferential data in my qualitative
analysis of archival materials fits well with process tracing methods (Jacobs 2015) that I
adopt in later stages. Archival research sites include the University of Malaya Law
Library and the Malaysian National Archives in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; the National
Archives of Singapore and the Singapore National Library in Singapore; and the National
Archives, National Diet Library, and Metropolitan Archives in Tokyo, Japan.
After completing archival research, I engaged in twelve months of participant
observation, spending six months in each of Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur. In each city, I
stayed in rooms neighboring areas where homelessness was historically concentrated: in
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the Sanya area in Tokyo and Chinatown in Kuala Lumpur. My research plans were
shaped by an awareness of ethical questions regarding who benefits from research on
homelessness and the risk of perpetuating social inequalities, exploiting informants, or
exacerbating harm to marginal groups as a researcher (e.g. Borchard 2012). Scholarly
works on homelessness that document social processes or lived experiences may not
necessarily beget significant change to, or broaden public knowledge of, the same
processes and conditions (Lyon-Callo 2012). For this reason, I took inspiration from
action research methods (Stringer 2014) and incorporated into ethnographic fieldwork the
use of collaborative inquiry sessions designed to facilitate more open, collaborative
engagement with people experiencing homelessness. By this design, I aimed to more
broadly contribute to generation of knowledge beneficial to not only my own research,
but also to others’ strategies and lives.
My methods for collecting data relating to questions on ideational and
institutional constructs, street-level policy impacts, and implications for human securities
were: participant observation, collaborative inquiry, and semi-structured interviews. For
participant observation, my primary aim was to examine the interface between policy,
practice, and policy impacts on people’s daily lives. I adopted Snow and Anderson’s
(1987) ethnographic “perspectives of action” and “perspectives in action” as frames for
ethnographic data collection. “Perspectives in action,” refers to individual views of and
responses to government policy at the time that interactions with officers and artifacts
occur. I would “go along” (Kusenbach 2003) with interviewees and stay outdoors to
observe both daytime and night-time policy enforcement. As interviewees engaged
officers, artifacts, and "political technologies" (Shore and Wright 1997), I took notes on
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their “perspectives in action”. I then expanded on this data by probing interviewees’ postfactum reflections, or “perspectives of action” in interviews and collaborative inquiry
sessions (outlined below). Data from interviews and field notes were organized in an
NVivo project with archival and documentary data and coded to classify ideational and
institutional bases in policy and their impacts.
Collaborative inquiry is a participatory activity designed to bring people into the
inquiry process through the creation of spaces for sharing and generating multiple forms
of knowledge, including that experiential, presentational, propositional, and practical
(Reason 2006 2014). I arranged small (approx. 3-10 persons) “open-air” collaborative
inquiry sessions, usually facilitated by one or two participant informants. Facilitators
guided the exchange of information or questions, relating to research themes as I shared
or otherwise made my own archival and ethnographic findings available. Sessions were
meant to explore participant perspectives on policy, policy impacts, state objectives, and
interactions with state agencies and civil servants. This forum expanded opportunity for
the emergence of new knowledge and ideas relating to policy and its relationship to local
and global political, economic, social, and cultural factors.
I also conducted semi-structured interviews with public- and civic-sector policy
agents as well as persons experiencing homelessness in each country. In Japan I
interviewed government officers responsible for national-, metropolitan-, and ward-level
policy formation and implementation about contemporary policy and its effects. This
included officers from the Taito Ward Urban Planning and Parks Section, the Taito Ward
Welfare Office, the Shibuya Ward Parks and Greenery Section, the Shibuya Ward
Council, the Tokyo Metropolitan Bureau of Construction, the Tokyo Metropolitan
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Bureau of Welfare and Insurance, and two separate offices within the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism’s Bureau of Kanto Regional Development. In
Kuala Lumpur, I interviewed officers from the Ministry of Women, Family, and
Community Development’s Policy Division and Enforcement Division, as well as
officers from Kuala Lumpur City Hall—one of whom provided me with a tour of Pusat
Transit. In interviewing people with experience of homelessness, I utilized theoretical
sampling (Glaser and Strauss 1967) to seek differences in experience by ethnicity,
gender, age, and other dimensions of identity to the best of my ability. I interviewed 20
people with experience of homelessness at each site and collaborated with local partners
in Kuala Lumpur to secure interpretation for Malay- and Chinese-language interviews
and transcriptions.

Analysis
For analysis, borrowing from comparative historical methods, I conducted a withincase historical analysis of each city to trace the embeddedness of certain historical
practices in the construction and enactment of policy today. I began with a review of
historical data, organized according to era and policy system. Because government
records and archival resources emerge from ambiguous processes and power relations
that “[contain, obscure, or deny] certain historical truths” (Trundle and Kaplonski
2011:409), I adopted Stoler’s (2009) critical approach to qualitative content. That is, I
read materials both with and against the grain to best appreciate and scrutinize
documented claims for insight into the myriad values, beliefs, pressures, and ideas that
animated working systems. I primarily utilized Fingfeld-Connett’s (2014) methodology
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for qualitative systematic review as I concentrated on policy changes over time, and then
used process tracing (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Jacobs 2015) to infer key
mechanisms in the ideational and institutional transformation of homelessness regulation.
This included processes of selecting and coding data, memoing, diagramming, and
reflection. For instance, I identified regulatory systems by first selecting and sorting data
on pertinent institutions, laws, and practices and then conceptualizing policy structures in
visual diagrams. Then, I used historical process-tracing to examine key mechanisms in
and outcomes of street homelessness interventions across public service agencies.
After within-case historical analysis, I extended inductive study to include
analysis of cross-case variation (Lange 2013; Jacobs 2015) and identified key
mechanisms and patterns across both countries while also concentrating on contemporary
policy and related ethnographic data. I began by reviewing field notes and transcribed
interviews to identify codes that offer answers to my research questions regarding:
ideational and institutional constructs, street-level impacts, and implications for human
securities. After coding ethnographic data, I considered it together with historical data in
cross-case analysis to identify: 1) the relative trajectory of key ideas, institutions, and
impacts across both countries; 2) the relationship of binational convergences and
divergences in policy and practice to local and global factors, and 3) which continuities
across policy trajectories are inherent to capitalist socio-spatial regulation functions.
Insights from this analysis were then organized thematically and presented according to
contemporary policy impacts, namely, within Kuala Lumpur (Chapter 2) and Tokyo
(Chapter 3) as well as across public spaces (Chapter 4) and social institutions (Chapter 5).
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My analysis of policy has revolved around key themes that surface repeatedly
throughout this dissertation. I introduce the significance of and foundational scholarship
on these themes, as relates to the global history of homelessness regulation, below.

The Roots of Policy
Difference
Just as extraordinary poverty was produced from the spread of industrial
capitalism throughout Europe—due to expropriation, on the one hand, and the retraction
of state systems for poor relief, on the other (Halperin 2004; McLaughlin 2000; C
Robinson 1983)—so it was also produced from imperialist territorial expansion in the
nineteenth century. For example, England’s gradual colonization of Ireland gave rise to
racialized relations between the two that surged as “Ireland [was] transformed into a
dependent sector of the English economy” by the turn of the nineteenth century (C
Robinson 1983:38). The political and economic powers that rested with colonizers
accorded favor to people who were valued more highly under Britain’s social order. This
uneven balance of power and opportunity shaped the formation of Ireland’s industries,
legal systems, labor markets and urban infrastructure including housing and health care
facilities. As industrial capitalism went global over the course of the nineteenth century
such imbalances between imperial (metropolitan) and colonial actors were recreated at
the global scale.
The spread of capitalism through Europe via expanding intra-regional exchange
was accompanied by the formation of states that entailed drawing boundaries between not
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only territories, but also people. Elite groups expanded their market economies by linking
horizontally with outside regions rather than developing local markets. This enabled elite
groups to gain wealth through inter-regional trade while also expanding their political
reach and power as political participation was contingent on wealth itself (Halperin
2004). Moreover, while dispossession experienced by the lower classes fueled protest
often framed in ethnocentric (e.g. linguistic and geographic) terms, competition between
ruling, bourgeois, and aristocratic elites led to (proto-)nationalist desires to claim and
cohere territories. Therefore, the growth of empires and economies necessarily involved
social and political boundary-making, often ethnic and racial in nature. Cedric Robinson
(1983:62) argues that the rise of myriad nationalist and ethnocentric sentiments was in
fact “a force which has proved definitely stronger in the modern world than the class
struggle which for orthodox Marxists makes the essence of history” and, at all scales,
racialism and ethnocentricism served as a key organizing structure for expanding
European industrial capitalism. 16
Bayly (2004:199) stresses that as European empires extended to other continents,
“tide[s] of nationalism…drew on indigenous legends, histories, and sentiments about land
and people” and therefore developed in locally specific ways. For this reason,
nationalisms (and socio-political organization in general) should not be viewed as
“exports” delivered along with industrial capitalism from the West, but rather as
indigenously constructed, often marked by continuities with historically entrenched
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Mignolo (2000) clarifies differences between the transantlantic expansion of commercial systems and
colonial rule into the Americas (i.e. Occidentalism) prior to industrialization and the expansion of the same
into Africa and Asia (i.e. Orientalism) during industrialization. Together these comprise a geo-economic
order that, nonetheless, carries a qualitatively different character of “coloniality” on each end.
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governing structures or cultural or economic systems, or a combination of these.
Moreover, Bayly (2004) underscores that, over the nineteenth century, longstanding 17
globalizing processes and ensuing growth in the global economy “produced a paradox”:
as movement became freer and covered more territory, it became the focus of more
attention, prompting the development of more rigid systems of regulation to control flows
between spaces and bodies. Thus, a “nationalization” of territories took place (enabling
central coordination of key urban and non-urban zones), creating a foundation by which
states became more interventionist. As part of this, laws, institutions, and other
technologies for organizing the political economy and society were created, each
indelibly shaped by ideologies pertaining to civilization and the “natural order” of
things—influenced as they were by transnational exchange. Ultimately, difference
itself—as seen between races, genders, (dis)abilities, and so on—became an organizing
principle of imperial and colonial systems at global, regional, and local scales.
While the concept of difference was itself not new, it was applied more
systematically in the late nineteenth century owing to the rise of social scientific work
dedicated to classification—and the ability of states to intervene. As a result, “difference”
took a more structural, institutionalized form across social, political, and economic
contexts. More specifically, ideas and knowledge drawn from global colonialist
projects—or, more importantly, the “othering” that both underpinned and was produced
by them—pervaded scientific, political, and social thought. In particular, race theory and
ideas of social hierarchy were popularized at the turn of the twentieth century among
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Bayly (2004: 42-44) explains in depth earlier “archaic globalization”, a loosely-constructed pre-modern
international system of exchange facilitated by the bonds of kingships, religion, and moral understanding of
physical health.
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academics, scientific experts, government officers, and the public at large through
international social science conferences and colonial expositions (Cristy 2004; Siddle
2004; Weiner 1997). Fora such as these advanced and legitimized the classification and
hierarchical arrangement of raced, gendered, sexualized, and physically and intellectually
(dis)abled bodies, organized at local, regional, and global 18 scales. These constructs of
difference circulated globally and served in both metropolitan and colonial territories as
templates for directing the regulation and control of populations.
These constructs, legitimized through social and scientific theory and proliferated
in public and government thinking, came to be seen as an intrinsic foundation for social
order. Hence, they were woven into ideas and institutions that guided the continuing
expansion of capitalist systems and modernization efforts. Historically, the effects of
raced, gendered, and otherwise hierarchical modes of thinking and practice have been
visible in the economic, social, political, and legal structures of normative orders in both
metropoles and colonies: they could be seen in profoundly raced, gendered, and
otherwise socially-differentiated divisions of labor (Lowe 2015; Mahmud 2012; C
Robinson 1983) including, for example, conditions by which free and unfree laborers
traveled, lived, and worked in line with (or in spite of) regulatory schemes (e.g. Driscoll
2012; Lee and Sivanathiran 1996). Scholarship has shown that effects were visible in the
management of sexuality (Foucault 1978; Stoler 1995; Woollacott 2006) and health care
facilities (Manderson 1996; Swarr 2012), as well as housing provision and the structure
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Use of scale was demonstrated in practices of grouping and classifying people; for example, Japanese
scientists participated in identification of peoples of the Japanese empire according to indigenous and
ethnic/caste affiliation, on the one hand, as well as the organization of global populations into European,
African, Asiatic, and Malay races, on the other (Weiner, 1997).
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of households (McClintock 1991; Watson and Austerberry 1986). It is for these reasons
that constructs of difference are not only inextricably linked to homelessness but actually
precede and produce it.
Until recent decades, the constructed nature of differences other than those
marked by class and/or nation were understated in sociological research (Tilly 1998).
Therefore, although regimes of difference such as gender, ethnicity, ability, and sexuality,
among others, have historically mediated political, economic, and social processes and
played a key role in the organization of the global capitalist order, the presence and
effects of such regimes were not often rendered visible in social scientific work, except
where they were “naturalized and normalized in the dominant culture” (Seidman 1997:8).
The result is that, as Seidman (1997:25) critically notes, even the “progressivist hopes
and narratives [of sociology to date] are a part of a dynamic of colonization, and… its
language of rights, constitutionalism, and legality in part, conceals disciplinary forms of
social control.”
The ramifications of this are evident in literature on poverty and homelessness
too, which has for much of its history treated each of the “the poor” and “the homeless”
categorically as social classes of their own (O’Connor 2009). For example, while poverty
and homelessness were studied as social problems at the turn of the twentieth century,
research concentrated on evaluation of the “submerged tenth” or “dangerous classes”—
or, more specifically, “vagrants,” “beggars,” “vagabonds,” and “tramps,” (Bassuk and
Franklin 1992)—who were deemed to be either “deserving” or “undeserving” of their
poverty (Cresswell 2001). Such studies generally treated poor and homeless persons as a
degraded—and often racialized (e.g. “Darkest England”) (McLaughlin 2000)—class
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“beneath” normative society who were to be uplifted, if worthy, and disciplined, if not,
by social reformers and policy agents (Beier and Ocobock 2008; Vorspan 1977; Haggard
2001). Thus, concerns regarding homelessness largely revolved around the presumed
moral or cultural (“civilized”) status of the homeless individual or social group—thereby
serving to naturalize and normalize their condition by associating it with individual
responsibility and/or inherent capacity. While gender, race, ability, and other factors were
also recognized apart from poverty (e.g. “vagrant women,” “Native beggars”), such
dimensions of social difference were given only secondary concern in terms of their
relation to homelessness. That is, one’s poverty or homelessness was naturalized or
normalized considering one’s moral character or inherent capacity, and this character or
capacity could be further explained (read: naturalized and normalized) for marginal
groups by their inherent (biologically-, culturally-, or environmentally-determined)
deviance from “civilized” norms (e.g. as “unsettled Natives,” or “promiscuous
women”) 19.
From the mid-twentieth century, homelessness studies began to direct greater
attention towards the social structural roots of homelessness and looking beyond
individual responsibility (Pleace et al 1997). As part of this shift, scholarship today has
directed greater attention to processes of racism, sexism, ableism, and other forms of
discrimination or exclusion as they affect particular social groups. However,
considerations of gender, race, sexuality, ability, and other differences often remain
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However, early studies did nonetheless allow for some consideration of structural factors and social
processes producing homelessness such as: a) economic downturns, labor exploitation, and other occasions
that could not be traced to the fault of the “deserving” poor, or b) social sanctions against, or rejection of,
the insiduous behavior or nature of the “undeserving” poor.
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secondary; in other words, homelessness as a phenomenon is theorized as existing apart
from social difference but with outcomes exacerbated by social difference 20, which
obscures the relation of gender, race, sexuality, ability, and other such categorical
differences intrinsic to homelessness’ production. As a result, dominant approaches to
studying homelessness of marginalized groups and individuals (e.g. “the mentally ill”,
“single mothers”) and implementation of policy 21 continue to involve “naturaliz[ing] and
normaliz[ing]” (Seidman 1997) the homeless state of the group by positing that the
deviation of the individual from broader norms is at the root of the homelessness (e.g. a
woman’s lack of a breadwinner, a person’s lack of medication for their mental illness),
rather than posing questions regarding the beliefs and norms that underpin their
exclusion. These approaches propagate the idea that such groups (and homeless
populations in general) need continued moral supervision via policy (Mohr 1998). Over
the last two decades, increased attention has been directed by scholars to this
“responsibilization” of individuals for their homelessness (Dej 2016; Whiteford 2010) or
the “medicalization” and “pathologization” (Lyon-Callo 2004; Mills 2015; Willse 2015)
of experiences of poverty and homelessness, which, in essence, justify homelessness as a
destiny or condition rooted in the individual. Lyon-Callo (2004:19) posits that, under
such a system, “the ‘natural’ processes of social inequality remain largely unchallenged”;
I would add that they simultaneously remain underexplored. Processes that produce

20
For example, as due to insufficient stocks of affordable housing in a given locality, which then
disproportionately impacts “minority” groups (see Wolch and Dear, 1993:20-27). Conversely, I believe the
emphasis should lie on the racist, sexist, and otherwise exclusionary nature and aims of policy guiding
housing production historically.
21
For discussion of how dominant approaches to policy practice today naturalize and normalize
homelessness, see Lyon-Callo (2004) and Beckett and Herbert (2010).
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social difference must be viewed in their proper context as forces at the root of—and
inseparable from—the production of homelessness.
In his exploration of “durable inequality”, Tilly (1998:7) puts forth a model for
understanding how “significant inequalities in advantages among human beings
correspond mainly to categorical difference, such as black/white, male/female, citizen/
foreigner, or Muslim/ Jew rather than to individual differences in attributes, propensities,
or performances”. Fundamentally, his model explains how groups are distinguished,
defined, and organized using social discriminators, which then serve as the basis for
exploitation, opportunity hoarding, and other “social mechanisms…[that] lock categorical
inequality into place”. Such perspective shows that inequalities borne from difference
become durable as they are reinforced via institutions and practices across time.
Nonetheless, the categorical differences that underlie social organization are not stable or
solid entities; rather the boundaries that define and contain social groups are inherently
ambiguous and shift over time (Sibley 1995; Tilly 1998).
Tilly (1998) gives numerous examples—both historical and contemporary—of how
the creation and maintenance of categories has been used within social structural systems
to preserve advantages for a social elite. His work corresponds in many ways to
approaches to the construction of “the other” or otherness as seen in postcolonial studies.
For example, Homi Bhabha (1984:19) argued that social difference was an axis on which
colonial exploitation was possible as: “construction of the [subject] in discourse, and the
exercise of colonial power through discourse, demands an articulation of forms of
difference —racial and sexual”. Bhabha also identifies the “fixidity” of categorical
boundaries as paradoxically known in stereotypes yet never fully true, thus requiring
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constant redefinition and refashioning. In Colonialism in Question, Cooper (2005)
highlights postcolonial contributions to scholarship on difference stressing:
“Modern” empires were in some ways more explicit about codifying
difference—and particularly codifying race—than aristocratic empires, for the
giving way of status hierarchies to participation in a rights-bearing polity raised
the stakes of inclusion and exclusion. Just where lines of exclusion would be
drawn—in terms of territory, race, language, gender, or the respectability of
personal or collective behavior—was not a given of the “modern state,” but
rather the focus of enormous and shifting debate in nineteenth and twentieth
century Europe.
Thus, while boundaries defining categories of difference and exclusion shift, these can
be recognized in public and government debates guiding change in ideas and institutions.

Liberalism
In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault (2004) explains that liberalism transformed
modern governance by introducing a new rationality, namely, one that defined economic
processes as governed by a quasi-natural order (such as Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”).
In liberalism, the free market is defined as a realm that must in fact be left to its natural
processes, without interference by government; thus, in theory, it becomes incumbent on
government to limit its own powers and manage the economy in ways that enhance
prosperity for the state and its subjects. Because of the advance of liberalism as a
rationality, the scope and form of the state’s powers shifted from what they had
previously been in the feudal era; for one, while the economy remained a concern of the
state, the state could no longer directly control or intervene in its institutions, now
considered to belong to a private, and apolitical, realm. Instead, it needed only to treat
them administratively (Agamben 2011). In effect, the modern state was understood to be
not unlike “an 'enterprise' just like a factory” (Weber in Comaroff 1998).
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At the same time, these changes transformed state governance over its subjects. In
his lecture from April 4, 1979, Foucault (2004) explores the relation between
governance, the economy, and civil society. First, he establishes government as an
organic extension of civil society (and therefore not a contrary force). Then, he
(2004:296) defines homo economicus as an “economic point that inhabits the dense,
full, and complex reality of civil society” while also recognizing civil society as “the
concrete ensemble within which these ideal points, economic men (sic), must be placed
so that they can be appropriately managed.” (italics are mine) Therefore, for the state to
ensure prosperity, which is determined through the function of the economy, it must
manage “economic men” and (enforce) their place in civil society. As a result, state
management of the economy is entangled with its management of society, and vice
versa or, in the words of Foucault (2008:296), “homo economicus and civil society
belong to the same ensemble of the technology of liberal governmentality.” This links
into his discussion (2008:67) of biopolitics in an earlier lecture where he states,
“Economic freedom, [that is,] liberalism in the sense I have just been talking about, and
disciplinary techniques are completely bound up with each other.”

Police and the maintenance of order
In The Fabrication of Social Order, Neocleous (2000) details the history of the
police as a core force in the maintenance of social order from feudal to modern times in
Europe. In particular, he notes that the introduction of liberalism as a rationality of
government required “a rethinking of the police concept in new, liberal terms.” That is,
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across time police and policy have consistently served as state instruments for ensuring
security 22, but prior to the nineteenth century this meant intervening in food production
and overseeing markets to ensure public order and welfare vis-a-vis the smooth
distribution of food as well as security by preventing riots. As feudalism disintegrated
and peasants were dispossessed of the commons, police became responsible for
mobilizing “masterless men” into work (Neocleous 2000; Piven and Cloward 1993).
Neocleous (2000:16) elaborates that, by the time liberalism was introduced into
governance, feudal police obligations to guard and enforce welfare were removed. In
Punishment and Welfare, Garland (1985:46) speaks of this same transformation as
follows.
[L]iberalism, and its strict division between public and private spheres, specified
that [questions of] welfare were private matters, unsuitable for state
concern…[and thus the domain of] private agencies… Much care was taken
ensure that agencies dealing with welfare [- like] reformatories [and] discharged
prisoners' aid societies - retained their private status and reputation, even when
they were a de facto element in the normal routines of penal practice…
[Welfare] was in no sense the duty, responsibility or proper concern of the
Liberal State.
As neither the state nor the police were responsible for public security vis-a-vis welfare,
unlike prior centuries where they assisted distribution of food, police duties were limited
to ensuring security vis-a-vis public order (Neocleous 2000). In this regard, laws and the
“rule of law” grew in importance such that police became protectors and enforcers of
law, positioned to act not as direct agents of the state (as before) but as arbiters for the
state in the interest of law. Because the liberal system of freedom was founded on
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And, moreover, largely indistinguishable from each other until the 16th century. Thus, in historical legal
studies, “police” or “policy” are used interchangeably.
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principles of property (including one’s labor as one’s property) as a right and essential to
life, legal and policing systems served to ensure its protection.
The liberal system—organized around the protection of property—in many
respects cemented and perpetuated social and economic inequalities. Ideologically,
liberalism espoused a universalism, one of a horizontal community in which every homo
economicus was equally free. By the same token, all persons who were economically
active could, in theory, claim freedom. However, despite this premise of egalitarianism,
in reality, those with only their labor to sell were not equally free; rather, they were
inserted in a hierarchical relationship with “his or her master, the owner of the means of
production” (Gordon 1991:28) who possessed under liberal “rule of law” a largely
unregulated power as a private sector actor. The state, concerned with the management of
land and the production of value, left the (social) security and welfare of workers—all
matters outside of its realm of administration—to employers and other private
associations.
However, the state, concerned as it was with ensuring state prosperity and
(public) order, sought to achieve both by mobilizing labor. On the one hand, this was
historically achieved through master and servant legislation (later to become labor
legislation), distinguished by the stringent leveling of penal sanctions against
servants/employees for breaching contracts over breaches by masters/employers (Hay
and Craven 1993). On the other hand, this was also achieved through policing
vagrancy—an important task at a time of massive poverty owing to widespread
displacement and dispossession. Forcing vagrants into wage labor was believed to reduce
crime since, it was argued, income prevented people from choosing to meet their needs
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through crime; on the other hand, by forcing unemployed persons to perform labor in
workhouses, the state was able to keep wages low while also capitalizing on reserve labor
pools 23 by contracting them out to private employers and public projects, among other
things (Garland 1985; Neocleous 2000; Piven and Cloward 1993).
By construing “idleness”, or individual failure to capitalize on one’s labor, as a
threat to public order, the state endowed police with power to directly govern over “men
and things” (Dubber 2005). In Manhunts, Chamayou (2012) dedicates a chapter to the
history of “hunting the poor” and homeless through police sweeps and patrols. He asserts
that hunting for the poor was justified through blaming victims by characterizing their
presence as insidious 24 while also claiming that capture/arrests and punishment helped to
inculcate freedom “by taming their nature” (52). In other words, crackdowns on the poor
and homeless fit onto a broader paternalistic order which requires that, before people may
be considered emancipated, they must achieve the “ontological responsibility” or “selfgovernance” (Chamayou 2012:53) they are presumed to lack. Manhunts for the poor
were fueled by both punitive intent and coercive benevolence determined by police
discretion. Social reformers and voluntary associations also wielded punitive intent and
coercive benevolence but in their capacity as guarantors of the welfare of the poor
(Haggard 2001; Hansen 2007). Thus, in tandem with the rise of scientific study and
professional specialization pertaining to matters of poverty, classification of poor people
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As stated by Foucault (1988, 229-230), “poverty was necessary too because it made wealth possible.
Because they labor and consume little, those who are in need permit a nation to enrich itself… [I]n short, a
people would be poor which had no paupers.”
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As Garland (1985:17) notes, “the twin doctrines of individual responsibility and presumed rationality”
crafted a belief that “the criminal actor, like his economic counterpart, [homo economicus] was deemed to
be in absolute control of his destiny.”
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into “dangerous categories and categories in danger” was reinforced broadly throughout
public, private, and civic sectors (Fassin 2015)

Welfare and social control
Reforms in poor laws across Europe over the nineteenth century [as explained in
detail by Dean (1991)] involved a reduction of state responsibility for welfare, primarily
by narrowing “eligibility” and institutionalized more rigid enforcement through private
associations. Stated differently, police function was attached to two parallel systems—
one penal and one welfare—and policing in each grew even more vigilant in its strategy
and technique for regulating the poor. Welfare agents, like police, were expected to
enforce laws and policy as arbiters for the state.
Numerous scholars including Dean (1991), Foucault (1988), Garland (1985),
Piven and Cloward (1993) and Rusche and Kirchheimer (1968) have illustrated the
common roots of and parallels between the juridical and welfare models of punishment
prominent in the nineteenth century. Dean, for one, stresses that these systems emerged
not from class relations (as theorized by Marx) or religious moral values (as theorized by
Weber) but, rather, from the emergence of the liberal and patriarchal ethos of “selfgovernance”, which demanded that wage-laborers engage in labor in formal markets.
Garland (1985:48) details that welfare recipients (who, by definition, violated these
imperatives) were subject to a “denial of citizenship”; that is, people who accepted aid
were obligated to “relinquish [their] private freedom [and] quit the political community
[to occupy] the status of outcast or pariah” in the workhouses and asylums. Garland
(1985:48) also notes that this “negative, repressive axis of the disciplinary network
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[targeting the poor]” was operative in both systems of welfare assistance and penal
sanction.
In many cases, state aid and private/civic aid were necessarily contingent on
work, as labor was considered “an infallible panacea, a remedy to all forms of poverty”
(Foucault 1988:55). Piven and Cloward (1993:29-30) explain,
To cope with [disturbances of rising poverty and unrest], relief expanded…
Everywhere, however, the main principle was the same: an unemployed and
turbulent populace was being pacified with public allowances, but these
allowances were used to restore order by enforcing work, at very low wage
levels… Conditions in the workhouse were intended to ensure that no one with
any conceivable alternatives would seek public aid.
This proliferation of policing via state, non-state, and quasi-state channels of aid
provision gave rise to “the modern nation [and] an unprecedented extension of the
organizational and moral community”; such developments would not have been possible
without “the penetration and continual presence of central political authority throughout
daily life.” (Silver 1967:12-13)
From the early twentieth century, poverty management in metropolitan regions
shifted in response to the proliferation in science and politics of eugenic concern for
social degeneration, presumably caused by modern urban life (Garland 1985; Rusche and
Kirchheimer 1968). Imperial states began absorbing responsibility for social welfare and
gradually transformed into “welfare capitalist states” (Epsing-Anderson 1990). This shift
included not only increases in public aid but also the integration of rehabilitative ideals
into penal policies, resulting in what Garland (1985) terms the hybrid “penal-welfare
complex”, which lasted through the 1970s. However, these largely rehabilitative systems
emerged not from an interest in resolving poverty per se; rather they were designed to
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organize and stabilize a national labor force through a new “familialization” (Orloff
2005) of the social order. That is, the state “both regulated and supported” (Orloff
2003:231) breadwinning at the household level by developing a state welfare apparatus
that legitimated and enforced paternalistic social divisions of labor (Haney and Pollard
2003). This extension of law and policy into social economic organization enabled
private and public sector agents to more rigidly enforce paternalistic norms of social
difference at the household level based on gender, sexuality, nationality, marriage status,
and formal (as opposed to informal) labor market participation, among other things
(Orloff 2003, 2005).

Lawfare: Law and coercion
Jean and John Comaroff, scholars of post/colonial governmentality and the
post/colonial legal cultures, have advanced the concept of lawfare to explain the ways in
which law has been used as an instrument for imposing a fabricated, patriarchal order
over colonized people and places to consolidate political power and facilitate the
extraction of labor and wealth. The use of law as a coercive tool is possible, they
(2006:30) argue, because legal instruments—from legal code itself to its execution
through policing and the courts—collectively serve as “means of violence 25 rendered
legible, legal, and legitimate by [law’s] own sovereign word.” Thus, Comaroff and
Comaroff (2006) stress the power that colonial governments exercised over human life
and political existence while law obscured its own complicity in creating inequity and
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For more on state monopolies on legitimate violence as promised through law, see Harcourt (2010),
Hussain (2009), Leonard (1995), and Tilly (1985).
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violence. Correspondingly, Comaroff (2001) argues that law is a mode of domination
imposed in the name of civilization and progress 26, as well as a site of resistance for
people subordinated to colonial systems. James Fitzjames Stephen, a nineteenth century
political philosopher and British high court judge, declared that the purpose of law in
colonial society is, “the sum and substance of what we have to teach them. It is, so to
speak, the gospel of the English, and it is a compulsory gospel which admits of no dissent
and of no disobedience.” (Hussain 2003:4) For this reason, law and policy produced
through negotiations between colonial agents and colonial subjects capture the social and
moral ideas, norms, and practices that produced the colonial state. Moreover, because of
particular colonial ideologies and institutions—including those valuing raced, gendered,
classed, (dis)abled, and other people of “difference” in divergent ways—law and policy
were “applied to multiple statuses and juridical subjects differently….often beyond
judicial inquiry” (Hussain 2003:6).
In her exploration of colonial legal pluralism 27 in Law and Colonial Cultures,
Benton (2002:253) also echoes analogous views that “the colonial state was in no small
part the product of the politics of legal ordering”. Her book emphasizes that colonial legal
orders were fashioned from ideologies of difference, racial supremacy, and the essential
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Imperialists and colonialists believed that non-European cultures lacked “a modern sense of right-bearing
selfhood” (Comaroff, 2001:306) and adequate capacity for self-governance within the context of their own
socio-political orders. This view justified the imposition of western legal orders on their communities
within colonial territories.
27

Generally defined as the co-existence of multiple legal systems, as developed in colonial cultures, to
allow for differential governance over matters of importance to the colonial administration and “native”
subjects. Benton (2002:22) explains, “Colonial legal policy relied on familiar categories in distinguishing
between property disputes that were central to colonial interests and should therefore be handled in courts
dominated by colonizers, and property transfers that could be properly viewed as familial, religious, or
culturally specific and could be safely relegated to other forums.”
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“order” of social hierarchies (also see Chatterjee 1993; Hussain 2003). In turn, she
explains, these legal systems underpinned the definition and distribution of local property
rights, for example, which profoundly shaped social organization and cultural norms
while also linking colonies to an international order of accumulation and exploitation
based on coercion and violence. Comaroff (2001:309) provides a clear view into the ways
in which international trade, liberal thought, and sociocultural transformations intersected
with colonial law as the latter set in motion “a process that made spaces into places to be
possessed, ruled, improved, [and] protected” while laying out how the world was
“constructed and valorized” and how colonial subjects “were construed, ethnicized and
racialized, their relations with other human beings, to the earth, and to their own cultural
practices delineated”.
In fact, Comaroff (1998:329) differentiates the legal system that emerged in
colonial contexts from their metropolitan counterparts by underscoring that, whereas the
latter were assigned “the ideological work of manufacturing sameness, of engendering a
horizontal sense of fraternity; the [former], despite its rhetoric of universalising
modernity, was concerned with the practical management, often the production, of
difference” based on imperatives of “govern[ing] development and discipline among
natives”. In other words, legal systems, legal codes, and their enforcement in colonial
spaces were meant to administer to numerous “populations” and “nationalities” but only
while explicitly erecting divisions and enforcing strict hierarchical relations among them.
This is evidenced by the structures of legal pluralism itself (e.g. the subordinate position
of traditional courts to modern ones) as well as the proliferation of laws and policies that
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distributed rights and protections differentially according to nationality, ethnicity, and
race, among other things.
Now, as specifically relates to poverty management, it was standard practice prior
to the mid-twentieth century for colonial administrations to fund urban policing and
public security measures, which included sweeps (“manhunts”) and arrests of “beggars
and vagrants,” while guaranteeing the social welfare of only government officers, who as
a rule predominantly hailed from the dominant (e.g. European) racial group. Because the
colonies relied almost exclusively on the labor of non-Europeans, often hailing from
“native” or migrant populations, “master and servant [read: labor] acts were coupled with
vagrancy, pass, police, prison, and other legislation to attract, control, and direct flows of
labor” (Hay and Craven 2004:24). Responsibility for the social welfare of indigenous and
migrant groups was delegated to leaders of their respective non-European communities
and justified by the liberal and colonial ethos of “self-sufficiency” (Midgley 2011).
Exceptions did exist, such as hospitals for non-European paupers, but these generally
served the specific purpose of advancing colonial interest in exploitation and
accumulation (MacPherson 1982).
In the mid-twentieth century, imperial powers became more interested in
“colonial development” and began introducing social services agencies into colonial
governments in the 1940s and 1950s. However, these were typically underfunded,
reactive, and at best piecemeal attempts to quell local unrest, and have been described by
Midgley (2011:199) as “largely inappropriate, inequitable and marginal to the needs and
circumstances of the majority of the population [making only limited] impact on people's
well-being.” Thus, whereas poverty management in imperial states had been
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characterized by its welfarist approaches by the mid-twentieth century, it remained
largely in the hands of police and juridical systems in colonial and postcolonial states 28.
As a result, the advent of neoliberalism, too, has had a different effect on poverty
management in postcolonial countries: although “small government” has indeed been
taken up as a mantra in many such countries, changes are rarely directed at alreadyneglected welfare systems and, instead, concentrate on economic, administrative, and
legal systems manifested, for example, in liberalization, privatization, and deregulation
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Midgley 2011)

Discrimination, discretion, and homo sacer
In the Fabrication of the Social Order, Neocleous (2000) explains that police
have historically possessed a general mandate of order maintenance. Moreover, he
advances the idea that the execution of the order maintenance mandate relies on the
practice of discretion as authorized through law. He (2000:100-1) summarizes as follows.
‘[D]iscretion’ in practice involves discrimination in the form of selective lawenforcement and order maintenance… [The] discriminatory nature of discretion
therefore has its foundation in the permissive structure of law and the powers
given to the police to preserve order.
His point in presenting this view is to underscore how the existence of discretion
insulates the state and its systems—such as the penal and welfare systems—from
accountability for discriminatory and unequal outcomes; it serves as the primary field in
which universal policies and protections may be applied by entrusted authorities in nonuniversal ways. Should problems arise, it is only individual agents that are questioned. As
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Except wherever communalist or alternate approaches emerged, such as in India.
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Neocleous (2000:104) states, “challenges to the welfare system become focused on
questions of maladministration in the exercise of discretionary power, while… challenges
to the police are turned into debates about individual acts of individual officers and
whether they used their discretion in the most ‘reasonable’ way.”
Scholarship on the history of police and the origins of modern criminal justice
systems emphasizes that neither police nor law were, in reality, designed to uphold
justice; rather, each have roots in liberalist desires “not to deliver justice so much as to
sustain a right moral and social order with property at its center” and, thereby, to ensure
“the welfare of the community” [read: public security and order] 29 (Gatrell 1996:518;
also see Benton 2002; Failer 2002; Dubber 2005). In her monograph on the rights of
homeless persons with mental illness facing commitment, Failer (2002) notes that, for
centuries, not only were “homeless people” labeled as social threats, but other groups
such as persons with mental illness too. She explains that, as a result, individuals and
groups have each been assigned different “bundles of rights” within the legal system to
facilitate their policing. She (2002: 33) highlights the roots of these practices in liberal
philosophy such as where, for example, John Stuart Mill limits his definition of liberty to
people in “the maturity of their faculties” thereby denying equal liberty to children,
people that “require being taken care of by others,” and—in a nod to colonialism—people
in “backward states of society” 30. She also notes that Kant outlined identical views,
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Similarly, Neocleous (2000:110) states that, “[J]ustice has never been the primary value to which law
devotes itself…[Instead, that value] has been order.”
30
Tellingly, Mill (2002:8) follows this assertion with an explanation that “Despotism in a legitimate mode
of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement”.
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denying full liberty to “passive citizens” such as women, children, and other
“dependents”.
Such philosophical views have had vast consequences for numerous groups
deemed as being “in need” (Failer 2002) of special paternalistic protection and
governance. Such protection and governance is: 1) rooted in the state authority of parens
patriate, which enables the state as exercised through the courts to make decisions on
behalf of persons deemed incapable of self-governance, and 2) implemented through the
“notion of police as state household governance” (Dubber 2005:xv). Historically, such
groups have included persons with mental illness, single mothers, alcoholics, and
juveniles and, as Failer notes, such governance necessarily denies them “regular rights”.
At the same time, as paternal protector, the state may extend special “protections” via
welfare systems thereby “construct[ing them and their] needs according to certain
specific—and, in principle, contestable—interpretations, even as they lend those
interpretations an aura of facticity that discourages contestation” (Fraser 1989:146). Here,
there is a slippage between policing and protecting subjects constructed as insufficiently
“mature” to exercise their full agency as citizens in a liberal political economy. Thus,
social policy is discursive in the same ways that criminal justice systems are because
both—separately and together—construct "dangerous categories and categories in
danger” (Fassin 2015:2). Welfare systems, like penal systems, “may be privileged as
central determinants of how systems of power and domination are perpetuated in society
as a whole.” (Mohr 2014:211)
Of pertinence to understanding political inequalities produced by socially
constructed difference here is the concept of homo sacer (and bare life), advanced by
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Agamben (1998). Agamben explains homo sacer as people rendered into “bare life,”
simultaneously sacred and accursed 31, and who are for that reason denied political
existence in modern society. He explains homo sacer’s role in the modern juridicopolitical order as something of a paradox: “That which is excluded from the community
(i.e. homo sacer) is, in reality, that on which the entire life of the community is founded”
(17) Agamben explains this paradox through the lens of Foucault’s biopolitics. Agamben
(1998:119) posits that politics itself inevitably calls the existence of modern man into
question, which runs parallel to Foucault’s (2008) assertion of biopolitics and state power
“to make live and to let die”. He adds that “If life, in modern biopolitics, is immediately
politics, [then] this unity… appears as an indissoluble cohesion” and homo sacer—the
one who is deprived of political existence, and therefore reduced to “bare life”—is one
who all people possess political power over, and one who they may deprive of life.
Agamben (1998:88) elaborates by stating that, by abandoning homo sacer, sovereign
power (read: the state) demonstrates how sacred life is; the importance of life in politics
is made real “not [by] simple natural life but [by] life exposed to death”. Marginalized
groups in the modern legal and political order are, like Agamben’s homo sacer, included
in society only by their exclusion. Purity, or absolute order, in the social collective
requires their elimination, thus they are “that on which the entire life of the community is
founded,” yet they are produced by the order itself. As one example, Agamben (180)
highlights the “poor classes” simultaneously scorned and pitied, purged and produced
globally through the “democratico-capitalist projects” of development. This
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Sacred as in pitied, for example, and accursed as in scorned.
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conceptualization of homo sacer and their reduction to “bare life” illustrates the process
that selectively reduces people, through discrimination, to conditions of political
exclusion and economic poverty, which may lead to homelessness. It also shines a light
on the particular power “to make live or let die” that not only the state—but also
society—exercise over homo sacer.
In Citizens without Shelter, Feldman (2004:5) poses the question of why people
experiencing homelessness “need to be contained, enclosed, disciplined, or excluded”
(italics in original) and pursues an answer through the lens of homo sacer. He identifies
portrayals of people experiencing homelessness as vacillating between those of the
“profanely free (justifying criminalization)” and the “sacralized, helpless sufferers
(justifying shelter)”. He (2004:18) nods to Agamben’s assertion that bare life is the
foundation of the civic body, and adds that state policy, in the face of the existence of
“homeless bare life” must “recover the fiction of ‘the people’ as a unity, of bare life as
fully morphed into the citizen [and p]olicies of exclusion and containment…. are one
example of this process.” From here, Feldman does what Agamben does not do. Whereas
Agamben (1998) focuses on bare life as life that is sacrificed, exemplified in his
exploration of Nazi concentration camps, and therefore made “victims” (in Feldman’s
words), Feldman (2004) takes the persecution of bare life as an opportunity to analyze the
production of “normal” subject, on the one hand, and marginal status, on the other 32.
Specifically, he (2004:20) highlights that “[h]ome dwelling citizen and homeless bare life
are political [not social] statuses” and that the liberal state produces these “mutually

32
He states that, “Outlaws of various forms are not the victims of particular injustices but rather signifiers
of a new universal condition.”
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constitutive categories of home-dwelling citizen and homeless bare life.” These statuses,
he continues, are produced by law, which “’eliminat[es] the evidence’ of its own
involvement [by] pretending to re-cognize a pre-existing sociocultural or personhood
status ‘out there.’” He (2004:22) offers that the creation of a universal rule by which all
people must inhabit normative homes creates “homeless bare life” by its denial of any
(potential) plurality; therefore, “[t]he dream of proper homes—even in its redistributive
progressive form—is implicated in the production of bare life when grand schemes for
ending homelessness are based on the destruction or conversion of nonnormative
dwellings such as residential hotels…and homeless encampments”. Such a view
underscores the substantive meaning and impact of systematic discounting of “bare life,”
or, stated differently, the consequences of social being deprived of political existence.
Such a reading calls into question of suitability or “justice” of any socio-legal response to
homelessness that does not simultaneously affirm the social and political existence of
“homeless bare life”. In other words, the root of ineffective policy lies not in penal or
therapeutic approaches—or any combination thereof—but rather in the deprivation of
political existence.
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CHAPTER 2. IMPERATIVES OF CARE AND CONTROL
THE REGULATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN KUALA LUMPUR - 1880S TO
PRESENT

Introduction
In April 2014, Malaysia’s Ministry of Women, Family, and Community
Development announced plans to criminalize begging by amending federal vagrancy law,
the Destitute Persons Act. As explanation, Minister Rohani emphasized the importance of
an aggressive approach, asserting: “It has to be severe, otherwise it wouldn’t be a
deterrent." (Nurbaiti 2014) Two months later, the Federal Territories Ministry proposed
bylaws aimed at establishing a homelessness-free zone in Kuala Lumpur’s commercial
Golden Triangle by banning food distribution and almsgiving. That same week, Minister
Rohani announced the launch of a month-long sweep called Operasi Qaseh, or
“Operation Generosity” in honor of Ramadan, to clear the capital of visible homelessness
through anti-vagrancy crackdowns and compulsory relocation of arrestees into
“rehabilitation centres” outside Kuala Lumpur (KL). In the press, public officers offered
that such measures were integral to achieving “zero homeless”.
Begging and homelessness are treated as a set in Malaysia based on vagrancy law,
a consistent force in urban regulation since the nineteenth century. The Destitute Persons
Act defines destitute persons as “person[s] found begging…[or with] no visible means of
subsistence” under the jurisdiction of Rohani’s Ministry, the lead agency for social
welfare. Government’s embrace of punitive sanctions could be read as the revanchist city

81

drawing near. Is Malaysia undergoing a “punitive turn”? Has neoliberalism’s global creep
beckoned an escalation of the “culture of control” (Garland 2001) in homelessness
politics in Southeast Asia?
These are fair questions rarely posed for cities outside the global North. When
“punitive turn” scholarship emerged in the 1990s, focus rested on Euro-American
developments signaling a “reversal of a settled historical pattern…towards
‘rationalization’ and ‘civilization’” (Garland 2001:3) in penal and welfare trends.
Scholars have tested the thesis, often in advanced capitalist contexts. In this article, I
analyze the formation of modern penality and neoliberal influence in homelessness
regulation in KL. My objectives are two-fold: 1) to consider the applicability of the
punitive thesis to homelessness management in Malaysia’s capital, and 2) to consider
how processes underpinning neoliberal outcomes in KL may inform transnational
understanding of the “settled”, or unsettled, nature of global and historical patterns in
policy development.
As a former colony and Commonwealth country, Malaysia has inherited British
forms of governance and customarily referred to UK practices. Overall, dominant
politico-legal institutions and ideologies are analogous to British-derived systems
elsewhere, the US included. Nevertheless, I argue that uncritically applying the concept
of a “punitive turn” to Malaysia would be a mistake. Transnational trends in urban spatial
orders cannot be understood apart from linkages to global and historical forces. This
Malaysian case provides opportunity for urban scholarship on punitivism to operate “at a
world scale” (J Robinson 2011:1) by considering city strategies beyond advanced EuroAmerican contexts. Specifically, I select KL for its historical and contemporary
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significance as a site for development of homelessness policy. Additionally, I offer
through historical analysis a new frame for understanding the co-constitution of punitive
and supportive dynamics under pre- and post-neoliberal reforms.

Homelessness Regulation, Policy Mobilities, and the Neoliberal Punitive Turn
The “turn” underscored in punitive turn discourse signifies deviation from a
theorized late nineteenth century shift towards integrating rehabilitative ideals into penal
policies. Garland (1985), in his genealogical account of crime control in the US and
Britain, terms this concern for the welfare and reform of offenders as culminating in a
hybrid “penal-welfare complex,” lasting through the 1970s. He argues that whereas
deterrence through punitive sanctions defined nineteenth century penal justice, penalwelfarism arose from “modern” ways of thinking about individuals and their relationship
to society. Increasingly, state actors sought to rehabilitate offenders who were “to be
pitied, cared for and, if possible, reclaimed” (1985:27) through scientific expertise.
Proponents of the punitive thesis reason that this inclusionary shift has been
upturned by a neoliberal penality that, like its Victorian predecessor, embodies state
power to enforce order through deterrence and punishment. Neoliberal faith in free
markets and self-governance as solutions to poverty has absolved government from
poverty management other than through security and policing. Hence, neoliberalism in
advanced countries is associated with measures that “roll-back” supportive social
programs and “roll-out” disciplinary institutional reforms (Peck and Tickell 2002), such
as corrective social programs and enhanced policing of society’s “dispossessed, deviant,

83

and dangerous” (Wacquant 2009:20). Often, such neoliberal outcomes are attributed to
the influence of “made-in-the-USA ideologies and policies” (Wacquant 2001:405).
Policy mobilities literature highlights the transnational travel and translation of
neoliberal policy. Scholars therein define neoliberalization as tied to retraction of
Keynesian-welfarist institutions, inspiring transformation of "[this] geographically and
historically specific form of statecraft…[into] new forms of statecraft " (Peck 2003:222;
emphasis in original). The concept of “fast policy” underscores the speed and complexity
characterizing contemporary policy travel. It seeks to correct notions of policy diffusion
as smooth, unidirectional transfers and invites consideration of processes that select and
modify policy over time. Study of fast policy mobilities highlights agents and processes
that variously transform policy to produce its “local globalness” (McCann 2011) at each
site. However, scholarly attention generally concentrates on neoliberal transformations
pertaining to liberal-welfarist structures. How might one recognize neoliberal era policy
beyond Euro-American-centered frames, particularly when most global cities fall outside
such scope (Halperin 2015)?
Ananya Roy (Baker et al 2016) makes this point in questioning comparative
policy studies that lack account of historical geographies of statecraft. Without a template
of prior state forms and functions, she explains, one cannot fully gauge forces
transforming governance. McCann (2011:109) similarly offers that “the circulation of
policy knowledge is paradoxically structured by embedded institutional legacies and
imperatives,” meaning that local agents and power structures markedly shape outcomes.
Hence, understanding neoliberal transformation requires consideration of prior
assemblages of governance to measure policy uptake on its own terms (Bunnell 2015).
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Scholars concerned with neoliberalism in homelessness regulation agree that
exclusionary rhetoric and practice has transformed policy landscapes; however, debate
surrounds whether recent punitive approaches should be unequivocally attributed to
neoliberalism (Doherty et al. 2008; O’Sullivan 2012; Sylvestre 2013) and whether
literature adequately accounts for inclusionary trends (DeVerteuil et al. 2009; Johnsen
and Fitzpatrick 2010; Marr 2015). Such concerns are sound. The propensity to label
homeless persons as threats to order, ostensibly necessitating their segregation and
punishment, is well-documented in Western and Western-influenced policy (Adler 1989;
Beier and Ocobock 2008). Furthermore, one cannot disregard ambivalence (Murphy
2009) bound into regulation, particularly where compassion and discipline intersect.
Government agencies strategically cast anti-vagrancy crackdowns in KL as benevolent
exercises of generosity, unapologetically slated for Ramadan. As DeVerteuil (2012)
posits, the punitive relies on the supportive. Clear lines cannot be drawn between the two;
rather, we ought to critically evaluate how they co-constitute and counterweigh each
other.
Such scholarship underscores the importance of considering distinct socio-legal
histories undergirding government and public thinking about homelessness, and how
punitive and supportive strains shape regulation. These aims are parallel subsets of a
larger concern: the need to account for the global and historical scope of regulation that
defines homelessness and constructs terms for addressing it. Recently, O’Sullivan (2012)
and Sylvestre (2013) have contended that contemporary responses to homelessness
extend from historical treatment of vagrancy. O’Sullivan (88), while considering
nineteenth and twentieth century Euro-American interventions, reasons that current

85

punitive trends are tied to a continuation of “a core response to homelessness [that] was
always punitive”. Additionally, he asserts that today’s “politics of social inclusion” are a
more forceful driver of policy change. In response, Sylvestre acknowledges the same
history yet refutes O’Sullivan’s negation of neoliberal influence; instead, she (364) uses
events in Canada as evidence that neoliberal ideas have instigated distinct punitive
effects, owing to their power as “legitimating discourses to justify existing repressive
practices” (original emphasis).
These perspectives raise important questions about transnational and
transhistorical dynamics shaping homelessness regulation, and how situated agents
respond to neoliberal pressures. As O’Sullivan suggests, neoliberal outcomes need not be
imported or even explicitly pursued, but may derive from local agents and processes.
Similarly, literatures on transnational policy networks (Stone 2008), global urban systems
(King 1990; Knox 1995), and urban history (Home 1997; King 1976) illustrate that
transnational networks—crafted from colonial and imperial urbanizations—have long
informed transnational urban imaginaries and distinct local histories. Hence, policy
mobilities as a construct need not be limited to neoliberal-era policy diffusion but, rather,
ought to include historical sets of inter-referencing practices exercised through global
policymaking circuits (Bunnell 2015).
As Sylvestre’s analysis concentrates on contemporary Canada and O’Sullivan’s
spans a broad swath of historical Europe, neither account traces data from a single site
across time. Hence, I offer a transhistorical analysis of homelessness policy in KL to
examine the “punitive turn” thesis, using Garland’s genealogical approach and a
concentration on vagrancy legislation. Elaboration of policy history is crucial for
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considering statecraft in locales, such as KL, typically excluded from policy literature
owing to their developmental status (J Robinson 2011). Moreover, it illuminates the
circuits and effects of policy mobilities beyond those neoliberal (Bunnell 2015).
Together, these facilitate critical interrogation into the neoliberal—or non-neoliberal—
nature and roots of contemporary outcomes. Thus, I offer a response to calls by Bunnell
(2015) and J Robinson (2011) for more comparative work across contexts, and by
DeVerteuil (2012) for representation of interplays between punitive and supportive
strands in homelessness policy outside the US.

Historicizing Homelessness Regulation
In Malay(si)a, KL has served as a key commercial and government center and a
crucible for economic and urban development since the 1880s. Here, the scale of
homelessness—and state attention to the same—have regularly fluctuated with economic
and developmental shifts. I present a historical analysis of transformations in antivagrancy regulation based on primary data from government and historical documents
collected at Malaysia’s National Archives, Singapore’s National Archives, and the
Singapore National Library. Archival records detail policy change over time, as well as
underlying influences and debates. I obtained primary data on recent developments
through interviews with officers responsible for enforcing and formulating policy at the
Ministry of Women, Family, and Community Development. Last, I utilize secondary
sources to locate legal and institutional developments within their socio-political and
economic contexts.

87

I take law and its implementing institutions as my unit of analysis; therefore, I do
not trace changes outside the governmental sphere. In collecting data and conducting
analysis, I identify how ideas are not only advanced by agents, but also transformed and
embedded in codes and practices over time. Through a longitudinal analysis, I aim to
highlight the history-laden context of contemporary plans to achieve “zero homeless”
through care and control. I also adopt a global historical perspective as I trace ideational
and institutional shifts in policy by situating them in the global field (Go 2008; Patil
2017).
Findings are organized into five historical periods, each containing ideological
shifts shaping policy and practice. Since ideological and policy changes cannot be parsed
into clear-cut chronologies, I introduce trends that pre-exist, persist, and overlap across
categories. Nevertheless, each period highlights principal reforms in care and control. I
adopt historically-accurate terminologies when referring to policy subjects, such as
vagrants and beggars. While I see general use of such language as problematic, I employ
it here to convey relevant socio-legal categories and historical forms of urban
marginality. Also, I inflect history with recognition of “graduated citizenship”, or
differential treatment of diverse populations via state policy rooted in “market
calculations and ethnic governmentality” (Ong 2006:79). Lastly, while I call attention to
punitive and supportive measures in each era, my aim is not to classify them per twentyfirst century normative standards. Hence, although past supportive measures may appear
punitive, I stress consideration of these policies as expressions of a particular
geohistorical context.
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City Strategies and Policy Re/Formation in KL
1870s-1900s: Introducing vagrancy law
“Scrambles” for Africa and Asia followed the 1869 opening of the Suez Canal.
This new state-led phase of global imperialism was fueled by aims to extend territorial
control, manifested as Britain’s Forward Movement in Malaya. Britain progressively
expanded its political control beyond the Straits Settlements 33 into the peninsula’s
interior, consolidated into the Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1895.
British Malaya’s politico-economic system—fashioned in the interests of British,
Chinese, and Malay elites—guided homelessness regulation. Social Darwinism and racial
thinking stimulated use of race as a strategy for cross-cultural negotiations (Manickam
2009) that produced and reified a hierarchy of ethnic identities: Europeans, Natives, and
Migrants (Ooi 2003). Formal treaties established Malay rulers as symbolic heads of states
and endowed British advisors with administrative control over the political economy.
Government was predominantly British, while Chinese and British capital served as the
economy’s foundation.
Urbanization accelerated once KL became the capital of Selangor state in 1880,
and the FMS capital in 1896. Growing commercial and manufacturing industries,
regional development, and income from mining fueled transformation, all reliant on
indentured and recruited labor from China, British India, and the Dutch East Indies.
Sustaining this colonial economy required monumental in-migration, totaling 200,000500,000 persons annually by the 1900s. Laborers, treated as expendable, were vulnerable
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The crown’s early mercantile ports.
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to illness, injury, exploitation, and homelessness. Many—especially Chinese laborers
employed in mines surrounding KL—sought services or better prospects in the capital.
In 1883, the government opened a Pauper Hospital in central KL. It received
thousands of patients yearly, almost exclusively “coolies”, prompting its relocation to the
outskirts in 1889. Government officers recognized high morbidity among coolie laborers
as rooted in employer negligence and sought partial remedy through the 1895 Labour
Code. Government also urged local Chinese elites to provide for their “population,”
directing organized philanthropy into a central force in aid. KL’s Chinese Capitan 34
established the Tai Wah Institution and Fund to improve access to medical care for
Chinese paupers. Located on Pauper Hospital grounds, the Institution provided housing
for discharged patients, while the Fund subsidized carts for picking up sick and dying
persons “from the roadsides” (Selangor Journal 1896:193-194).
Economic downturns also led to spikes in homelessness. In 1895-1896, “many
labourers were thrown out of…the mines and…became vagrants” (Daniels 1906). Others
became homeless after leaving employers to seek opportunity elsewhere. Hence,
government officers recognized that hospitals alone were insufficient for reducing
vagrancy. Yet, as visibility of “idle, “filthy”, “diseased”, and “weak” people in public
grew (Hare 1897), so did pressure to “[rid] our towns of [this] most undesirable portion
of our community” (Belfield 1904). Contemporaneously, in England, imaginaries of
“vagabond savages” emerged from evolutionary and racial thinking that fused fears
surrounding “itinerancy, class, criminality, race, and morality” (Hansen 2007:65). From
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Capitans were appointed Chinese leaders.
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this, greater scrutiny of “deserving” and “undeserving” characters (Haggard 2001)
materialized in social policies and programs, including those brought by British
colonialists to Malaya.
Vagrancy in KL became punishable by imprisonment in the 1880s 35. However,
widespread illness among offenders spurred officers to allow admission to the Pauper
Hospital’s Vagrant Ward in lieu of jail (Welch 1894). Although the Vagrant Ward was
built “as a Prison Ward…with iron bars,” medical workers could not legally or
logistically detain patients who were wont to leave (Residency Surgeon 1894). Thus, in
1893, Selangor adopted the 1872 Straits Settlements’ vagrancy ordinance mandating
imprisonment for all vagrants, including those needing medical care (Daniels).
Nonetheless, insufficient space in the prison hospital made policy impracticable.
Advancing that neither hospitals nor prisons were adequate “for dealing with
vagrants” (Hare), the government developed a new system for classifying and managing
them. In 1902, the FMS enacted the Decrepit Vagrants Act, aimed at “provid[ing] for the
control and relief of sick and decrepit vagrants.” The law stipulated that decrepit
vagrants, defined as “medically certified…as physically incapable of earning a living,” be
held in special wards on prison premises. By this distinction, decrepit vagrants were
legally absolved of wrong-doing, while able-bodied vagrants were subject to criminal
treatment. However, both “classes” were confined to prison grounds.
Rules for Selangor’s vagrant wards stipulated that “inmates are humanely treated,
discipline is strictly enforced, and economy is duly promoted” (Selangor State 1902).

35

I have arrest records, but not an exact statute. Arrests may have occurred without legal basis (Residency
Surgeon, 1894).
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These norms sprung from customary notions that “Government [should not] support
vagrants in idleness” (“Vagrancy Bill” 1906) and vagrants, including decrepits, would
benefit from labor (Hare). Perak’s Resident enthused, “[C]onfinement in the ward is [not]
merely a punishment but also a means of enabling the vagrant to recover his health and
become a useful [community] member” (Belfield 1904). He then urged that decrepit
vagrants in wards receive longer sentences than the able-bodied in jails.

1910s-1930s: Refuge and repatriation
In the early twentieth century, global political-economic integration amplified
individual vulnerability to international markets and facilitated the spread of sociopolitical mobilizations. In response, imperial states increasingly turned to interventionism
and the provision of social protections to quell unrest and enhance legitimacy at home
and abroad (Bayly 2004). British Malaya gained prominence in the global market as
accelerated production of tin and rubber elevated its commercial importance. Its political
order remained fragmented with supreme power vested in Malay rulers, economic power
in Chinese and British capitalists, and the Colonial Office overseeing each. The scale and
demographics of homelessness in KL shifted with development and the economy, such as
upsurges in Indian vagrants during rubber market slumps.
At the century’s turn, white homeless “beachcombers”—often European sailors
and American soldiers—pervaded Asian port cities. Fear that they might “lower the
standard of the orang-puteh (white people)” (Vagrancy Bill 1906) in colonies quickly
manifested in policy such as the Straits Settlements’ 1906 Vagrancy Ordinance, which
included statutes to expedite repatriation. This law, lauded for purging the “disgrace” of
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“poor Whites” and deterring “vagrant classes of Chinese [who] fear banishment…more
than imprisonment” (“Vagrancy Bill”), soon shaped FMS regulation.
FMS officers used repatriation to tamp down vagrancy even before its
incorporation into vagrancy law. As early as 1891, the Prisons Department advocated
solving the “intolerable nuisance” of vagrants through repatriation (Hare). Some Chinese
vagrants were repatriated via the 1899 Banishment Enactment. Additionally, government
regularized and funded extra-legal repatriations, particularly during the 1910s.
Nonetheless, the FMS streamlined repatriation through its 1921 Vagrancy Enactment,
modeled after the Straits Settlements’ Ordinance, enabling commitment of both decrepit
and able-bodied vagrants to vagrant wards for up to one year “until work has been
found…or until he is [repatriated]”. Government records show decrepit workers
frequently resisted repatriation, spurring some officers and civic leaders to defend their
right to remain.
Concurrently, multiple agencies sought to establish a Central Decrepit Asylum.
They aimed to support key mining districts by removing “vagrants knocking about” and
offering “laborers [suffering from] ware and tare” (Choo 1925) “a decent home and
refuge…in accordance with modern notions” (Dowden 1927). The 1928 Vagrants and
Decrepit Persons Enactment and its 1934 successor passed in this spirit. The laws
redefined decrepits and vagrants as “two classes” deserving “differential treatment”
(Rigby 1933), namely, rehabilitation for decrepits and punishment for the able-bodied,
both subject to repatriation unless employed in one year. Decrepits were sent to
“settlements,” inspired by European labor colonies and managed under the High
Commissioner and Medical Department. The largest, located outside KL in Sungai
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Buloh, opened in 1934 for Chinese laborers. Debate continued over forced repatriation,
as few migrants wished to return. Eventually, the asylum was abandoned. Instead,
officials granted settlement land to a neighboring leprosarium and dispersed inmates
throughout FMS hospitals (Fitzgerald 1934).

1940s-1960s: Preserving public order through compulsory care
World War Two played a powerful role in unsettling empire globally. For one,
Japan dislodged Euro-American rule throughout Southeast Asia. Afterwards, colonialists
returned to their former colonies, the British with plans to reconstruct empire. However,
nationalist and anti-imperialist movements persisted, eventually leading to
decolonization. In Malaya, ethnic tensions and a communist insurgency prompted the
British to declare a state of emergency (1948-1960) complicating plans for a centralized
multi-ethnic state. Between 1948 and 1957, native-born and long-term residents of all
ethnicities were gradually conferred citizenship. The federal government, embracing
economic fundamentalism, undertook development plans that channeled investments into
“productive” economic sectors while avoiding “consumptive”, “non-remunerative”
liabilities of social services (Ness 1967:107; Rudner 1972:65). Mass rural-urban
migration and urban extension fueled population growth in KL, now the federal capital,
exacerbating underemployment and housing insecurity.
Policies for managing destitution were modified for different aims under Japanese
rule (1941-1945), not explored here. After their postwar return, the British reorganized
government agencies, authorities, and legislation at all levels, resulting in a substantial
shift in homelessness management. In 1948, the newly-formed Social Welfare
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Department (SWD) was given jurisdiction over pauper hospitals and decrepits. As it
planned unified federal legislation, the SWD coordinated repatriation of “destitutes and
other persons” (David 1950). Simultaneously, large numbers of “unfortunate old men,
many [who served Malaya] in their youth” were filling prisons, causing the Prisons
Commissioner (1946) to protest with “great embarrassment” at having to incarcerate
them like criminals.
By the mid-1950s, anxiety rose over a perceived begging epidemic in the capital.
The SWD conducted a nationwide survey of 750 beggars, finding that three-quarters
were Chinese and concluding that the problem for all ethnic groups lay in “elderly folk
being pushed…into the ranks of the unwanted” (SWD 1955:16). The report also
debunked “popular myths about beggars” like lucrative earnings. However, such
considerations were not reflected in policy. Instead, federal agencies pursued legislation
for “deterrence and punishment” (SWD 1955:1), realized through statutes in the 1955
Minor Offenses Ordinance that expedited arrest of “idle and disorderly persons”. The
report (1) concedes that most beggars had disabilities, but government homes were full
and “demands for drastic economy” made expansion impossible; thus, penalization
seemed the most expedient route.
In 1957, federal agencies formed a Committee to “rid the streets of Kuala Lumpur
of beggars” prior to independence celebrations (Elliott 1957). Teams of police and social
welfare officers conducted raids publicized as “Operation Beggar”. In 1958, social
welfare officers discussed using Mersing Camp in Johor, 200 miles from KL, as a multistate detention facility (Raja Abdul 1958). The Municipal Secretary urged immediate
action to “remove the scar…of beggars…leav[ing] a bad impression on…foreign
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visitors” (Mohamed Din 1961). In response, the Prisons Commissioner (1961) insisted
that, “prison is NOT the place for beggars and vagrants.” The Social Welfare Ministry
(n.d.) agreed, calling incarceration “incompatible with social justice and human rights”.
Thus, alternate means were necessary.
Malaya’s first federal vagrancy law was drafted over 1961-1964. The Act
endowed police with powers to arrest “destitute persons” and have them “compulsorily
detained” (Fiennes 1962) at social welfare facilities. The parliamentary counsel assumed
the arduous task of drafting legislation that decriminalized begging and vagrancy, yet
justified arrest and detention for the same. This was achieved by defining such acts as
offenses against public order, enabling circumvention of constitutional protection of
movement. The bill also presented detention as a mode of care delivered in
“rehabilitation centers”. Parliament passed the Vagrants Act “for the care and
rehabilitation of destitutes and the control of vagrancy” in 1964. Police enforced the law
in periodic raids, and the Ministry opened Desa Bina Diri (DBD), its federal
rehabilitation center, in Mersing.

1970s-1980s: Policing as social welfare services
The 1970s world crisis transformed economic globalization, as shifts to off-shore
production prompted global restructuring. This essentially underwrote the “East Asian
miracle” and the rise of Southeast Asia’s newly industrializing economies. Many Asian
states moved to control quick-paced industrialization and urban change by intervening in
development processes. Additionally, swelling Southeast Asian tourism inspired states to
take appearances seriously. Malaysia was no exception in any case.
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In Malaysia, postwar development exacerbated socio-economic disparities and
political discontent, culminating in an ethnic riot in 1969. Thereafter, political leaders
used inter-ethnic tension to justify “soft authoritarian” rule (Khoo and Loh 2002:4) and
garnered favor by elevating poverty eradication as a national objective via the New
Economic Policy (NEP). However, NEP focus on rural sectors meant that urban poverty
received little attention, despite growing pressure on the capital as manufacturing drew
migrants from Malaysia and abroad. Simultaneously, KL’s escalating importance—after
its cession from Selangor and establishment as Malaysia’s first federal territory—fostered
concentrated development (Bunnell 2002) and federal desire to control the city.
Between 1965-1970, police caught over 2,500 people nationwide in anti-vagrancy
raids and the Social Welfare Ministry launched a Three-Year Plan to “eliminate”
(menghapuskan) beggars nationally. In KL, police formed the Beggar Eradication
Committee (Jawatan Kuasa Membasmi Pengemis) to coordinate apprehension of
migrating (berhijrah) beggars and their “sentencing” (menghukum) to rehabilitation
centers (Lim 1970). In 1973, the Social Welfare Minister was asked in Parliament
whether government would aid “these people…as [poverty eradication] is the policy of
the Alliance Government” (Dewan Rakyat 1973). She responded that vagrancy and
poverty were separate matters, rebuffing that aid was necessary. However, government
publicly presented raids and arrests as “benefit[ing]” and “protect[ing]” subjects, thereby
more closely aligning policy to care (Hartog 1972:218).
In 1975, the Ministry’s research division produced an unpublished internal report
urging “greater understanding and compassion” for beggars and vagrants (Welfare
Services Ministry 1975). In a nationwide survey, it found that beggars were “[not] an idle
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shiftless lot…[and generally had] honest employment well into old age”. Authors noted
that most were foreign-born, often with Malaysian citizenship but no family, and half
were former rubber estate, tin mining, or manual laborers. Moreover, they (110) criticized
the “evolving” system by which people must reach absolute destitution to access state
assistance and urged consideration of “a right to protection and care”, especially for
“dependent ageing person[s]”.
The next iteration of vagrancy legislation brought little substantive but radical
procedural change. Enacted in 1977, the Destitute Persons Act transferred powers of
arrest from police to social welfare officers 36. Hence, the social welfare ministry attained
legal mandate over the regime, from coordination of raids to arrests and rehabilitation
centers. Vagrancy legislation became social welfare policy: further removed from its
penal origins in theory but largely identical in practice.
Officers conducted over 1,000 raids nationally between 1977-1979, averaging
five weekly in KL in 1979 (Begging Bares 1979). In 1981, an investigative newspaper
report on DBD decried the practice of indefinite detention saying, “many become mad
over time…[or] stay until they die” (Dregs 1981). This prompted a 1985 amendment
limiting detention. The explanatory statement conceded that indefinite detention was
“longer than necessary” and caused “emotional disturbance [that] could adversely affect
rehabilitation programme[s].” (Act A638 1986)

36

Also, officers appointed by local authorities.

98

1990s-2016: Criminalization as care
Through the 1990s, Southeast Asia remained a key site for the
transnationalization of production, and swelling migration and capital flows. While the
1997 Financial Crisis served as impetus for neoliberal structural reform throughout the
region, it also kindled popular mobilization and protests against the hegemonic powers of
US and international institutions. In Malaysia, Prime Minister Mahathir advanced
neoliberal tendencies towards furthering privatization, liberalization, and deregulation as
he tightened authoritarian rule. He also made KL a symbol and vanguard site for
Malaysia’s global future by further interweaving it into global and regional politicaleconomic circuits.
Malaysia had minimal “big government” infrastructure for paring down, but
neoliberal principles discouraged expansion of social protections through the bogeyman
of the welfare state. Near double-digit GDP growth through 1997 fueled optimism and
dampened tension brought by rising drug addiction, pressure on low-income households,
and swelling numbers of foreign workers. The late 1990s reformasi movement
mainstreamed social protest and paved new avenues for civic dissent. As Mahathir’s
successors ascended in 2003 and 2009, popular support for Malaysia’s ruling party
waned and protests grew, spurring authoritarian backlash and new strategies for retaining
power.
In the 1990s, Mahathir sought to make KL a “world-class” city though heightened
urban development, directing multiple mega-projects and a new limelight to the capital.
This intensified colonially-rooted aversions to “dirt, disorder, and underdevelopment”
(Bunnell 2004:299) and fostered policies for removing the urban poor. Federal agencies
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expanded anti-vagrancy sweeps using vagrancy law statutes to form multi-agency
operations (operasi bersepadu); thereafter, Immigration and the newly-established
National Anti-Drug Agency, among others, became regular partners in enforcement.
Hence, while welfare officers could only provide “rescue” by sending arrestees to
rehabilitation centres, other agencies could investigate and charge vagrancy offenders for
crimes. Homelessness was presented as a menace to Malaysia’s economy and dignity, as
when the social welfare minister proclaimed tourists must “not see these people making a
nuisance of themselves [so we] round them up and put them in rehabilitation centres.”
(Minister orders 1996)
The Ministry of Women, Family, and Community Development began bolstering
anti-vagrancy infrastructure in the 2000s by building four new DBD centers, more than
doubling capacity. It also sought to extend protections and powers for enforcing officers
in a 2008 bill (DR18/2008), later withdrawn. Ministry data show persons taken into
custody rising between 2000-2009. Concurrently, the Ministry took steps to engage civil
society, noting growing grassroots involvement in homelessness outreach. In 2010, it
collaborated with NGOs in a KL street count. The following year, Prime Minister Najib
announced he would direct federal funds to a pilot shelter. Nevertheless, federal agencies
unfurled deterrence measures like the KL campaign, “Henti Memberi, Kami Prihatin
(Not Giving is Caring)” designed to educate the public that almsgiving fuels addiction
and anti-social behavior.
The Ministry’s plans to criminalize begging, announced in April 2014, involved
neither criminal legislation nor police. Rather, Minister Rohani explained, vagrancy law
would be amended to make begging “an offense” because current provisions included
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only avenues to rehabilitation centers and “no element of punishment” (Nurbaiti). Since
begging remains a punishable offense under the 1955 Minor Offenses Act, the Ministry
was proposing the creation and management of a new offense governed through its own
powers. While this announcement elicited little response, plans revealed in June
prompted greater scrutiny.
That summer, public protest erupted following statements by Minister Rohani and
the Federal Territories Minister. The former promised an escalation of anti-vagrancy
raids in KL for Ramadan, and the latter introduced plans for metropolitan bylaws
criminalizing almsgiving and food distribution. Ramadan’s significance as a charitable
season, and restrictions on civil liberties affecting the public writ large, sparked tumult.
Civic organizations vowed to disobey municipal bans, and unflagging media attention to
the controversy inspired both agencies to reverse rhetoric and undo plans within days.
Minister Rohani insisted publicly that raids were “rescues”, while proposed bylaws were
abandoned. The Ministry proceeded with smaller-scale sweeps throughout KL during
Ramadan, spurring opposition politicians and NGOs to call for vagrancy law’s repeal.
Eventually, the Prime Minister, Minister Rohani, and the Federal Territories Minister
sought to regain public trust by visiting NGOs. Within days, Prime Minister Najib
promised a new shelter.
In 2016, the Federal Territories Ministry and a property developer collaboratively
launched the Homeless Transit Center in KL, currently administered by a governmentlinked NGO. Rohani’s Ministry is formalizing a new stance that supportive homelessness
programs be managed by civil society and lower government tiers; thus, it urges action
from state and local governments and NGOs. Simultaneously, it continues to enforce
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vagrancy law with 1,500 persons caught nationwide in 2015, and plans expansion of its
“rescue and rehabilitation” regime.

The Trajectory of Vagrancy Law
Here, I answer my queries about whether KL’s homelessness regulation is
undergoing a “punitive turn”, and what these events could tell us about the “settled”, or
unsettled, nature of historical patterns in policy development. I examine KL’s policy
trajectory vis-à-vis its global relationality and territorial particularities. Together, these
denote Malay(si)a’s regulatory paradigm. I conclude with lessons from history.

Global relationality
Just as cities are “relationally (re)constituted [through] ‘citation, allusion,
aspiration, comparison, and competition’” (Bunnell 2015:1984), the arc of changes in
laws and institutions applied to KL from the 1880s has been distinctly shaped by translocal references. Management in late nineteenth century KL began with arrests and
imprisonment, reflecting practice in early US-UK penal regimes. While philanthropic
organizations offered aid, agencies in KL increasingly reoriented engagement with
vagrancy as a social rather than criminal justice concern, analogous to contemporaneous
penal-welfarist approaches. Such change is illustrated in treatment of decrepit vagrants,
who emerge as an exceptional category differentiable from the able-bodied. Their
difference was formalized in law, and later prompted creation of management strategies
such as facilities for “relief” and “refuge,” derived partly from European systems.
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From here, a penal-welfarist fusion took place in vagrancy institutions, redesigned
according to Western-influenced “modern notions” prescribing state intervention. State
institutions sought to segregate and repatriate vagrants when providing for welfare, based
partly on Singaporean precedent. In the 1960s, rehabilitation centers became central
institutions for “care and rehabilitation” consistent with globally-prevailing ideas of the
protective duty of welfare agencies. By 1977, the regime was entirely recast under the
social welfare ministry’s jurisdiction. Over this course, punitive and supportive aims
were married in myriad ways. Policy objectives counterbalanced early aims of control
with “care and rehabilitation,” while enforcement incorporated both policing and
(compulsory) care. Thus, penal-welfarism emerged in forms that reflected British origins
by simultaneously drawing from and perpetuating binaristic classification of people as
pitiable or dangerous. Nonetheless, policy perceptibly stressed care over punishment.
Policy developments from the 1990s also reflect relational influences. For one,
the expansion of anti-vagrancy raids to target drug users and undocumented immigrants,
among others, mirrors “broken windows” policing. In the 2000s, the social welfare
ministry doubled its capacity to detain destitute persons via newly-built “rehabilitation”
facilities. Such neoliberal transformations were achieved through extension of existing
domestic institutions and infrastructure. Additionally, since 2010, state initiatives for care
have been increasingly devolved to local government and civic and private actors. In
Malaysia, as elsewhere, such changes are not driven solely by government since civic and
private sector actors vie for state sanctioning to manage care. Together, these
transformations mark a recalibrated orientation in state anti-vagrancy regimes: whereas
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agencies foregrounded care in the 1960s and 1970s, by the late 1990s they used demands
for increased “security” to justify enhanced policing and forced removal.

Territorial particularities
While globally-travelling ideas shaped homelessness regulation, territorial
particularities reveal that their adoption did not mean wholesale accession to “imported”
frameworks. Rather, local factors had a decisive effect on outcomes. For instance, when
public officers advocated for long-term refuge for decrepits, demands for economy
nevertheless lead to systematic repatriation. Similarly, rights and justice sworn to
vagrants in the 1960s relieved prisons of having to incarcerate them, but did not prevent
government from sidestepping their constitutional protections. Moreover, recent
government calls for enhanced deterrence and punishment have spurred no “turn” to
police involvement. In each case, globally-mobile ideas were reformatted to fit local
circumstances, ideologies, and institutions.
Relative to Euro-American developments, Malaysia’s (post-)colonial context
uniquely shaped policy interventions. For one, demographically, most unsheltered
persons in colonial KL were Chinese and South Asian laborers who existed at the
intersection of three marginal positions: as “sojourners” at the bottom of class and ethnic
hierarchies. Their disposability, manifested in processes leading to vulnerability to
homelessness lasting into the 1970s, shaped institutionalization of homelessness policy.
As repatriation became a leading strategy, the scale by which people were expelled from
the city meant that homelessness management became less a matter of social engineering,
aimed at reintegrating persons into national life, and more of segregation of non-
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productive workers and citizens. The “civilization” achieved through this rationalization
was an exclusionary one, consistent with KL’s colonial ethos.
Similarly, whereas emerging social protections shaped penal-welfare complexes
in post-imperial countries, the absence of such protections shaped Malay(si)a’s. For
instance, police remained the lead agency responding to homelessness until 1977, and in
1965 the social welfare ministry undertook responsibility for care only after vagrancy
arrests. From 1977, in the absence of a welfare state, or universal rights to protection and
care, the welfare ministry took on a distinctive role by serving as arbiter of policing and
detention vis-a-vis the Destitute Persons Act. This “rescue and rehabilitation” regime,
bolstered by abundant substructures for “control” and “care,” led to Malaysia’s twentyfirst century approach to homelessness criminalization: through social welfare initiatives.
This “punitive turn” does not appear as a “startling reversal of a settled historical pattern”
(Garland 2001). Instead, it resembles a continuation.
Although impulses for care were occasionally stymied or abandoned, care should
not be construed as the weaker force. Care, like punishment, was repeatedly proposed,
opposed, subverted, and renewed in negotiations that shaped management. Notably, its
influence was channeled through Malay(si)a’s (post)colonial constraints; agencies
governed in accordance with raced, classed, and otherwise hierarchically-ordered
imperatives. In response to resistance by vagrants to detention and repatriation, some
civic and government figures adopted more stringent practices (e.g. “iron bars”) to ensure
state care, while others challenged the cruel nature of the same. Criticism of overlycoercive care, coupled with demands for more genuine protection, proliferates in
nineteenth and twentieth century historical records. Multiple agents in and beyond
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government continually (re)assessed these imperatives, making care and punishment
alike driving forces in policy.
Today, too, the force of multiple agents and events bears down on vagrancy
regulation. Public protest halted the adoption of new criminalizing measures. Yet, federal
agencies remain reluctant to repeal vagrancy law, which is central to historicallyentrenched logics justifying removal of “destitute persons” and the material substructures
for doing so. Policy change would require realignment of each and, as public pressure
remains marginal, little impetus for change exists. Moreover, neoliberal ideas reinforce
state aversion to social assistance by absolving government of social responsibility. As
before, engagement with globally-circulating ideas inspires policy transformation, but
changes are channeled through local logics and imperatives.

A Malay(si)an paradigm of homelessness regulation
In Malaysian vagrancy law, care and penality have historically functioned as two
sides of the coin of control. As in Europe, they variously intertwine with imaginaries of
the deserving and undeserving poor, defined by who is “fit to work”. However, in
practice, punitive and supportive aims have been fluid and nearly transposable. In the late
nineteenth century, for instance, forced labor and confinement were prescribed as
curative measures for “sickly” and “sturdy” vagrants alike. This obscure terrain between
supposedly clear-cut policy categories illustrates the ambivalence bound up in regulation:
of knowing and not knowing the problem, of wanting and not wanting to help. As the
colonial government navigated penal and social reform, it fused deterrence strategies of
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banishment and imprisonment with benevolent strategies of care to produce a succession
of hybrid institutions like vagrant wards, decrepit settlements, and rehabilitation centers.
In post-independence Malaysia, rhetoric surrounding implementation of vagrancy
law has been both disciplinarian and compassionate. Mass round-ups and raids, albeit
contrary to constitutional rights, have been presented as a win-win response that delivers
an orderly city while providing compassionate “rescues” to those in need. Thus, it
discursively becomes practical and ethically palatable as policy. However, within the
dichotomous framework of deterring the dangerous and rescuing the pitiable hides a
paternalistic parlor trick: namely, the will and wishes of persons experiencing
homelessness is rendered irrelevant. Once one qualifies as a “destitute person,” only the
state is deemed capable of making decisions affecting one’s life. Such a view of
“destitute persons” opens a Pandora’s box of violations; it reasons that an individual’s
best interests are served by suspending their civil rights.
This alienation of the rights and interests of persons experiencing homelessness
rests at the core of vagrancy law. The doctrine of parens patriae, derived from English
common law, confers the state with power to act as guardian for individuals regarded as
incompetent or otherwise incapable of making decisions (Stauts 2000). Consequently,
legal systems, welfare practice, and public attitudes in many Western and Westerninfluenced societies assign persons “in need” with a different “bundle of rights” (Failer
2002). Vagrancy laws historically rendered people experiencing homelessness secondclass citizens via parens patriae, essentially denying them “full personhood” (Feldman
2004). The logic of this control, amalgamated from seemingly opposed-yet-intertwined
tendencies for compassion and repulsion, is shared among multiple countries in the
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global North and South. Such connectedness may facilitate transnational circulation of
strategies that amplify globally- and historically-entrenched imperatives of punishment
and care. The danger to persons experiencing homelessness and, by extension, our
collective ability to prevent or reduce homelessness lies not in punishment or care but in
the overarching frame of legal paternalism that merges these. Overcoming such a danger
requires an alternate frame: one that does not harm the rights, undermine the human
securities, and obscure the voices, knowledge, and interests of persons experiencing
homelessness. Decisions that are forced upon unsheltered persons, founded on
convictions of their incapacity, are instruments of control—and a barrier to constructively
addressing homelessness.
O’Sullivan (88) notes that “a core response to homelessness was always
punitive.” Supportive aims, too, consistently drove responses. While politics of inclusion
and imperatives of care are essential for developing and enacting policies to improve
individual and collective security, history shows that they will not necessarily lead to the
same. Inclusion not set on the terms of persons experiencing homelessness risks
prolonging difficulty and exacerbating harm as it may channel paternalistic drives to
“care and control”. Care must be enacted outside of paternalistic frames.

Conclusion
Recently proposed measures suggest that globally-mobile policies carried
neoliberal, or “punitive turn,” trends into Malaysian homelessness regulation. However,
closer examination reveals that pre-existing ideologies, institutions, and pressures were
also activated as pillars for reform. That is, change emerged from both relational and
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structural contingencies: while federal proposals signaled references to neoliberal
strategies elsewhere, they were also built from historically-established logics and
practices. This pattern has surfaced for over a century. Historically, cross-border flows of
policy ideas—channeled, challenged, and transformed through interface with variouslysituated agents—have generated KL’s particular trajectory of regulation.
In Malaysia, shifts under neoliberalization indicate that, as before, locally-situated
politics of punishment and care variously drive change in homelessness policy.
Simultaneously, punitive and supportive state practices have upheld principles of parens
patriae, undermining basic rights. Such principles embrace caring, yet raise grave
questions about the nature and legacies of paternalistic care. Why would rights and
protections be null once one is “destitute”? Does “rehabilitation” address the interests of
persons experiencing homelessness? Public and civic actors have long posed such
questions, stimulating continual resistance and change.
Comparison of change across developmental contexts reveals that
neoliberalization in homelessness regulation need not revolve around “rolling back” state
social programs, which may be sparse in global South countries. Nevertheless, my
account shows that the Malaysian neoliberal state “rolls out” disciplinarian restructuring
alongside disavowals of responsibility for care. Important here is that (post-)colonial
states historically consigned care to family, community, and non-government sectors, and
this enduring practice is now (re-)emerging in (post-)imperial states. This affirms
Halperin’s (2015) claim that neoliberalization deploys practices once “submerged” (70)
by Keynesian-welfarism in the global North, such that “post-Keynesian spatial
policies…[resurrect] pre-Keynesian structures” (90). Greater study may show that this
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disavowal of the “social state” has led to intensification of anti-vagrancy codes and
parens patriate doctrine in homelessness regulation globally. While these were
“submerged” in the global North by welfare state interventions that reduced
homelessness, they nonetheless persisted—as evidenced by Britain’s 1824 Vagrancy Act,
still in force, and US substitution of vagrancy law with criminalization and coercive care.
This longitudinal account illustrates history’s bearing on the neoliberalization of
homelessness management, as mediated through contemporary ideational and
institutional foundations in policy. Tracing the local re/formation of regulatory regimes
over time facilitates identification of globally- and locally-rooted factors in policy
changes. Additionally, this study shines a light on the prominent role of historical policy
mobilities in not only shaping policy re/formation at the city scale, but also underpinning
the transnational construction of policy fields, such as homelessness management. The
global historical dissemination and propagation of vagrancy laws facilitated development
of divergent city strategies for homelessness management that, with greater study, ought
to evidence shared imperatives of care and control.
Across other policy fields, too, long histories of cross-border policy travels have
produced global constellations of comparable policy regimes. These contemporary
regimes—albeit mutually distinct—necessarily incorporate logics and institutions that
potentially resonate across borders. The synergies that exist between policy approaches
enacted by regimes that are differently-located yet historically-entangled likely direct and
reinforce policy trends at multiple scales. That is, in KL as elsewhere, it is precisely
because globally-mobile neoliberal ideas activate nodes of illiberal rule historicallyembedded in local policy that agents may select them as “legitimating discourses to
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justify existing repressive practices” (Sylvestre). Hence, examining neoliberalism’s
global reach requires understanding, through global historical studies, how contemporary
governance structures, policy regimes, and inter-referencing strategies have evolved.
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CHAPTER 3. NEOLIBERALISM’S IMPERIAL PAST
THE JANUS FACE OF ANTI-HOMELESS URBANISM AND TOKYO’S MODERN
SOCIO-SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction
The 1995 Tokyo metropolitan government report, “A New Urban Problem and
Future Responses” marks a turning point in public and government thinking around
homelessness in Japan. Historically, homelessness was characterized as a matter of “idle”
“vagrants” lacking stable employment or accommodation, as defined in a century of antivagrancy codes. However, regulatory attention shifted in the 1990s to “homeless
persons” engaging in “inappropriate use” of public space. In its 150-page report, the
Metropolitan Policy Planning Office (1995:64) underscored detrimental effects of
homelessness on “the health and well-being of urban society” and advocated action to
ensure “[everyone] including homeless persons can live like human beings”. This view
underlay Japan’s first national policy on homelessness, enacted in 2002, which newly
defined “homeless persons” as people living in public space.
In 1996, tensions felt by government regarding urban redevelopment and swelling
recessionary homelessness led to actions that heightened public scrutiny. Notably,
metropolitan agencies evicted one large encampment in Shinjuku Station’s West Exit
corridor while arguing that construction of a $3-million walkway required it. Agencies
prepared accommodations for evictees but most encampment residents refused to leave
prompting a stand-off and intense media attention (Hasegawa 2006). News reports
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highlighted divergent public views: some identified camps as unwelcome and supported
clearance, while others voiced dismay regarding copious investment in walkways over
welfare. Ultimately, the clash fueled movements that brought greater civic involvement
and rights protections into policy.
These tensions birthed Japan’s first national policy, designed to manage the twin
interests of bolstering “self-reliance” and ensuring “appropriate use” of public facilities
under welfare and urban development agencies, respectively. Metropolitan- and localgovernment agencies also replicated this dual-focus structure fusing social and spatial
remedies in subsequent measures involving housing-first initiatives, public work
programs, and public assistance, each offset by enhanced securitization of public space
(Kitagawa 2010). These policies have had distinct socio-spatial effects, as users are
directed to facilities and districts that historically accommodated housing-insecure
populations. Additionally, people who find no refuge in the current system face mounting
prohibitions against using tents, benches, and public facilities essential for their survival.
Abundant literature on neoliberalization details these socio-spatial effects, marked
by the production of “certain kinds of spaces” (Mitchell 1997:304) for reintegrating or
relocating people (Peck 2001). Moreover, Sparks (2012:1512) finds historicallyentrenched ideas of “homeless deviance and dependence work alongside and through”
neoliberal policies in a “mutually constitutive” relationship with spatial management and
social citizenship, as evidenced elsewhere (Feldman 2004; Gowan 2010; Lyon-Callo
2004) including for Japan (Hayashi 2015; Marr 2015). However, historical inquiry into
homelessness regulation in Global North contexts rarely extends prior to welfare states,
thus averting the “traumatic mid-twentieth century” (DeVerteuil 2012:875) of
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imperialistic militarism and genocidal violence; therefore, why prior ideas would be
symbiotically attached to neoliberal-era policy is left to speculation. Here, I ask: exactly
how are past ideas bound up in responses to homelessness, spatial management, and
social citizenship?
In this chapter, I argue that historically-entrenched ideas concerning homelessness
are produced from—and essential to—imperial formations (Stoler 2008), defined as
asymmetrical relations of power that, in homelessness regulation, propagate dual-focus
regimes of care and control governing “disorderly” peoples and spaces. In a review of
policy history, I illustrate how public agencies have variously merged corrective and
compassionate logics and practices when crafting interventions, and how these responses
simultaneously distract from—and reinforce—a nullification of the right-full existence of
persons experiencing homelessness. I argue that this systemic delegitimization of
homeless existence via policy lies at the root of anti-homeless urbanisms, and not the
supportive, punitive, or ambivalent ambitions thereby conveyed.

Why the Imperial Past?
Increasingly, scholarship explores what is old rather than new about neoliberal
transformations. This multidisciplinary literature builds on postcolonial studies of
imperial-colonial relations and their lasting effects in fields like urbanization (King
1976), social science (Blaut 1970), and economic development (Rodney 1973). Today,
scholars extend postcolonial theory into “cosmopolitan” methodologies that decolonize
Eurocentric and nation-state-centric paradigms by “globalizing” social (Go 2016) and
spatial (J Robinson 2011) inquiry. This involves “thinking across” different experiences
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and allowing for pluralities (J Robinson 2011:2), rather than adopting essentialist,
hierarchical constructs. Such cosmopolitan approaches facilitate identification of
“webbed connectivities” (Patil 2017) across time and space that reveal the globalhistorical roots of contemporary political-economic systems, including relations of
domination (Stoler 2006; Narayan 1995) and other legacies of empire (Halperin 2015).
Colonial and capitalist expansion have been justified through ideas of racial
difference since feudal Europe (C Robinson 1983). By Japan’s Meiji era (1868-1912),
Western imperialist powers traded mercantilism for liberal ideology, prompting states to
pursue wealth by governing individuals (rather than markets) in what Foucault (1980,
2008) calls a society of normalization intent on suppressing abnormalities. Nineteenth
century Lockean thought spurred litmus tests of liberal citizenship, barring inclusion to
people deemed incapable of reason like children, persons of insufficient “breeding” or
“inheritance”, and colonial subjects (Mehta 1999:59). Thereafter, ideas and institutions
borne from the liberal codification of hierarchical relations and the Eurocentric legal
ordering of people (Benton 2016) proliferated in policy systems globally owing to EuroAmerican imperialist expansion. Concurrently, Meiji leaders navigated the global order
by emulating and challenging dominant Eurocentric models (Hane 2016) in an autocolonial mode of Westernization (Komori 2004) that produced Euro-normative yet
distinctly Japanese policy systems.
In Japan, industrial capitalist development began with dispossession of socially
marginalized groups from their customary lands, particularly those believed to fall
outside of Japan’s civilizational boundaries. This had a lasting impact on communities
considered external to: national polity, like Koreans and Ryukyuans; Japanese culture,
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like indigenous Ainu people; and the pre-Meiji social order like outcaste burakumin
(Hane 2016; Howell 2003). Consequently, from the late nineteenth century, urban zones
formed in Tokyo where these and other impoverished and uprooted people were spatially
contained (Dohi 1994). During Taishō (1912-1926), yoseba (day labor) districts emerged
from these zones where people grappling with socio-economic insecurity found casual
employment and accommodation, including sons and daughters shed from rural
households under male primogeniture systems (Aoki 1989; Fowler 1996). Hence, yoseba
“turned vagrants into laborers” (Takenaka 1969), though labor and housing insecurity
meant yoseba also intrinsically produced homelessness (Eguchi 1979).
In Japan (Bayliss 2013; Soejima 2014) and globally (Beier and Ocobock 2008),
nineteenth century homelessness regulation was exemplified by vagrancy law and the
ambiguous legal category of vagrants, while twentieth century management introduced
welfarist strategies producing “a hybrid penal-welfare structure” used for rehabilitation
(Garland 2001:28). As neoliberalization in the Global North has advanced the roll-back
of twentieth century social protections and roll-out of new disciplinary interventions
(Peck 2001), historically-entrenched “tropes of homeless deviance and dependence” have
bolstered an otherization of homeless existence that delegitimates claims to social
citizenship (Sparks 2012:1512-1514). In Japan, decades of deindustrialization, welfare
reforms, deregulation, and urban redevelopment have produced similar outcomes,
disproportionately impacting persons experiencing homelessness and yoseba
neighborhoods characterized as “dark” and deviant (Haraguchi 2016; Hasegawa 2006;
Hayashi 2015). For instance, recent policies direct attention to people “dependent” on
public space via policy narratives that downplay welfare-state principles of universality
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and state responsibility, while advocating neoliberal tenets of self-reliance and publicprivate partnerships (Sasanuma 2008; Kitagawa 2010; Marr 2015; Yamada 2008).
Growing attention to gentrification (Haraguchi 2016), anti-homeless
securitization, and their effects of reducing “tolerant space” (Murota 2017) has stirred
Japanese scholarly interest in Smith’s (1996) revanchist theory, owing to its unwavering
critique of profiteering urbanisms, increasingly state-led, that defend displacement in
furtherance of redevelopment. Revanchist theory and related literatures underscore
exclusionary forces advanced by neoliberal socio-spatial regulation as state interests shift
from “underwrit[ing] social reproduction” in cities (Smith 2002) to “penal treatment of
urban marginality” (Wacquant 2009:21). However, controversy surrounding revanchist
discourse and its “dystopian” and “singularly punitive” tenor, has motivated scholars to
pursue more “sympathetic” critiques of neoliberal shifts (DeVerteuil 2012:875). Such
scholarship elucidates “more complex, and more varied” (DeVerteuil et al 2009:655)
arrays of responses spun from not only punitive but “kinder and gentler” (Murphy
2009:323) aims. A “shifting constellation of policies and practices” (Greene 2014:320)
constituting a “blurry geography” of hybrid practices has emerged to include
“compassionate revanchism” (Hennigan and Speer 2018), “coercive care” (Johnsen and
Fitzpatrick 2010), and “therapeutic policing” (Stuart 2016).
Lawton (2018), borrowing from this scholarship on hybridity, offers that today’s
revanchist city has a double: “the seductive city”, which reshapes gentrifying processes
by incorporating promises of justice and diversity. Such dualisms and hybridities not only
blur the neoliberal present, but also saturate our modern global past, as underscored in
postcolonial literature on colonial-imperial relations (e.g. Bhabha 1994). Therein, social
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control through law has hinged on punitive and therapeutic responses (Black 1993) that
pervade Euro-American “harsh relief practices” (Piven and Cloward 1993:177). Indeed,
welfarism itself was established in metropoles by European reformists who mimicked
nineteenth century colonial civilizing missions, epitomized by Salvation Army’s projects
in “darkest” London (McLaughlin 2000). Hence, policy histories reveal care’s “dark
side” of paternalistic tendencies (F Robinson 2016) that “sometimes function
ideologically to justify or conceal relationships of domination” (Narayan 1995:135).
However, in homelessness regulation, continuities across nineteenth, twentieth, and
twenty-first century policy regimes remain largely unexplored.
As DeVerteuil (2012:880) notes, this gap derives partly from academic silences
surrounding “the traumatic mid-twentieth century” of war and genocidal violence,
leading to the demise of the imperial world order. These silences limit our ability to
interrogate modern governance because they hide “basic political contradictions of
nation-states [as seen in] gaps between the political freedoms implied and the political
limits experienced” and their ramifications under neoliberalism today (Kelly and Kaplan
2004:140). Such silences reinforce still-unexamined narratives that postwar policy
regimes established by imperialist states are structurally more compassionate or just than
their predecessors. By extension, divorcing the postwar global order from its past also
risks inferences that neoliberal configurations and complexities are wholly unique. As
Halperin (2015: 69) notes, recent changes in state forms and political-economic
governance are far from “historically unprecedented”.
While DeVerteuil (2012:879) is correct to dispute “singularly punitive” narratives
of neoliberalism, his argument against “pessimistic” discourses urges a “historical
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appreciation” that optimistically adopts a singular view of mid-twentieth century
genocidal violence as “intentional” and incomparable to today’s “sort of non-intentional
structural violence”. I offer this not to single out DeVerteuil but underscore how
hegemonic narratives and silences that selectively put various pasts to rest insulate
particular histories from examination. The imperialist past and neoliberal present are
neither the same nor entirely separable. However, defending human life, rights, and
securities requires knowing the ties and divides between them.

Tracing Imperial Formations (1868-2019)
-Research and WritingThis chapter draws on archival materials collected to identify “legacies of empire”
(Halperin 2015) and “imperial formations” (Stoler 2008) in modern homelessness
regulation spanning criminal justice, welfare, and urban development policies. Primary
sources included policy documents, agency reports, and social survey data procured from
the National Archives, National Diet Library, Tokyo Metropolitan Archives, and public
information disclosure systems.
Because government records and archival resources emerge from ambiguous
processes and power relations that “[contain, obscure, or deny] certain historical truths”
(Trundle and Kaplonski 2011:409), I adopt Stoler’s (2009) critical approach to qualitative
content. I read materials both with and against the grain to appreciate and scrutinize
documented claims in an archival ethnography centered on recovering the experiences
and voices of subjects. For analysis, I adopt Fingfeld-Connett’s (2014) methodology for
systematic review, including processes of coding data, memoing, diagramming, and

119

reflection. I identified regulatory systems by first selecting and sorting data on pertinent
institutions, laws, and practices and then conceptualizing policy structures. Last, I used
historical process-tracing to examine key mechanisms in and outcomes of interventions
across public agencies.

This history merges with Foucault’s population geographies (Legg 2005), or the
advent of modern population regulation through classification systems and penal-welfare
structures (Garland 2001). Therein, social policies cultivated biopolitical divides between
insured and non-insured lives to realize socio-spatial control (Duffield 2008). Because I
focus on street homelessness, and have limited space, I do not detail the myriad
rehabilitative and custodial institutions produced by social policy for people deemed
“deserving” of protection like women, children, and people with disabilities. However, in
reviewing history, I include signposts to indicate how these institutions emerged as
mechanisms for reinforcing a social and spatial order necessarily premised on raced,
gendered, abled, and classed capitalist divisions of labor. As this paternalistic policy
framework re/defined “deservingness” of aid over time, street homelessness—and urban
zones like yoseba districts—became spaces for cultivating and enforcing “self-reliance”
among those excluded. Consequently, this chapter narrates how imperial formations, or
uneven relations of power, in policy and practice across the twentieth century led to
disproportionate homelessness among outwardly able-bodied men. Likewise, I highlight
how policy frameworks prolong and capitalize on homelessness, including through
yoseba, as an institution for these unprotected “labor-capable men”.
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In doing so, I adopt the following terminologies:
•

Labor-capable - refers to people deemed suited to labor in the discretion of
policy agents, considering age, mental and physical condition, etc.

•

Men - refers to people deemed men in the discretion of policy agents.

•

Vagrants, sick travelers, beggars - are specific policy terminologies. I use these
terms only where they illuminate popularized policy categories.

As outlined earlier, marginalized groups have historically been over-represented
in yoseba populations. Although I do not detail these histories, I urge readers to
remember that “labor-capable” has been globally and historically aligned not only with
gendered (male) bodies but also with raced and classed ones (Roberts and Mahtani 2010)
owing to locally-situated ideas of who is more suited to casual labor and
enforced/coerced “self-reliance”.

I divide Japan’s modern history into five epochs of socio-spatial re/development
encompassing: early Meiji (1868-1899), early twentieth century (1900-1929), wartime
(1930-1945), postwar (1945-1979) and neoliberal (1980-2019) eras. Trends introduced
pre-exist, persist, and overlap across periods. Nevertheless, each represents a key stage of
institutional and ideological development, discussed further in subsequent sections. By
this history, I demonstrate how state control over spaces and people, realized through
Janus-faced arrays of compassionate and corrective interventions, rely upon the
delegitimization of homeless existence. I argue that this delegitimization, a legacy borne
from imperialism, is the heart of the imperial formation.
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Imperial beginnings: Status containment to spatial containment (1868-1899)
Homelessness today is perhaps regarded as a problem experienced by people
rather than of people, but historically this was not so. For centuries, European antivagrancy codes created a legal truth of homelessness as an anomaly. As the globalizing
imperialist order engaged Japan in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, people without
stable employment or abode were deemed spiritually and materially “savage” and
anathema to enlightened modernity. Meiji-era leaders understood that the world’s great
powers would not recognize Japan as an autonomous civilized state unless its people and
urban landscapes exhibited such spiritual and material—social and spatial—development.
The Meiji Restoration, or Japan’s transition to a renewed imperial state, was
largely guided by bureaucrats trained in Western studies. Hence, the Meiji mission of
“rich nation, strong army” brought Western-influenced capitalist development and
empire-building, primarily achieved by merging Western and Japanese institutions.
Western powers imposed some policy changes through unequal treaties like Westernstyle penal codes. Other changes, like the abolition of caste, emerged under less explicit
pressure. As Japan’s modernization untethered people from feudal orders and stimulated
new territorial claims and expansion, outcaste burakumin, Ainu, Ryukyuan, Taiwanese,
Korean, and other subjects disproportionately endured dispossession and impoverishment
owing to displacement from social economies under imperial systems.
Japan’s feudal caste systems had allocated social roles to vagrants, but Western
models of regulation required their removal from public space. Japan’s Justice Ministry
ordered Tokyo’s first clearance in 1872 prior to a Russian diplomatic visit to avert

122

“weakened public security and national shame” associated with homelessness (Dohi
1994:57). Police detained hundreds, later transferred to a new poorhouse. Able-bodied
poorhouse residents were subsequently conscripted to urban development projects
advanced by the Home Ministry, rebuilding the very spaces they were driven from (Dohi
1994).
From the 1880s, penal and welfare programming more closely reflected structures
and logics of Western liberal capitalist systems. Japan’s first penal code (1880)
criminalized vagrancy, defined as lacking stable abode or employment. Vagrants were
presented as criminals who “disturb and intimidate others [and] yearn for unlawful
property…[harming] both public and private” (Yokairei 1892). Rights advocates
challenged anti-vagrancy measures, but authorities argued that “vagrants’ activities
obstruct human freedom [so they] earned their fate.” (Yokairei 1892) Reinstituting public
order—previously organized though caste systems—required relinking subjects to
community and state through allegiance to the modern economy, measured according to
labor. Hence, anti-vagrancy codes became crucial instruments for interrogating individual
relations to the political-economic system.
Early Meiji welfare policies offered limited material aid. Sick Travelers
Assistance Regulations (1871) authorized police to pick up people incapacitated along
roads and public spaces, sending those without homes to the poorhouse. Relief
Regulations (1874) obliged communities—not the state—to care for the poor, but offered
rations to non-labor-capable persons lacking caretakers. Home Ministry officials insisted
that Japan, unlike Europe, must offer only sparse relief to prevent any “loss of
independent spirit” (Akaishi 1982:315) but encouraged private-sector actors to help the
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needy. Philanthropist Shibuzawa Eiichi modeled this altruism by taking charge of
Tokyo’s poorhouse, eventually limited to sick travelers. Vagrancy statutes were used to
arrest outwardly healthy people vilified in media reportage as “maggots”, known to live
along district borders and evade police by crossing jurisdictions (Tokyo’s Maggots 1891).
In the late 1880s, urban development involved spatial segregation of lower-class
communities, presumed to carry contagion. Segregation included: bans on kichinyado
(cheap lodgings) in Tokyo, excepting peripheral zones like Asakusa and Ueno, alongside
laws authorizing police surveillance of kichinyado occupants. Studies on homelessness
described vagrants as comprising societies with people of various ages, genders, and
(dis)abilities. One 1896 survey of ragpickers found 95% stayed near kichinyado in
Asakusa and Ueno. Poorhouse records show sick travelers were predominantly workingage adults found in kichinyado districts where employment brokers clustered (Muzenshi
1903). Overall, police occupied the frontlines of homelessness regulation as they
monitored kichinyado, rescued sick travelers, and arrested vagrants—all in districts
formed by law to facilitate surveillance by containing poverty.

The private realm made public: “Improving social infrastructure and inner life” (19001929)
Imperialist expansion and laissez-faire capitalism cohered the globalizing order.
Japan adopted a coordinated market economy and German-influenced paternalism in
social policies. Western powers recognized Japan’s constitutionally limited democratic
government as evidence of its modern, autonomous status and dissolved the unequal
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treaties by 1899. Moreover, Japan’s 1905 victory in the Russo-Japanese War rendered it a
“great power” globally, which bolstered domestic support for the imperial state.
Increasingly, people viewed themselves in relation to the world. Qualifying exams
for civil servants required proficiency in international law and European languages.
Policymakers and practitioners regularly referred to foreign sources and attended
international conferences on law and development. Mass media, too, connected people to
the world such as by reporting on vagrancy abroad.
Public investment in social infrastructure accelerated after the 1900 enactment of
Kanka (Reform) Law, inspired by Protestant movements in Europe and Japan. Reformist
ideology was instrumental in spiritually binding subjects to industrial capitalist society as
it limited liberty to “self-governing” individuals—defined as people imbued with virtues
like industry, sobriety, and self-help. Conversely, poverty was treated as evidence of
virtue’s absence—either through willful deviance or blameless incapacity. Hence, by law,
poverty undercut claims to liberty. Poor people deemed unable or unwilling to work, like
sick travelers or delinquents, were obliged to enter rehabilitative or reformatory
institutions. Labor-capable persons could only claim autonomy if they pursued
employment; hence, reformists opened employment services, typically specialized
according to gender, nationality (i.e. Japanese, Korean), and class.
Japanese reformist movements adopted European colonialist rhetoric, as seen in
publication of In Darkest Tokyo (1894), modeled after William Booth’s book In Darkest
England, depicting the “dark” nature of lower-class neighborhoods and the “light” of
virtuous labor. Japanese researchers launched surveys, including Tokyo’s earliest on
beggars (1909) and vagrants (1910), while political leaders, scholars, philanthropists and
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industrialists began collaborating on reform agendas “to prevent [poverty] and provide
aid where it already exists” (Hiro-Chusa 1913:1). Persons associated with homelessness
were portrayed as existing on a spectrum from pitiable to dangerous, all adjacent to
criminality. Muzenshi (1903:6) noted, “vagrant youth start earning through begging and
later…become pickpockets and muggers…before finally becoming habitual criminals
and sick travelers.” Tropes specific to women also emerged, especially as gendered labor
divisions (i.e. male breadwinners, dependent housewives) became widely accepted in the
1920s. These featured women or girls who start begging or sex work, contract disease,
and then turn to exploiting children and joining organized crime (Sechiyama 2013).
Hence, social interventions were intended to forestall or end criminality by assisting
people based on their ability and will to work and nurturing self-governance. Shibuzawa
himself endorsed labor-based solutions, highlighting reduced prison expenses and
increased productivity as benefits.
Gendered labor-market segmentation and its relation to homelessness was clear
by Meiji’s overwhelmingly female first industrial workforce in the 1900s. Because young
women were expected to work only provisionally and remain virgins until married, they
were subject to lower (non-breadwinner) wages, severely restricted mobility (i.e.
dormitories, curfews), and greater job insecurity relative to male counterparts. Shelters
and employment services mushroomed around kichinyado. Surveys showed that
Asakusa’s employment brokerages served mostly women seeking factory and domestic
work, yet homelessness predominantly affected men as unemployed women were either
rehoused by marriage or lost to trafficking (Kitaura 1913). Increasingly, public agencies
centered male experiences of homelessness, often treating women as corrupting factors
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(Sake and women 1926), while expanding both criminalization of sex work and women’s
assistance programs.
Labor division also shaped urban spatial development, as seen in heightened
incorporation of productive (e.g. industrial) and reproductive (e.g. residential) zones and
infrastructure in city planning. This birthed yoseba districts as, in the 1920s, Tokyo’s
newly-founded Social Affairs Bureau invested 500,000 yen (USD$23 million today) in
lodging houses, followed by public markets, cafeterias, and bathhouses to support the
reproductive routines of labor-capable men and extend their workforce participation.
Officials stressed that material aid would ensure laborers could subsist on dismal wages.
Hence, laborers remained poor, and anyone worse off presumably had only themselves to
blame.
Recurring crises over the 1910s and 1920s introduced social unrest. Public
agencies expanded social programs in response, but refused economic aid lest it create
dependency and corrupt “beautiful Japanese traditions of family and community support”
(Yasui 1933:77). City government introduced the Homen-Iin system, a volunteer network
that infused state authority into everyday lives (Garon 1998) and sought to reduce
poverty through inculcating industriousness and conservative values. Inclusionary state
programming targeting the working classes—including universal male suffrage in
1925—grew with industrialization, especially since imperial growth relied on workingclass labor. Correspondingly, marginalized groups leveraged their productive value in
social movements to gain state protections.
Public commitment to welfare led to improved social infrastructure (setsubi), but
practitioners prioritized shaping and improving subjects’ inner life (seimei) above all else
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(Yamamuro 1925). Diaries of labor-capable men staying at free shelters detail their
anxieties—most related to socio-economic factors compelling them to work (Tokyo
Social Bureau 1928). This includes verbal abuse by workplace supervisors,
discriminatory public attitudes, and distress caused by just the possibility of missing
workdays due to weather, illness, abure (being sent away), or need for rest. Diarists
articulated problems posed by day labor and proposed solutions like new forms of social
assistance, rectification of inequalities, and avenues to steady work, underscoring that
policy and prejudices mandating industriousness exacerbated, rather than resolved,
hardship.

Welfare as empire’s burden (1930-1945)
Japan faced a financial crisis in 1927 and the global depression in 1930. Together,
these revived public skepticism regarding capitalist modernization. As one day-laborer
noted, modernization brought convenience like electricity, but also generated “despair
and suicide” (Tokyo Social Bureau 1928:64) After the 1931 Manchurian Incident and
subsequent military takeover, public agencies abandoned economic liberalism and
individualist dogma. Japan instead pursued a centrally-managed “co-prosperity”
economy geared towards territorial expansion and mass mobilization, justifying greater
micro-level interventions. From here, social policy priorities shifted because, as Japan’s
Welfare Council (1956:80) acknowledged, “helping the weak and needy was
overshadowed by [concerns] for securing human resources and [expanding] production
capacity.”

128

The 1929 Public Assistance Act, partly “borne from Western ideas and legacies”
(Yasui 1933:3), redefined welfare. Like its predecessor, the Act barred labor-capable
adults from assistance. However, it newly obliged the state to provide aid, mediated by
state-appointed Homen-Iin agents. Homelessness fell beyond the scope of direct
assistance, but state agencies expanded shelters for protected categories of people like
youth and single mothers, while offering new accommodations and work programs to
labor-capable men. Accordingly, Homen-Iin escorted people to police, employment
services, and shelters as necessary. They also visited yoseba to urge laborers to abstain
from vice and send remittances home.
In the early 1930s homelessness and unemployment skyrocketed. The Social
Affairs Bureau acknowledged that anti-vagrancy roundups were ineffective, given
circumstances, and launched new shelter and public work programs. While easing
roundups, Tokyo’s Police Superintendent-General visited facilities with reporters in tow
to meet “overjoyed” residents (Maruyama’s Visits 1930). However, within months,
agencies resumed a critical tone. City government identified vagrants as the capital’s
“cancer” and “shame”, and justified plans for clearance by pointing to available support
(Clearing Asakusa 1931:1205). New repertoires emerged supplementing care with
clearance, and vice versa, to seemingly offer subjects a choice between carrots or sticks:
assisted integration or banned, degraded existence. For instance, police began distributing
lodging tickets and material aid while advising (rather than coercing) vagrants to leave.
Similarly, by 1935, men staying in Tokyo’s free shelters were being sent to work in
Manchurian colonies—by welfare officers.
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The Social Affairs Bureau endorsed public welfare as vital for industrial growth
and emblematic of an enlightened national family. The wartime magazine, Manchuria
Graph, reinforced this message in one story about a Japanese resident in Shanghai who
gives food daily to an elderly Chinese beggar (Sanada 1940). One winter day, he wakes
from a fever to find the beggar dead, frozen in his waiting spot. This allegory for
benevolent care, commitment to community and empire, and arguably the impossibility
of supporting dependent populations concludes with the protagonist’s despair for failing
the man. Yet, unlike empire’s imaginary of its own benevolence, people marked as
vagrants felt isolated and scorned. For instance, one diarist bemoans: “Just because we
stay at [free shelters] does not mean we are any different as human beings; I don’t
understand why society treats us like beggars” (Tokyo Social Bureau 1928:61)
Compassionate and corrective repertoires featured prominently in imperial
policies because they explained state interventions—and, hence, relations of
domination—in the language and limited democratic systems of liberty, marking what
Foucault (2008) calls the democratization of sovereignty. The mandated order—despite
claims of generosity—required people like the beggar and shelter residents to remain in
precarity, because of imperialist anxieties surrounding dependence, especially where
manifested in men. Sociologist Koto Eichi (1933:171) explores what he terms
“loneliness” among people without stable abode, suggesting it emanates from both social
denial of their humanity and political denial of their rights. His analysis underscores their
historical unbelonging—of being granted aid but not full personhood by paternalistic
Janus-faced interventions.
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Making then insulating the universal state: discretion, self-reliance, devolution (19451979)
Firebombing and Japan’s Fifteen Years War left Tokyo in shambles. The postwar
Allied occupation (1945-1952) guided democratization by indirect rule: GHQ/SCAP
oversaw policy development while Japanese agencies independently instituted systems.
All actors referred to new international models in setting standards, like the Beveridge
Report. Specifically, social policy under the Welfare Ministry was deemed fundamental
to realizing a stable, democratic society.
Postwar social insurance systems, like their prewar counterparts, were stratified
and paternalistically-predicated on male-breadwinner models. Still, there was a
conspicuous ideological shift away from reformist “uplift” towards universalist
egalitarianism. Japan’s Livelihood Protection Act (1946) obliged government to provide
aid “without favor or discrimination”; however, one statute contravened this by denying
eligibility to persons “lacking will to work”. While 1950 revisions eliminated the statute,
they also introduced the objectives of “guarantee[ing] basic living standards and
promot[ing] self-support”. Hence, the specter of idle vagrants continued to haunt welfare
policy.
Tokyo’s population exploded as war survivors and returnees rushed in, many
homeless. Tokyo reportedly held three-quarters of Japan’s unemployed and Ueno
remained synonymous with homelessness. Government agencies renewed imperial-era
institutions like roundups, shelters, vagrancy laws, and yoseba districts and reorganized
them into systems that distributed aid unevenly, with “true” vagrants granted the least.
Police, railroad management, and municipal welfare officers quickly launched roundups
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under GHQ guidance and rehoused thousands in makeshift shelters, albeit without legal
basis (Iwata 1992). Agencies classified people in custody according to perceived need,
relegating “true vagrants” to the poorest quality accommodations and aid (Iwata 1995).
People with any strength typically escaped these shelters, as conditions were better
outdoors. Concurrently, city government erected tents in Tokyo’s yoseba, Sanya, where
people avoiding shelters or seeking work would go.
A self-organized union of people sleeping in Ueno Station challenged stigma and
isolation by posting flyers in 1948 declaring, “To all women and men, young and old…
who are penniless… come build a bright and joyous family with us” and take “pride that
we are outstanding Japanese citizens, not vagrants” (Otani 1948:146). Yet, Tokyo’s
landscape changed as postwar reconstruction progressed. After anti-vagrancy statutes
were reintroduced in 1948, police used arrests to drive people into Sanya until it began
drawing people naturally in the mid-1950s as a laborers’ town. Sanya’s population
peaked at 15,000 in 1962, and pre-Olympics construction boosted employment among
younger laborers. However, repressive policing, continued from prewar governance,
produced tensions that escalated after installation of Japan’s second-largest police
outpost, dubbed “The Mammoth”. Periodic riots erupted in response to police
mistreatment and inaction over labor exploitation. Central and municipal agencies
launched Sanya Taisaku (Measures) in 1960, intended to enhance economic security
among residents via employment services and work programs, with limited social
services for families.
American influence in welfare policy reinforced prewar concerns for dependency
and inaugurated casework and discretionary decision-making as pivotal mechanisms for
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staving off moral hazards. Manuals instructed caseworkers to “[fix] problems beyond
those addressed by Livelihood Protection” (Japan College 1960:359) such as failure to
understand “industriousness and productivity deliver one from poverty” (Furusawa
1955:42). Although livelihood protection was both universal and a constitutional right,
welfare offices launched welfare corrections (fukushi teiseika) in the mid-1950s designed
to cut recipient benefits and, by extension, ensure “self-reliance” and reduced expenditure
(Japan College 1960). Additionally, protocol (until 2003) barred persons lacking stable
housing from receiving aid; instead caseworkers directed them to welfare homes that
advocated “becoming self-reliant and leaving” (Shinagawa 1955). Moreover, supportive
facilities like these deliberately incorporated penalties, like discomfort, to discourage
extended use (Akiba 1959). By 1956, sociologist Isomura Eiichi observed that Sanya’s
day-laboring residents were “outside the scope of modern welfare" and targeted for
scrutiny not despite, but because they lacked secure housing, family, and employment
(Iwata 1992:21).
Before the 1964 Olympics, Japan began promoting Tokyo as a “welfare city”,
highlighting its constitutional guarantees to basic living standards as evidence of its
advanced status. This, however, heightened anxiety around homelessness. Citywide
clearances targeting tents appeased some, while sweeps conducted by police and welfare
officers dispersed rough sleepers. Welfare-city strategies also prompted administrative
restructuring (1963-1967), bringing social infrastructure under lower, ward-level
management and homelessness-related policies under multiple levels of governance,
diffusing authority. With this greater discretionary power, ward offices used sweeps
(renamed “street consultations”) and “extra-legal support” measures (i.e. aid outside
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Livelihood Protection, such as emergency rations or transportation fare) to shuttle people
between districts and pack them into Sanya (Iwata 1995). Local welfare and police
officers swept the city, acting jointly as protectors and enforcers, to direct labor-capable
men to Sanya while mobilizing welfare-state resources for protected categories of
persons, such as women, children, and the elderly or ill. Welfare officers also worked
with psychiatric facilities to direct Sanya’s rough-sleepers into voluntary and involuntary
commitment.
Over this span, city planners classified Sanya a slum using racialized US
definitions concentrating on broken families, blight, and minority enclaves. This affirmed
public views of Sanya—already known for its violence, vice, single parents, unregistered
children, and proximity to Korean and burakumin neighborhoods—as menacing. Men
unable to find work relied on selling blood, such that many fainted and died in the streets.
However, this symptom of poverty too was held against them as evidence of an ingrained
lazy, shameless, or degenerate character. Quickly, Tokyo launched slum clearance
campaigns to relocate married and single-parent households from Sanya’s “dark”
neighborhoods to nearby wards deemed more appropriate for women and children. By
1970, only unattached labor-capable men remained.
In the 1970s, metropolitan agencies recognized Sanya’s deepening poverty as
linked to population ageing and diminished employment but persisted with status-quo
solutions: stop-gap labor programs. Despite knowing that employment programs were
ineffective in addressing poverty among ageing laborers, authorities declined to act
beyond existing paradigms, instead doubling down on self-reliance. As homelessness
spread across Tokyo, central and metropolitan development agencies launched small-
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scale clearances around roads and public infrastructure, all while installing fenceenclosures to prevent re/entry. Tokyo Councilor Hosaka Sanzo publicly said that
homelessness policy was in a detestable state—particularly in Sanya—citing institutional
failures to act regarding public suffering and death. The Sanya Taisaku Office (1976:1)
warned that Sanya’s once-renowned “dynamism” had become “stagnant” and asked:
“What will become of Sanya’s laborers?”

Turning the public realm private (1980-2019)
Japan’s bubble economy brought record-level affluence co-existing with
mounting homelessness. In 1980, a day laborer—mistakenly reported as homeless—set a
bus on fire in Shinjuku, killing many. In response, local governments starting with
Shinjuku began organizing so-called “environmental cleanup” committees to lead patrols
for removing vagrants.
Tokyo’s 1995 report emerged from pressures posed by climbing homelessness,
predominantly among labor-capable men over 50, alongside stalled redevelopment in
Shinjuku. Metropolitan agencies planned to convert available Sanya Taisaku
infrastructure into a centrally-managed city-wide shelter system. However, the televised
spectacle of aggressive evictions in 1996 spurred public debate surrounding
homelessness, evictions, and human rights. Through 2002, cases carried to the supreme
court also elevated related concerns. Hence, government fused ideas from its 1995 report
with rights-based frameworks to produce new national policy in 2002.
The 2002 Homeless Self-reliance Support Act established protocol for
interventions targeting “homeless persons,” defined as people living in parks and public
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facilities. First, the Act explicitly frames homelessness as a constitutional rights violation,
obliging action by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW) to “bolster selfsupport” among homeless persons, which affirms only the second aim of Livelihood
Protection (“guarantee[ing] basic living standards and promot[ing] self-support”).
Funding was channeled to MHLW for outreach services (25%), temporary shelter
accommodation (10%), and employment services (33%) to guide people to labor markets.
These measures are classified as extra-legal support (hōgai-enjo) because they fall
outside of and cannot be used with Livelihood Protection. Second, the Act authorizes
public facilities to “ensure appropriate use…wherever occupation by homeless persons
hinders this”, overseen by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
(MLIT).
Over 10,000 people entered the self-support system in its first years, but few from
Tokyo’s encampments. Hence, metropolitan agencies launched the 2004 Transition-toCommunity-Life Program, targeting tents in metropolitan parks. Two metropolitan
bureaus oversaw the 2004 Program: Social Welfare managed recurring park patrols and
voluntary rehousing into subsidized apartments while Construction managed park
security to prevent re/settlement and “inappropriate use” of public space. Early on, civic
groups and tent residents questioned program terms, including limited two-year contracts
to subsidized housing and ineligibility for Livelihood Protection. Nevertheless, the
program initially proceeded unmodified, forcing tent residents to choose between
subsidized apartments or tents, each potentially untenable in the long term. Within two
years, tents declined by half—and in ten years, by 90%. Additionally, post-911 and postearthquake (2011) security concerns became pretext for so-called upgrades in smaller
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parks involving enclosures, privatization, and anti-homeless architecture, further
shrinking access to public space.
In 2008, the grassroots Haken-mura campaign brought attention to a
mushrooming demographic of young, contingent workers facing homelessness, borne
from late 1990s deregulation. Public shock at the co-existence of poverty and
employment, particularly among youth, led to public support for correcting discretionary
practices that denied Livelihood Protection to labor-capable men. Also, despite the
yoseba’s post-industrial decline, government agencies modified policies to bring more
people into Sanya. For instance, in the early 2000s, Sanya Taisaku public works
programs—once limited to day laborers—began accepting people without day-labor
experience. Similarly, Livelihood Protection—once denied to anyone in doya (SRO)
accommodation—became accessible in 2003.
Today, metropolitan agencies promote revitalization of urban parks, dubbed “the
face of Tokyo”, particularly in Ueno, Shibuya, and Shinjuku (Ishikawa 2007). Recent
projects include Shibuya’s New Miyashita Park, a mall-top park modeled after New York
City’s High Line and entrusted to Mitsui Fudosan for development. Metropolitan
departments also have plans for a new soccer stadium in Shibuya’s Yoyogi Park. These
projects are preceded and accompanied by evictions and securitization, alongside new
housing-first programs under Shibuya governance. Securitization has hinged on
prohibitions against tents and other settlements enforced by patrols for ending
“inappropriate use” of public space. These modes of control targeting “homeless persons”
and complicating their survival is meant to incentivize entry into expanding welfare
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programs. In fact, metropolitan agencies expect uptake of housing-first programs in all
twenty-three wards by 2020.

Neoliberal policies have extended pre-neoliberal strategies of channeling laborcapable men away from universal welfare protections towards stopgap aid and selfreliance programming, albeit via new and more structured fusions of clearance and care.
Moreover, while policies include innovations like rights protections and supportive
housing schemes, socio-spatial impacts remain unchanged. Anti-homeless securitization
proceeds apace, and unsheltered persons are directed to Sanya through revised welfare
and public works programs. Yet, government agencies have failed to address historicallyrecurring structural exclusions that fundamentally undercut the efficacy of aid.
Yamada (2008) illustrates this in an analysis of government data showing that
Livelihood Protection, or universal aid, performs as well as homelessness-specific “selfreliance” programs in supporting exits from homelessness. Moreover, he shows it would
be more effective if not for drop-out rates largely attributable to conditions imposed on
people applying while homeless. That is, because regulations prohibit anyone in a state of
homelessness from receiving aid, people who are in fact homeless must enter registered
medical or residential facilities for accommodation, where aid is conditional on their stay.
Yamada reveals that state reliance on these ad hoc spaces—often run by non-profit and
private-sector actors—positively correlates with drop-out rates. In reality, state reliance
on these spaces negatively correlates with its ability to adequately support clients inside.
These ad hoc, state-mandated institutions exist not because certain people lack
stable homes, but because people experiencing homelessness—historically and today—
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are legally treated as lacking self-governance. This lack ostensibly justifies imposing
limitations on their autonomy, including restricting constitutional rights to aid (granted in
Japan’s Article 25). Moreover, these facilities necessarily complicate exits from
homelessness because, by extending state powers and paternalistic relationships of
authority over “homeless persons", they embody unilateral and undemocratic systems of
rule over users, dictating their interests and needs, at best, and rendering them vulnerable
to abuse and exploitation, at worst.
These spaces have long been essential to the imperial purposes of homelessness
regulation, which requires unilaterally correcting the anomaly of homelessness. That is,
the legacy of vagrancy law, and the corpus of the imperial formation, rests in policy
systems and processes that nullify the right-full existence of people experiencing
homelessness as a platform for myriad punitive, supportive, and ambivalent interventions
that, furthermore, engender spaces that continue to suspend or diminish rights for the
sake of rehabilitation. The Janus-faced nature of regulation functions to validate the
necessarily undemocratic delegitimization of homelessness within myriad policy fields.
Moreover, this delegitimization, a vessel for relations of domination, obstructs society’s
only avenue to effectively addressing homelessness: by the knowledge and guidance of
people with first-hand experience.
Policy’s configuration complicates users’ channels for voice and exit, resulting in
chronic failure to serve their needs or interests. For instance, regulation is complicit by its
inaction in widespread political disenfranchisement, whether due to a lack of address or
other conditions hindering political engagement. Additionally, because people
experiencing homelessness are systematically excluded from the democratic public, they
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have few avenues for holding public service providers to account. This insulation of
public and state-mandated service providers from direct accountability discourages policy
users faced with program failures or hazards from exercising voice; instead, they have
acquiescence or exit (i.e. street homelessness), where exit is delegitimized by its
unlawful/unprotected status. These conditions produced through policy compel users to
endure insecurities and indignities such as medicalization (Lyon-Callo 2004) and abuse,
or choose unprotected existence (Kitagawa 2010). While homelessness carries
innumerable risks, it is nonetheless preferable for many who—through no fault of their
own—find no refuge in the present system. Given the intolerance directed through law
and society towards people marked by abnormalities (Foucault 2008), including but not
limited to homelessness, some people find open space the most tolerant (Murota 2017).

Neoliberalism’s Imperial Past—and Present
The modern configuration of regulation—merging punitive, supportive, and
ambivalent technologies atop delegitimized existence—is not accidental. It extends from
imperial projects of socio-spatial development founded on asymmetrical relations of
power. Social policy and programs developed as instruments atop anti-vagrancy bans, not
as alternatives but enhancements. Consequently, prohibitions over time—such as against
vagrancy, receiving Livelihood Protection while unsheltered, and “inappropriate use” of
public space—have preserved a socio-legal illegitimacy of homeless existence
constraining access to rights and protections. Fundamentally, it is unlawful status, rather
than corrective or compassionate action per se, that is weaponized to compel conformity.
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Arrays of punitive and supportive intents offset rudimentary prohibitions to render
people hyper-visible as pitiable, contemptible, or otherwise in need of rehabilitation and
reintegration (Foucault 2008; Feldman 2004), justifying intervention. Hence, Janus-faced
ambitions perfect the modern configuration of regulation as they direct attention to
problems created by law, i.e. illegitimate existence, or failing to “live like human beings”
(Koto 1933), thereby cloaking the role of law itself, as interventions are contested and
reshaped. This socio-legal entanglement, introduced as Agamben’s (1998) Homo Sacer
and eloquently applied to homelessness by Feldman (2004), ensnares people targeted by
policy—and pervades the temporal and spatial breadth of modern homelessness
regulation.
Responses developed atop delegitimization of homelessness necessarily fail
policy users and society because of how they normalize and propagate forces of
domination like paternalism and violence, which multiply anti-homeless sentiments and
spaces across micro-, meso-, and macro-level geographies. Effects include exploitative
and abusive practices long-plaguing shelter, employment, and other supportive services
(Kitaura 1913; Yamada 2016) and the persistence of policies of questionable efficacy,
like Sanya Taisaku, still active today. By its present configuration, homelessness
regulation cannot produce humane or adequately responsive solutions because it
fundamentally identifies homeless existence as the primary problem, conflating it with
“disturb[ance of]…both public and private” (Yokairei 1892), or socio-spatial disorder,
necessitating pretexts for engagement and spaces for containment above all else. Stated
differently, regulation is schematically-designed to unilaterally correct interruptions of an
imperial imaginary and actually-non-existing socio-spatial order. Its construction serves
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only the ideals and whims of power by authorizing public agents to act unilaterally while
absolving them of accountability. Most tellingly, this configuration—produced from
powers of domination—deprives people experiencing homelessness of legitimate avenues
to caring for themselves on their own terms.

By focusing on continuities from the imperial past to the neoliberal present, I do
not mean to imply that recent decades of change are unimportant. To the contrary, they
connote political and economic currents driving governance itself. For instance,
neoliberal-era insistence on redefining homelessness vis-a-vis urban space underscores a
definitive shift in public-sector priorities: from maximizing industrial productivity to
expanding commercial development through public assets and surplus life (Willse 2015).
Policy landscapes suggest that public agencies were attuned to shifting capitalist logics
since the 1960s, evident in the fusion of slum clearance and private development, policy
stasis vis-a-vis Sanya’s escalating poverty, and mounting urban securitization 37. Today,
policies involve trifectas of evictions, accommodation programs, and large-scale
re/development like New Miyashita Park, each hinging on public-sector coordination and
private- and voluntary-sector implementation. While agencies increasingly embrace
innovative supportive programs and protections, aggressive state sanctioning of and
investment in measures tackling “inappropriate use” of open space suggests that a “new
urbanism” (Smith 2002) and neoliberal financialization, rather than welfarist interest,
underpins enduring political will to address “homeless people”.

37

For US-based discussion, see Weber (2002)
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Because Tokyo’s “blurry geography”—marked by “caring means of control”
and “spaces of care… bolster[ing] anti-homeless urban geographies” (Hennigan and
Speer 2018:2)—traces back to Meiji, it offers a view into how punitive and supportive
rhetorics and aims have co-constituted socio-spatial control across history. Blurry
geographies viewed over time can telegraph the shifting pace and tone of policy across
political-economic restructuring. For instance, two discernable peaks in the synthesis and
deployment of technologies emerge in the 1920s and 2000s, each spanning decades. The
first overlaps with expanding imperial claims to socio-spatial control (i.e. public assets
and services) through democratization and doctrines of “benevolent” public service.
Here, care and clearance became so enmeshed in technologies they seem reversed, with
police leading aid distribution and social agencies sending vagrants to labor colonies. The
latter decades overlap with the neoliberal privatization of socio-spatial control, justified
as a people-centric liberation from state rule accompanied by de-democratizing forces
like marketization of politics. Here, policies advance privatized re/development in
similarly enmeshed form by mobilizing police and infrastructure agencies alongside new
modes of welfare provision to oblige relocation. Interestingly, socio-spatial effects in
each era include blast points (e.g. parks) and capture points (e.g. Sanya; Manchuria)
illustrating control over people and spaces, under both expanding and shrinking state
functions.
Also salient is the state’s enduring exclusion of housing-insecure populations
from democratic publics across and between both eras. This gap between “political
freedoms implied and [political limits] experienced” (Kelly and Kaplan 2004:140) is
exemplified in not only exclusion from universal systems, but also conditions of
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insecurity and indignity propagated via limited aid. Continuities underscore homelessness
regulation’s originary function of limiting claims to autonomy—often through, rather
than despite, avenues to aid. That is, post-war systems upheld prewar logics and
structures designed to enforce limited democracies, which effectively signal a
transnational failure to democratize policy systems in the mid-twentieth century.
Moreover, the deployment of historically-entrenched tropes associated with penalwelfare structures effectively channels public energies into established paradigms of
socio-spatial control (Greene 2014) shrouding and propagating exclusions from social
citizenship.

Undoing Imperial Formations
In describing revanchism, Smith (1996) inverts the language of imperialism as
he introduces “dark and dangerous” forces of gentrifying “pioneers” wishing to cleanse
and reclaim urban frontiers via civil-izing gentrification projects. This characterization
offers a unique corrective to historically-entrenched tropes portraying marginal groups as
the “dark and dangerous” threats. While his “dystopian” narrative may not provide a full
account of neoliberal governance, inclusive of care and ambivalence (DeVerteuil 2012),
Smith (1996) does pointedly challenge modern ideas of progress predicated on “taming”
people and places. In doing so, he lays domination and the imperial formation bare.
Pushback against revanchist theory has produced a fortunate boon of
investigation into the hybrid and intertwining Janus-faced forces of modern regulation.
However, this nuance also carries risks. Legacies of empire, by definition, produce a
“world conceived in binary terms” (Bhabha 1994:20) in which power negotiates for itself
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more nuance and sympathy. Pursuing nuanced views should not be motivated by our own
imperial desires to absolve the present of intentional violence and, instead, relegate it to
the past, or otherwise evade reckoning with actual violence in uneven power structures
that “darken” the name of today’s civilizing agents—who are us. We should seek
evidence of care, but not solace or pardon by its presence. As Murphy (2009:323) notes,
compassionate strategies do not hinder “marginalization… even if some… can be read as
kinder and gentler”. Care is often complicit in systematic dehumanization and a far cry
from justice.
Imperialism, by definition, regards itself as superior to anything else. In the
context of homelessness regulation, this includes actual means employed by people to
survive. Socio-legal arrangements propagated under this pretension—ones that
unilaterally determine what social existence is legitimate—deliberately deprive people
experiencing homelessness of “full personhood” (Feldman 2004), which also absolves
the state of responsibility for their well-being. Tokyo’s policy history shows that
compassionate and supportive measures—like their corrective and punitive
counterparts—fail to genuinely account for the needs and interests of housing-insecure
populations. Instead, they offer anti-democratic responses that constrain socio-spatial
mobility and liberties. History evidences that failure to ameliorate homelessness is neither
rooted in corrective or therapeutic approaches per se—nor is it resolvable by them.
Rather, to achieve these ends, there must be an undoing of the fundamentally
hierarchical, patriarchal, and anti-democratic imperial formations delegitimizing
homelessness itself.
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Ending “the revanchist city” of clearance requires abandoning its twin, “the
seductive city” of care, and ensuring that people have fundamental social, political, and
economic rights—and tolerant space (Murota 2017) wherever they choose to be. Policy
configurations that invalidate the right-full existence of persons experiencing
homelessness, sustained under global and locally-situated processes of modern capitalist
development, have propagated anti-homeless “revanchist” urbanisms and injustices
across history. Undoing imperial formations requires, above all else, legitimizing and
protecting homeless existence. Homelessness regulation under any other conditions will
remain, by design, anti-democratic and weighted against the interest of resolving
homelessness, no matter how innovative frameworks may otherwise seem.
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CHAPTER 4. COMPASSIONATE ACTORS
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AND THE POLITICS OF CARE

Introduction
In Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur (KL), profound change has taken place in regulation
of homelessness over the last twenty years, especially considering prior policy stability
since the 1960s, owing to rapid-fire advance of new regulations, protocols, and programs
under myriad government agencies. In both cities, policy reforms began heading in a new
direction as civil society organizations (CSOs) took up the banner of addressing and
reducing homelessness through the provision of direct aid, which clashed with state aims
of reducing the visibility of homelessness through public order measures. In Japan, this
began in the mid-1990s when the Tokyo Metropolitan Government launched mass
evictions targeting encampments in Shinjuku Station. In KL, it began with increased civic
interest and action regarding homelessness in the late 2000s and accelerated in 2014
when federal authorities attempted to clear the capital of homelessness during Ramadan.
In subsequent years, friction between public concern for the rights and well-being of
unsheltered persons, on the one hand, and state interest in improving the image and
marketability of the city via enhanced public order governance, on the other, has birthed
multiple waves of new policies and approaches.
Japan's cascade of modifications began with the 2002 Self-Reliance Support Act,
which marked the central government's recognition, as per Article 1, of its "duty to
provide routine support to prevent homelessness… [and] bolster self-support among the
homeless" under an aim “to direct resources [to remedying homelessness] in line with
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rights protections, and advancing civic understanding and cooperation". These duties and
aims committed government agencies to efforts that had been sidestepped for decades
under Tokyo's devolved welfare system between the 1970s and 1990s. Subsequent
measures included the metropolitan-level Transition-to-Community-Life Program (20042009), which offered subsidized housing to persons occupying tents in five of Tokyo’s
major parks and ward-level housing-first projects (2017-present), as well as policy
reforms such as the 2008 revision of Livelihood Protection Act guidelines to ensure
universal access, including by people historically turned away for their presumed
“capacity to find work”.
Similarly, in Malaysia, burgeoning public interest in expanding aid has prompted
the federal government to establish two new transitional shelters in KL and new forms of
cash aid for low-income (including unsheltered) individuals and families. Also, with the
accession of Pakatan Harapan and Prime Minister Mahathir to power in 2018, there has
been a de facto break in KL’s anti-vagrancy operations conducted under the Destitute
Persons Act (DPA), Malaysia's central policy on homelessness and a vestige of British
colonial vagrancy law. In each city, forceful opposition by CSOs to harsh public order
measures led to new public and civic sector partnerships that brought CSOs into policy
formulation and implementation. From the perspective of CSOs, such partnerships have
produced what would seem to be fresh opportunity to effect policy change—but they
have also fractured CSO networks as CSOs who do—and do not—align themselves with
government programs are pitted against each other not only in terms of ideological
difference but also by uneven distributions of resources and power.
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Moreover, even as CSOs have proceeded to advance more constructive agendas
of compassion and aid vis-à-vis social policy, government agencies in each capital have
proceeded to advance more rigid control over urban spaces, largely in support of
re/development. In Tokyo, the displacement of encampment communities and individuals
from urban landscapes through codes mandating "appropriate use" of public land—a
A/S

Figure 4. Map of Special Priority Development Areas for Urban Renaissance (shaded).
*My primary field sites include the highlighted areas of Shibuya Station and Asakusa/Sanya
(marked “A/S”; added by author).
Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government (n/d). Bureau of Urban Development

euphemism introduced in the 2002 Self-Reliance Support Act and applied as a
prohibition against survival activities conducted while homeless—has proceeded
alongside re/development projects. Redevelopment initially came into vogue as it
targeted underground corridors in the 1990s before picking up pace in commercial
districts and waterfront regions designated Urban Renaissance Urgent Redevelopment
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Areas (Figure 4) under a 2002 national law 38 designed to “enhance the attraction of cities
and their international competitiveness”. In KL, DPA rescue operations and related
institutions have been expanded by federal agencies as public and private sector agents
have rushed to fulfill Malaysia’s 2010 Economic Transformation Program (ETP), which
C/K

Figure 5. Map of central Kuala Lumpur, showing the River of Life area.
*My primary field site aligns with (6) Masjid Jamek Mosque, (8) Pasar Seni, and (10) Petaling
Street, which may be crossed by foot in 20 minutes. )
Source: (Stevens et al, 2016)

includes the transformation of KL’s downtown district, where homelessness has
historically concentrated, in line with the River of Life (ROL) project (Figure 5).
Consequently, in both cities, people experiencing homelessness are not only targeted by
public- and civic-sector outreach programs but are also regularly monitored and
interrupted by public- and private-sector agents linked to development policies, including
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The Act on Special Measures Concerning Urban Reconstruction
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municipal officers, transportation and sanitation workers, police officers, and security
guards.
Hannah Arendt (1965:79; see also Degerman 2019) calls attention to dangers
inherent to compassion mobilized in the public sphere, especially as a political
instrument, owing to its proto-totalitarian potential for being "enjoyed for its own sake,
[which] almost automatically lead[s] to a glorification of its cause, which is the suffering
of others". This tendency was indeed visible in shifts in homelessness regulation in
imperial states—including Japan—over the first half of the twentieth century, when
imperial and colonial authorities wielded benevolence, among other strategies, to justify
discrimination and uneven power. Compassion, as constructed in today's socio-political
order, is prone to carrying paternalist tendencies that embed in policy the power of
compassionate actors. Such paternalism 39 has been linked to "incoherency,
inconsistency, bias, [dysfunction] and possible corruption" in public function (Kato
2015:36) and, furthermore, undercuts democracy to the extent that “categories of gender,
race, caste, ethnicity, nationality, and…social class… translate directly into categorical
differences in political rights and obligations”, as histories of liberal democracy show
(Tilly 2007:75).
Between 2018 and 2019, I spent twelve months in Tokyo (February 2018 –
February 2019) and six months in Kuala Lumpur (February – August 2019) observing
which public policies are currently enforced, how they are enforced, and what
conceptions of homelessness that underlie enforcement decisions. A majority of my time

39
This paternalism underlies the proliferation of extra-legal systems like Japan’s extra-legal aid (hōgai
enjō) or Malaysia’s rescue operations (operasi mengyelemat).
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was spent interviewing and "going along" (Kusenbach, 2003) with people experiencing
homelessness to observe policy agents and policy artifacts intersecting with and
impacting their lives. This chapter details their engagement with a wide range of
compassionate actors, including public officers in open spaces and voluntary agents at
CSO-run food distributions. In light of research on the de-democratizing effects of
neoliberal marketization in public life, public space, and politics (Tilly 2007; Brown
2015), I interrogate whether the increased inclusion of civic organizations and related
supportive, or compassionate, ambitions in policy processes marks a substantive shift
towards enhanced democratic governance in Tokyo or KL.
For decades, the fusion of government and non-government institutions and aims
has been assumed to have a progressive political effect, as most popularly argued by the
United Nations in its Local Agenda 21 initiative. Based on my fieldwork in each city,
here I consider how CSO involvement and its legitimation by the state relate to social and
spatial governance—and its democratic foundation.

Public Goods and Public Good
Framing the problem: Public agents, perspectives, and powers
—Site 1. TOKYO: The inappropriate nature of homelessness
In June 2005, Tokyo launched the Transition-to-Community-Life Program in
Yoyogi Park by opening a small prefabricated office (see Photo 1, page 153) for
counseling and registering potential applicants from among over 300 Park encampment
residents. The metropolitan government already completed two rounds of registration
elsewhere: first in Shinjuku, Tokyo’s administrative capital, and second in Sumida Park
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by the famed tourist destination of Asakusa. While the metropolitan government arranged
for substantial press and fanfare around the launch of this, Japan’s pilot Housing-First
program, it did not widely transmit information on program terms and eligibility. Articles
noted that registrants would receive subsidized housing for 3000 yen per month, and
access to public work programs. However, they rarely included that eligibility was
limited to people already residing in encampments—only in five designated parks—
rather than anyone experiencing homelessness generally. Outreach and registration
activities were managed by CSOs like Yurin Association, the quasi-governmental
organization responsible for Yoyogi Park’s office. For over 40 years, Yurin Association
has acted as a provider of homelessness-related services for multiple municipal
governments.

Photo 1. The Transition-to-Community-Life office in Yoyogi Park, 2005.
Source: (Murakami, 2005).
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The Program immediately attracted widespread public interest, especially since it
came on the heels of the 2002 Self-Reliance Support Act and Japan’s unveiling of selfreliance shelters nationwide. Moreover, because the Program was Japan's first attempt at
a Housing-First model, it gained support from numerous CSOs, some brought on as
implementing agents. At the same time, many CSOs expressed skepticism as
metropolitan government officers refused to answer key questions, such as whether
housing contracts would be renewable after their four-year baseline, and whether people
declining housing would be permitted to stay in parks. Without assurances in either
direction, many encampment residents feared the Program was a bait-and-switch: that the
offer of temporary housing would be used as a tool to later justify park clearance. Over
time, questions of whether to work with or against policy produced tensions among CSOs
also, weakening relationships despite decades of history collaborating.
While welfare-oriented public agencies and CSOs were at the frontlines of
assistance services and housing provision, agencies responsible for urban infrastructure
retained exclusive control over enforcing protocol for “appropriate use” of public
facilities targeted under the Program’s framework. For example, in 2004 the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government’s Construction Bureau instituted its Terrace Improvement
Office, responsible for the improvement (tekiseika, lit. corrections) of public space along
Sumida River by reducing the number of tents 40. Similarly, the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, and Transportation (MLIT), responsible for monitoring national land like
riverbanks near Asakusa and a national highway beside Shibuya station, also began

40

Sumida River encampment residents in areas targeted by the Transition to Community Life Program
were relocated to alternate sites or evicted after registration for the Program was complete.
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patrols—today managed under its Policy Bureau Division of Planning for Secure Life
(Sōgō Seisaku-kyoku Anshin Seikatsu Seisakuka), established around 2007 41. Officers at
these and other agencies continue to regularly patrol public spaces today.
In August 2018, I interviewed two officers from the Metropolitan Construction
Bureau. Officer Tanaka was responsible for Asakusa’s Sumida River Terrace, while
Officer Harada managed nearby roads and bridges. Officer Tanaka explained their aims
as follows.
People who are homeless are managed under welfare, so they can consult
experts at welfare offices. Our mission, however, doesn’t allow for people
freely using roads and waterways. Public infrastructure is a public good, and
we can’t allow people to just live there. At the end of the day, they must go.
National- and ward-level agencies also observe similar missions when monitoring public
assets. Moreover, agencies have adopted uniform protocol for implementing policy, one
that borrows from CSO strategies for outreach such as using greetings and engaging in
conversation (see Figure 6, next page). By approaching people in this manner, agencies
like the Terrace Improvement Office are able to communicate information on safety nets
like livelihood assistance or Housing First programs. When I interviewed Metropolitan
Government officers in charge of welfare policy, they expressed confidence that current
measures were sufficient for addressing homelessness; in their view, the stickiness of
homelessness as a social problem stems from insufficient public awareness of available
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My research regarding this policy division is ongoing. At present, I believe it may have been established
as part of a push for "barrier-free" transportation systems in 2007 and has—over time—become a policy
division responsible for the interests of marginalized groups such as persons with disabilities, women,
children, and persons experiencing homelessness. Management of homelessness under the MLIT's
Division of Planning for Secure Life (Anshin Seikatsu) interestingly mirrors its management under the
Community Safety Planning (Seikatsu Anzen) Division at the National Police Agency, where the difference
between security/safety referenced in each relates to an individual's sense of security (e.g. relief from
anxiety) in the first instance, and external security (public order) in the latter.
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programs and individual lack of cooperation. Ward-level agencies, on the other hand,
expressed more nuanced views acknowledging gaps in policy and problems related to
service providers. Simultaneously, however, they too stressed the importance of outreach
for informing people experiencing homelessness of options. Hence, government agencies
see outreach as a core, indispensable strategy.

Responsibilities for Managing Parks under Homeless Measures

Figure 6. From the Homeless Measures Manual on Improving Park Management.
*Explanation of coding missing from original

Source: TMG Construction Bureau (2016:16; Translation by author).

However, most scheduled patrols targeting public facilities are conducted not by
welfare officers, but by public agencies or designated administrators responsible for
public assets. As shown in Figure 6, these agents are obligated to “seek out improper
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use”, warn against such use, “instruct people…to take their property and leave”, and
“undertake other daily activities for managing homeless persons”. The expected outcome
is a trip to the welfare office voluntarily taken by policy targets (Figure 7). This appears
as a success because homelessness is presumed to be foremost a welfare matter.
Consequently, the Tokyo Metropolitan Park Association, a quasi-government agency
dedicated to researching park matters, reports that these patrols “send out public officers,
sometimes in teams of ten or more, to ensure [facilities] are more safe, secure, and
pleasant for users 42” (TMG Construction Bureau 2011:2). In 2016, the Construction
Department publicly reported that “pro-active measures targeting homeless persons have
proven valuable and we plan to sustain them as means to improving…security and
satisfaction 43" (TMG Construction Bureau 2017).These assessments make clear that

Figure 7. From the Homeless Measures Manual on Improving Park Management.
Source: TMG Construction Bureau (2016:22; Translation by author)
In Japanese, "Sūjūnin kibo no shokuin de sagyō suru dai-kibo kyōdō sagyō nado no kufū ni yori, anshin
anzen na kōen dzukuri, kaitekina kōen tdukuri ni torikunde iru."
42

43
In Japanese, "Hōmuresu taisaku…heno sekkyoku-tekina torikumi ha ōini hyōka deki, kongo mo keizoku
shite kōen no anzensei kaitekisei no kōjō ni tsutomeruyo kitai suru."
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while policy outcomes are evaluated based on benefit to “park users”, people
experiencing homelessness are not included therein.
When I returned to Tokyo in 2017, I met with Kei, a woman in her mid-40s and
one of under 30 remaining encampment residents in Yoyogi Park. When I asked her
about her experiences with the Transition-to-Community-Life Program, she began by
remarking that Yurin Association had been very helpful during their tenure, offering the
example of their intervention into a matter of domestic violence. For this reason, she
explained, Yurin seemed interested in assisting all encampment residents, and not just
those planning to enroll in the Program. However, she continued, after registration was
complete and Yurin left, park management officers began conducting more
interventionary patrols that involved dictating new rules regarding park use. According to
Kei 44, officers took pictures, identified new infractions, and otherwise strained residents’
day-to-day lives. “No matter what we did," she noted, "they always found ways to
pressure us into thinking we couldn't stay. They started micro-managing our everyday
lives to prevent us from doing what we normally did to get by.”
Changes included enforcing new rules governing the appearance and structure of
tents, which affected whether and how residents did laundry or stabilized shelters against
storms. Kei continued, “They weren’t explicitly telling us we had to leave but it was like
they were thinking of how to make things difficult for us. Some days, they’d approach
someone who was sick or old and ask them, ‘Why are you still here in that condition?
You should go.’” She also noted that when tent residents requested assistance from park

44

October 10, 2018 interview.
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management—like when they saw peeping toms lurking in the woods in spring and
summer hoping to catch women urinating—the office would only half-heartedly respond,
if at all. Kei has grown accustomed to management’s selective attention. Moreover, she
has no choice but to sustain tense engagement with officers from other agencies such as
the Metropolitan Construction Bureau, Shibuya Ward’s Parks and Greenery Office, and
the Tokyo Metropolitan Park Association.
Officer Tanaka of the Metropolitan Construction Bureau offered insight into why
taking record of people identified as homeless has become standard practice. Tanaka
patrols an area along the east side of Sumida River spanning 15 kilometers, or about 50
tents, and patrols this area each week. He engages not only tent residents but also anyone
who appearing homeless. He explained that information collected during patrols, when
shared internally, helps officers build rapport with targeted individuals and, ultimately,
convey advice.
We let them know the benefits of livelihood assistance. Here, they have no
heating or air conditioners, and they can’t use fire…but [through livelihood
assistance] they can move to an apartment—a one-room apartment—with a
kitchen and water. They can be normal, like us, and take baths and showers,
use a kitchen, and have AC. Our duty is informing them that the welfare
office will provide aid—and, after that, they cannot camp like this again.
The protocol for engaging people deemed homeless stems from duties assigned by the
2002 Self-Reliance Support Act, stipulating that public officers must provide information
on welfare assistance, while also enforcing standards of "appropriate use". Consequently,
despite agreement among public agencies that homelessness is a matter of welfare, laws
and practice governing homelessness reveal a blurring between practices of managing
people and those managing public space. Hence, just as welfare officers now regularly
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patrol public spaces for outreach, non-welfare agencies have cemented clear protocol for
engaging and even advising persons experiencing homelessness.
The Construction Bureau's mission to scale down “inappropriate use” of public
space also colors officers’ perceptions of other actions by people experiencing
homelessness. For instance, Officer Harada, responsible for roads, also described his
concern regarding their poor choices, or behavior, as follows.
It would be a relief for us if they went on welfare. These people earn money
collecting aluminum cans…but, frankly, that’s stealing… [T]hey carry
around large bags (like thieves) and fill them with bottles and cans, even
though there are signs stating it’s a crime. They don’t even earn as much as
they would like…. They should just take livelihood assistance.
Harada’s personal view expresses a measured rationalism that condenses people’s options
into two categories: accepting, or refusing, Livelihood Protection. However, the system
of values that compels him to conclude that accepting welfare is the only rational
choice—or, in Tanaka’s words, solid avenue to “be[ing] normal, like us”—is relatively
new. Since its postwar occupation, “dependency” on Livelihood Assistance has been
stigmatized—and this stigma has only recently been reduced since 2004. The
compassionate argument for welfare's importance made by each officer is grounded less
in compassion and more in institutional norms that present the refusal of welfare as
misguided, or “inappropriate”, owing to potential harms to the individual and society.
This view—often manifested in the words and actions of agents, as Kei explained—tends
to underlie tensions between them and the targets of policy.
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—Site 2. KUALA LUMPUR – People in trouble… or causing trouble
I returned to KL in February 2019, after 18 months in Tokyo and a 5-year
absence. Immediately I discovered exponential growth in the number of CSOs
distributing food, offering medical services, and otherwise conducting outreach. Since
homelessness began receiving national attention in 2014—and especially since City Hall
began running KL's newest shelters since 2016—government agencies have been asking
CSOs to follow “proper channels” by directing aid and services to governmentestablished facilities, rather than going to people on the streets. Government agencies
justify these appeals by arguing that CSO action without government coordination wastes
resources by poorly distributing them. As in Tokyo, government agencies like City Hall
aim to bring CSOs into policy and programs, often using the carrot of subsidies and
influence, and the stick of public censure. Hence, over time, CSOs have been integrated
into policy processes, including as implementers of PIT counts, participants in policy
consultations, and advisors or leads in research activities. However, many groups also
openly disregard government advice. On Hang Lekiu Street, where I spent three nights
each week doing fieldwork, I saw about 5-10 organizations independently (without
government coordination) delivering anywhere from 15 to 150 meals each, and even
more on weekends. All passed notices informing the public not to "give food or material
items to people on the streets" (see Photo 2, page 162) but to instead distribute them
through Anjung Singgah, KL’s first homeless shelter, just 30 meters down the road.
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The halt of anti-vagrancy operations in KL, after Pakatan Harapan 45 took power
in late 2018, appears to have been motivated by a desire to avoid courting tension with
CSOs, given recent (2014-2017) upset over anti-vagrancy operations—especially since
civic movements played a large role in facilitating the party's rise. Although night-time
anti-vagrancy operations were informally suspended in KL (that is, without any formal
declaration of a halt), daytime anti-begging operations continued uninterrupted. This shift
in targets—from people sleeping on the streets to those begging, both stipulated under
Malaysia’s Destitute Person’s Act (DPA)—is likely meant to compensate for the state's
truncated ability to enforce the DPA vis-à-vis vagrancy. It appears that the Welfare

Photo 2. Signs posted by Kuala Lumpur City Hall on Hang Lekiu Street.
Photographs by author.

45
Malaysia's first opposition party to win a federal election over Barisan National since independence in
1957.
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Department in charge of DPA enforcement has decided to capitalize on largely
unchallenged negative views of begging to fulfill objectives of reducing or, in
government lingo, “rescuing” so-called destitute persons 46. The shift of operations from
night-time to daytime has been received positively by people sleeping rough as most can
now rest at night without fear of capture. However, people earning income from
begging—disproportionately women, persons with disabilities, senior citizens, and
refugees—now grapple with greater risk of DPA arrest.
Azleena, a 46-year-old trans Malaysian-Malay 47 woman, told me in an interview
that she was caught twice in anti-vagrancy operations, just prior to their halt. When I met
her, she was not sleeping on the streets but rented a partitioned room 48 in Chinatown,
which she afforded through sex work and help from friends, alternately. Like many
people, she cycles between the rented room and homelessness, depending on her ability
to find funds 49. She also kept her room open to trans and gay youth who would stop to
rest, some of whom referred to her as their mother. In summer 2019, she said 50, she was
sitting on Hang Lekiu Street with a large bag that kept her from running when officers
appeared.

46

Generally, CSOs insist that begging and homelessness do not overlap; research by Rusenko and Loh
(2014) and Syafiq and Selvaratnam (2018) show otherwise.
47

In Malaysia, convention is to identify ethnicity after Malaysian. People therefore identify as MalaysianMalay, Malaysian-Chinese, Malaysian-Indian, etc
48
An informal-sector room for rent. Malaysia’s traditional two-story Chinese shoplots are often partitioned
into 7’x4’ cubicles on the second floor, and rented out for 20 Ringgit per night.
49

Some persons, but not Azleena, qualify for disability or senior assistance and can use that income to
double up with a friend to rent rooms, for example.
50

June 14, 2019 interview.
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[One officer] said, if you cooperate with us, you are invited to the lorry, but if
you refuse we will force you inside. So, I thought, what can I do? I just take
my belongings and go inside the lorry. In my thoughts, I worried I was going
to be sent to a camp… [because] the government has the right to arrest
[people on the street]… [Once] we arrived at City Hall headquarters … they
grouped us and then asked for IDs... [After two hours] at 3 or 4 o clock I was
called….[and] they asked me what I was doing [outside]. I explained I was
resting… and they released me, but they don't send us back. We had to walk.
You know how far it is?!
The walk takes one hour for someone healthy, without physical limitations. It takes more
for people who are older, disabled, or unwell and is dispiriting for anyone who has been
kept up all night for drug tests and questioning. Azleena noted that Social Welfare
detained one man who was "rather like childish", and that immigration and police
agencies drove away with several arrestees each. She also added that, on a separate
occasion, the government van drove her and 10 others straight to Rawang, 20 miles
outside of KL, and abandoned them on the side of the road. Although this practice dates
back decades, it now makes the news as CSOs have begun to protest its inherent cruelty.
As night-time operations have receded and CSOs provide evening meals, Hang
Lekiu Street takes on a buoyant energy after dark, especially during its busiest hours of 810pm when over 100 people gather to eat, rest, and chat. However, not all people relying
on these meals are homeless. Approximately one-third join from nearby public housing
complexes and partitioned rooms. Interestingly, I found that many people attending—
regardless of age or geographic origin—saw CSOs as an extension of the government,
that is, as bona fide government actors 51. Thomas, a 33-year-old Malaysian-Indian

51

Such confusion is unsurprising, as political parties in Malaysia have co-opted or created NGOs to serve
as the face of party interests, and voluntary government agents—such as RELA, a voluntary police force—
are both prominent and widely popular. Hence, as with Japan, the outsourcing of social programs to non-
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sleeping on the streets while he is between jobs, responded to my question about the
duties of the Social Welfare Department as follows 52.
Thomas: [They come] down to give donations, food, and necessary items….
Rayna: You see the Department doing this? (Points to people passing out
meals.)
Thomas: Oh. It's hard to know, because they don't have uniforms. He could
be staff, or maybe he’s from an NGO.
Although I initially assumed this mix-up stemmed from his confusion, over time I
realized that most people did not differentiate between CSOs and public agencies, and
that this was because CSOs were becoming the face of government policy. For example,
Loh, in his late 40s, told me that “Every day we have NGOs come and give food. This is
how the government takes care of us and I should be thankful to the government for
that 53”. CSOs not only distribute food from government shelters and conduct surveys on
behalf of agencies but, as Thomas pointed out, public officers patrolling the streets are
rarely in uniform anyway.
The most common example would be plain-clothes police—typically young men
walking in groups of three or more—who patrol Jalan Hang Lekiu 3-4 evenings a week.
Regular patrolling enables them to identify who is new, for questioning. Thomas said
they often approach newcomers, to see if they are using drugs or “ask for their ID to
[check] …if they have jumped bail”. Older men who are less likely to be suspected of

government actors occurs under neoliberal policy models that seem to offer greater political power, and
economic burden, to civil-society, justified via market-oriented and social responsibility rationale.
52

May 7, 2019 interview.

53

I have also heard this response in regard to operations, and I understand it is a relatively safe response for
an authoritarian context. That is, for example, even where people would talk about the failure of operations,
and I would ask for their advice on how to improve, they would assure me that they were grateful that at
least the government tried something.
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illegal behavior tend to welcome the patrols, believing that frequent police checks deter
hardened criminals and drug use, which they fear could bring more danger. Younger
people, like Thomas' friends that evening, are more ambivalent. They explained they felt
like targets and often dealt with questioning. Most said that, as a precaution, they avoided
the area until they were ready to sleep. Their avoidance is interpreted as policy success by
some older people who view them as delinquents.
Stereotypes of people experiencing homelessness—and especially youth—as
prone to criminality justify intense policing of their public behavior. Fazil, a man of
Malay and Chinese descent is in his late 40s, explained 54 that police presence was for the
better because "here, where there are so many homeless people, things can go wrong.”
Badi, a Malaysian-Malay man in his early 40s and new to the streets, was arrested shortly
after I first met him. I heard from his friends that he mistook a plain-clothes officer for an
acquaintance and ran up to the officer yelling. When he returned from jail one month
later, I asked whether the arrest upset him. He said 55, "I was Army, so I know what law is
for. Malaysia has its laws, and I broke the law." Badi and many others spending time on
the streets feel compelled to accept this policing—partly due to the power imbalance, but
also partly out of fear, as they generally view, like Fazil, “homeless people” as markers of
social and spatial disorder. Ultimately, people sleeping on the streets embrace—albeit
reluctantly—state agents as protectors.

54

May 2, 2019 interview.

55

July 13, 2019 interview.
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Redevelopment and regulation
—Site 1. TOKYO – The paradigm of steady decline
Data on homelessness reveals two shifts. First, while men have constituted over
90% of persons counted in national surveys for decades, average age has increased each
year, reaching 61 in a 2016 national survey where over half (55%) of respondents
admitted being homeless over 5 years (MHLW 2016). Second, while the Transition-toCommunity-Life Program reduced the number of tents in Tokyo by 90% in 10 years
between 2004-2014, government agencies at all levels have worked hard to further push
this decline. This is reflected in the metropolitan government’s annual count (Tables 3
and 4 below), initiated in 2003. For instance, results classified by jurisdiction and type of
facility (top) show a steady decline across ward, and metropolitan, and national assets
(top). Therein, metropolitan facilities show declines in parks riversides, which include
both Yoyogi Park and Sumida River. Moreover, the rise until recently in people along

TMG

Ward

Parks
Roads
Riverside
Subtotal
Parks
Roads
Riverside
Other
Subtotal

Railway

Table 3. 2019 Tokyo Metropolitan count of homeless people, by type of facility.
*In each column, numbers to the left are count results; numbers to the right are from previous year.
Source: Bureau of Social Welfare and Public Health (2019a; Translated by author)
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Table 4. 2019 Tokyo Metropolitan count of homeless people, shown by ward.
*In each column, numbers to the left are count results; numbers to the right are from previous year.
Source: Bureau of Social Welfare and Public Health (2019b, 2015, 2004; Translated by author)

metropolitan roads underscores the particular focus on park and riverside assets, which
have historically had higher populations. All other facilities—whether managed under
ward or national agencies or by railway operators—show a steady decline. Tables in
Figure 6 also illustrate steady reductions across most wards, except Shinjuku, Koto and
Shinagawa.
Metropolitan counts occur during daytime hours, when persons experiencing
homelessness are harder to identify in public spaces. Every year since 2016, one Shibuyabased CSO named ARCH has conducted a night-time count and consistently reaches
totals 2-3 times higher than metropolitan counts. This gap makes the news each year
(Over 1000 unseen 2020) and has inspired speculation as to whether public agencies are
deliberately undercounting to minimize impressions of a problem. While this view has
merit, I think the numbers also serve another purpose. Population counts are commonly
believed to measure the efficacy of supportive policies, but I believe their design reveals
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intent to assess progress in enforcing “appropriate use” of infrastructure. These daytime
counts necessarily concentrate on artifacts and people targeted in daytime patrols by the
Metropolitan Construction Department and other administrators. Hence, these surveys
speak volumes about not only the effects of policies, but also their intensity—and
focus—on a very narrowly-defined outcome.
During my 18 months in Tokyo, I saw Shibuya’s landscape transform, especially
surrounding Shibuya station. Shibuya closed Miyashita, its largest park 56, for
construction in 2017 with plans to reopen prior to the 2020 Olympics. Officers from
Shibuya’s Parks and Greenery Office explained in an interview that they patrolled
Shibuya's few remaining parks and adjacent open spaces like bridges and roads to enforce
“appropriate” use where necessary. In late 2018, the Office began installing planters along
walkways under bridges, such as on Mitake Road (see Photo 3, page 170). The officers
admitted that planters serve as part of ward-level measures for addressing homelessness
(hōmuresu taisaku) or, stated differently, effectively bar people from taking shelter in
open spaces. Moreover, as Kenta called to my attention, ward officers had attached signs
identifying planters as part of a work project for people with disabilities; this strategy
was meant to undermine the possibility of protest by pitting the interests of two groups
against each other.
On Saturdays, I attended an outdoor kitchen in Shibuya where volunteers and
attendees—many homeless—shared information about the changing landscape. Small
parks were being closed and barricaded, like one small garden in Jingu-Dori Park where

56
While Yoyogi Park is larger in area than Miyashita Park, the former is managed by the metropolitan
government while the latter is the responsibility of ward-level agencies.
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3-5 men slept. Also, people returning to Shibuya after taking up work, residence, or
rough sleeping in another ward would comment that it was harder to find places to sleep
in Shibuya. Private guards around Shibuya Station had grown stricter over the years and
the availability of public space was in decline. For many people Shibuya was a lifeline
because it is one of only two wards (of twenty-three) that has not criminalized cancollecting. Hence, the effects of metropolitan- and ward-level measures intended to

Photo 3. Barriers placed to prevent people from sleeping or resting beneath New Miyashita Park. One
cardboard shelter can be seen at the far end. Planters were later installed (right).
(Photographs by author)

“improv[e]…security and appeal 57” were highly distressing for people surviving without
shelter (TMG Construction Bureau 2017). As a result of these and others changes, I
found that many, especially younger persons with relatively greater mobility or access to
income, felt compelled to either spend money on resting in internet cafes or restaurants,
or leaving Shibuya for other parts of Tokyo.

57

In Japanese, "kōen no anzensei, kaitekisei no kōjō."
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Among destinations, Tokyo’s historic day-laboring district, or Sanya, was most
popular because of its social infrastructure, like public work programs (offering
approximately $75 for one day of work per week) or access to the Johoku Center’s 12hour drop-in center. Also, because homelessness has been concentrated in Sanya for
decades, numerous CSOs regularly provide meals, medical services, counseling, and
other support daily. While volunteering with one such organization in 2018, I met 76year-old Toya, a former day laborer who has been living and working in Sanya for
decades—both with and without shelter. He told me that Sanya continues to attract new
people, which he attributed to public work programs. I asked whether he thought
stringent security measures played a role and he responded that policing in Sanya has
become, in his words 58, "softer" over the last decade. Viewed together, policies have
enforced decline by sustaining and even expanding Sanya’s public programs while also
reducing exclusionary policing in the district to secure its role as a space for containment.
Policies governing welfare, policing, and public infrastructure all play equal roles in
determining spatial outcomes.

—Site 2. KUALA LUMPUR – Phasing out unilateral rescue, introducing choice
Public agencies in KL are currently transitioning to a new paradigm for managing
homelessness and evaluating policy. The previous paradigm emerged in the early 1960s
as traditional vagrancy laws were modified to ensure both “care and control”, as stated in
policy objectives. This produced the Vagrants Act, a welfare-oriented directive

58

January 9, 2019 interview.
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facilitating the capture and institutionalization of people deemed vagrants or beggars in
remotely located rehabilitation centers. From the Act’s earliest days, data has accentuated
big numbers to underscore the reach of its operations, known today as rescue operations,
and the Desa Bina Diri rehabilitation centers 59 run by the Ministry of Women, Family,
and Community Development (hereafter, Ministry of Women). National data since 2010
(Table 5) shows an increase in the number of rescued persons year-on-year, representing
progress in responses.

Year

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

DPA arrests
1,446
(national)

1,223

1,048

1469

1527

2278

4365

3472

N/A

Table 5. Number of people rescued annually, according to Ministry of Women data.
Source: (Jabatan Kebajikan Masyarakat 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015:157, 2016:153, 2017:136, 2018:132)

I have not yet received clarification of who is included in these annual numbers. I
know that the number of people admitted to Desa Bina Diri, centers, which are limited to
adults (19-59), rarely exceeds 400 persons annually. As I learned in previous years of
research (Rusenko 2013), a disproportionate number of people in Desa Bina Diri have
disabilities or mental illness, like the "rather like childish" man Azleena saw. Rescue
totals also likely account for other people taken into custody by the Social Welfare
Department—like single mothers, pregnant women, senior citizens, and children—and
sent not to Desa Bina Diri but to specialized facilities for women, children, and the
elderly. As Azleena noted, some people are arrested by immigration or police but these

59

In 1965 the first rehabilitation camp was opened in Mersing, Johor. In 2005, a second was opened in
Jerantut, Pahang. In the last 15 years three more have opened: one in Kucing, Sarawak, one in Sabah, and
one outside of KL.
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numbers are probably neither included nor tabulated 60. I often wonder whether numbers
include people taken into custody and subsequently released, which is the vast majority.
Given the spike to 4000 in 2017, I now more firmly believe they do.
The newer paradigm for managing homelessness emerged following the Ministry
of Women’s first homeless survey in KL in 2010, which identified approximately 1400
people sleeping rough in the capital. Shortly thereafter, the Prime Minister’s Office and
the Minister of Women matched resources 61 to launch Malaysia’s first transitional
shelter—and first alternate to the rescue system—in 2011: Anjung Singgah (Figure 8).
This shelter has been limited to voluntary short-term stays and primarily aims to assist
people seeking work. Additionally, it also accommodates people who can be transferred
to civic or civic welfare institutions, but the limited capacity of such institutions keeps
numbers low 62.
Since 2010, interest in population counts has risen, such that the Town Planning
Department at City Hall has taken up GIS mapping of “hotspots” throughout the capital
(see Figure 9, page 175). In truth, this mode of collecting and organizing data borrows
from data administration under the previous paradigm, used to plan courses for mass
roundups. That is, previous generations of officers kept geographic record of where
“destitute

60

These numbers are not available. I believe these arrests are not included in annual rescue totals.

61
Specify here amount of funding from PMO, and the Ministry of Women arranged for one of its own
assets to be converted into a shelter, which would be administered by the National Welfare Foundation, a
government-established quasi-governmental organization chaired by the Minister of Women.
62
This is generally limited to: orphans, women and children escaping domestic violence, people living with
Aids, and some people with disabilities.
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persons” gathered to arrange caravans for taking them into custody. However, City
Hall’s role in managing data appears new. One officer at the Ministry of Women’s Policy
Division clarified in a 2019 interview63 that the Federal Territories Ministry and its
subsidiary City Hall are “the one[s] with the resources and logistics” to manage mapping,
while the Ministry of Women was better prepared to concentrate on policy.

Figure 8. Google map showing Anjung Singgah on Hang
Lekiu Street.
Figure 9. Map of KL Hotspots
Note: Cahaya Suria (see Photos 6 & 7) is on the opposite side Note: Numbers given in red reflect numbers of
of Mydin Kotaraya, approximately 300 meters or 4 minutes respondents to a Think City survey; They are
away.
not a population count. The locations however
Source: Google Maps
were provided by government.
Source: Think City (2019:31)

When I returned to KL in 2019, I noticed that the spatial layout of areas
frequented by people experiencing homelessness had changed. I believe this traces in part
to new institutional arrangements for shelter operations at Anjung Singgah; that is, rather
than having NWF provide all meals and material aid through donations, as it had before,

63

May 30, 2019 interview.
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a system of “integrating” CSOs was put in place. This system emerged as the federal
government asked CSOs to provide assistance only when coordinating with governmentlinked facilities like Anjung Singgah, run by NWF under the Chairship of the Minister of
Women (Photo 4). As mentioned earlier, CSOs that refused to cooperate were said to be
at the root of litter and improperly distributed resources (Photo 5) As the integrated
system took shape, Anjung Singgah also accommodated the wishes of CSOs wishing to
distribute meals to people other than shelter residents. Thus, the shelter became a site for
hundreds of people to come receive meals, services, and material aid on designated
evenings. Consequently, this system brought more people to Hang Lekiu Street, now
KL’s largest "hotspot" (see Figures 8 and 9, previous page).
Mohammad, a young Malaysian-Malay man in his 30s with repeated experience

Photo 4. Malaysia’s new Welfare Minister
on the cover of CSR Malaysia.
Source: CSR Malaysia (2019)

Photo 5. Photos used by media and government to shame
CSOs. Source: New Straits Times (2019, May 21)

of homelessness and currently living in employer-provided accommodations—explained
that the introduction and expansion of services alone does not explain the growth in
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hotspots. Rather, he notes, the spread of construction and redevelopment projects is also
affecting the availability of space, as formerly open spaces are being privatized and/or
developed. He explains that the pressure homeless people feel to relocate is not always
explicitly targeting them.
Spaces are destroyed and rebuilt because of the development, lah 64.
Sometimes the place needs to change or upgrade. Sometimes it's not to
displace the homeless. You see now [in Cahaya Suria Park], they can still
sleep there [despite construction]. City Hall and the Social Welfare
Department ask them to leave but they can still sleep.
He noted that the partial closure of Cahaya Suria (Photos 6 and 7; also Figure 9,
page 175), a hotspot of five years prior, forced many people to seek new sleeping

Photo 7. Cahaya Suria Park under construction in
2019. Chinatown can be seen in the background.
(Photograph by author)

Photo 6. Cahaya Suria Park in 2014, when it was
known as a hotspot.
Source: City After Night (2014)

spaces, as did extended construction along KL's Klang River for the River of Life
project. Hang Lekiu Street in 2014 had only about 10 people sleeping regularly in

64

“Lah” adds stress. It reads as if the word preceding it was italicized.
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the vicinity. However, development projects and the expansion of services at
Anjung Singgah have led to over 1000% growth in numbers.
City Hall, which manages the two newer shelters, also relies on integrated
CSOs for in-house meal provision and other activities including surveys and
counts. The latest survey of persons sleeping rough in KL, conducted by Think City
(2019), a government-linked think tank identifies approximately 80% of
respondents as chronically homeless, defined as homeless for over one year, with
37% homeless for over 6 years. Large open spaces in the capital have become
valuable points for CSOs interested in providing aid to meet with potential clients,
typically in locations near public transport (in consideration of volunteers and
clients) and far from commercial districts (in consideration of City Hall). Increased
interest in homelessness and the social value of charity and volunteer work has led
to a concentration of activity in the Hang Lekiu Street area, owing in no small part
to proximity to Anjung Singgah, which—in largely authoritarian Malaysia—
denotes the government’s blessings to civic actors interested in getting involved.
While police regularly patrol Hang Lekiu Street and other hotspots at night,
tourist spots are patrolled by City Hall during the day. Fazil described the purpose of the
daytime patrols as being to protect Malaysia’s flourishing tourist industry. He explained
that "tourists come between 10am and 4pm so City Hall lets us know that we should not
be not be visible [at those times]". In a separate exchange with an officer from the
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Policy Planning Division of the Federal Territories Ministry, which guides City Hall, I
was informed 65 that these agencies are moving to the frontlines of policy because:
City Hall and the Federal Territories Ministry felt that there is an urgent need
for our intervention… [because homelessness] carries with it serious
ramifications to…Kuala Lumpur if left unchecked, most particularly with
regards to the image of the capital city.
More specifically, City Hall and the Federal Territories Ministry, both non-welfare
agencies, have taken the lead in intervening in homelessness to remedy what they identify
as “discomfort and obstruction to businesses and other city dwellers”. Such action is, in
their view critical for fulfilling agency objectives of maintaining KL’s international
image, particularly vis-à-vis tourism. When it comes to homelessness today, measures
under welfare and public infrastructure agencies—the Ministry of Women and City Hall,
respectively—are being modified and recalibrated, while policing alone appears to
continue with minimal change.

New strategies and in/securities
—Site 1. TOKYO – Eviction: Where force advances, reason recedes
Not all of Tokyo’s visible reductions in homelessness are attributable to patrols;
there have also been repeated evictions since enactment of the 2002 Self-Reliance
Support Act (see Aoki 2010; Sasanuma 2008) counter to its aim to “reintroduce sociallyexcluded persons like the homeless into society to actualize the spirit of the
Constitution’s Article 11 (Guaranteeing human rights) and Article 25 (Right to minimum
standards of living)” (MHLW 2005). Government agencies have enacted several
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May 26, 2019 email correspondence.
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evictions under administrative subrogation, such as one in Miyashita Park in September
2010 and several in Koto Ward's Tatekawa Riverbed Park in 2011 and 2012. Other
evictions, including one series of three evictions in Shibuya in June 2011, have been
premised on the need for urgent infrastructural repairs, and thus use claims of public
safety to override legal rights against eviction. More recently, the Olympics have
provided public agencies with powerful rhetorical justification for initiating eviction, as
evidenced in 2016 at Meiji Park where evictions forced not only park residents but also
residents of nearby public housing 66 (Inaba et al 2018) to make way for the construction
of an IOC Headquarters.
Meiji Park’s tent residents spent months protesting the impending eviction, as did
many in the public housing complex. Legally, the closure of Meiji Park would violate the
Urban Parks Act as the municipal government had failed to establish an alternate park for
evacuation purposes, as required. Consequently, encampment residents confronted
officers sent to remove them regarding the state’s audacity in violating its own laws while
"you criticize us for supposedly violating ‘appropriate use’ statutes." (Orinpikku OidashiYamero 2016). Ultimately, the national government handed the project over to the Japan
Sports Council, a quasi-governmental agency that used a temporary court order to evict
residents. Today, evictees are suing the Japanese government, IOC, and JSC for unlawful
eviction because—as one plaintiff, Fukui, says—other agencies might replicate this
strategy if government “got a taste of success” 67. Fukui used the Japanese proverb,
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Ironically, public housing had been built as compensation for households who lost homes due to
preparations for the 1964 Olympics.
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December 15, 2018 interview

179

“Where force advances, reason recedes 68”to explain that the Olympics was accelerating
change. As one witness to the Meiji Park eviction remarked, "the special exception [of
the Olympics] has given the state opportunity to expand the limits of the law"
(OurPlanet-TV 2016).
Over the last decade, rapid growth in the tourist industry in Asakusa around
Sensōji Temple has led to commercial development in this historically working-class
region, underdeveloped during Tokyo’s modern urbanization because of its historical
association with poverty. Today, its antiquated aesthetic makes it popular as a tourist
destination that contrasts Tokyo’s flashier regions. Moreover, redevelopment projects
have crept into areas that people sleeping rough once freely congregated in including
along Sumida River, one of the five areas targeted by the Transition-to-Community-Life
Program. In late 2018, I learned that one man at Nishi-sando Arcade, located less than
200 meters from Asakusa’s Sensoji Temple, was appealing to local CSOs for help after
police had come one rainy night to evacuate everyone sleeping in the arcade, which is
unusual for the area.
I later went to the arcade with a CSO to learn more and met Taka, an ordinarily
cheery man about 60 who stayed with a small clique of men who all earned money from
public work and picking up odd jobs in Sanya. In an interview, he explained that officers
had come multiple times and, each time, they woke everyone up by tapping their
shoulders or banging on their cardboard and ordering them to, “Get up, get up!” When I
asked him how they justified the clearance, he explained 69,
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In Japanese, "Muri o tōseba dōri ga hikkomu".
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December 18, 2018 interview.
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Here, we are in a relatively weak position, so they don't need to say much.
Sometimes they say that we can’t sleep here. Each time, I ask, “Well then,
where should I go?” … Once it was raining and an older man next to me had
a cold, so I said, “You’re asking us—you're asking this sick man—to go out
into the rain? Who will be responsible if his condition worsens, or if he dies?
Will you take responsibility?!” But he said no.
Taka often recounted this story, usually in an agitated tone, when we would wait in the
evening for police activity. Every time, he became very animated as he recalled defiantly
confronting the officer while insisting, "Will you take responsibility?!” He seemed to be
reclaiming his own importance after not being offered protection, or even consideration.
Despite repeated questioning by local activists and people like Taka who were
forced to leave, the police never confirmed what legal foundation they believed justified
their action. When I witnessed two such evacuations, the police insisted each time that
they were acting—and justified in acting—on anonymous complaints. I tried pointing out
that their actions violated multiple tenets of the 2002 Self-Reliance Act and 2018 national
police orders (requiring police to honor the rights of homeless people and educate the
public on those rights), but officers were firm in their stance that their obligation to the
public to resolve complaints was platform enough. Specifically, I was told:
Officer: You do realize that if someone calls the police complaining that
there is a problem, the police must take action, don’t you?
Rayna: Yes, but there is no legal basis here…
Officer: The bigger issue here is not the legal technicalities but the fact that
police officers cannot choose to not respond to a complaint. If we do not
respond, people will wonder what it is we do. 70

February 9, 2019 observation. In Japanese, "Meiwaku dakara toiutsūhō ga areba keisatsu ga ugokanai to
dame deshō. (Author: Tada hōtekina konkyō ga naito…) Hōritsu dōnokōno yori ha konkai ha tsuhō ga
haitta kara nanimo shinai wake ni ha ikanai. Nanimo shinaide ireba tsūhō shite kita hito ga 'aa keisatsu ha
nani o yatte irunda' toiu fūni nacchau. Sore, wakarimasu yone."
70
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Unlike other agencies, police officers emphasize a need for expedient results. However,
this was accompanied by a presumption—visible across all agencies—that disorder
would be best corrected through unilateral action targeting “homeless persons”.

—Site 2. KUALA LUMPUR – From Parens Patriae to Persuasion
In preparing for the 2017 SEA Games, the Ministry of Women arranged a twomonth “boot camp” for people sleeping rough in KL called Kem Pemantapan Jatidiri
(Camp Get-Yourself-Together), located at a military training camp two hours from the
capital. In an interview at the Ministry of Women’s Policy Division, one officer
explained71 that federal agencies wanted to clear the city, as it was customary to do so
for major events using rescue operations. However, he also reassured me that “taking
them away is not [like] locking them in a jail, because they have done nothing wrong.”
His pre-emptive explanation signaled to me his awareness of regularity of protest over
DPA operations since 2014. Today, the Ministry is more careful about planning and
justifying its actions.
To succeed with the two-month clearance in autumn 2017, the Ministry adopted
three strategies. First, they developed plans for the camp with a “self-help” module
incorporating skills training, health, and motivational courses as well as incentives in the
form of an allowance (200RM) and a certificate, both received upon completion. The
Ministry of Women's officer elaborated on the program design as follows.
The right thing to do is to expose them to certain skills or knowledge so that,
we hope, within that 8 weeks they learn something, and they won’t cause any
trouble to anybody. Hopefully, they can become better and get a job that is
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May 30, 2019 interview.
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better. Or, if they want to connect with family, we assist them. If they don’t
want to do anything, we release them.
Second, the Ministry and the Welfare Department brought CSOs on board during
planning stages by asking them to join the camp and distribute snacks, clothing, and other
materials to participants. Lastly, they arranged for the camp to be voluntary. Persons who
refused to participate were not forced to attend, as I confirmed through several
interviews. However, pressure was nevertheless applied to maximize participation.
Multiple rescue operations were conducted over the span of a few weeks “to persuade
hundreds of homeless people in the capital to participate”, according to local newspapers
(Bernama 2017). They counted approximately 200 participants.
Among people who declined to attend was Jaya, a Malaysian-Malay man in his
early 70s, who has been living on the streets for much of the past two decades. He
expressed 72 frustration that agencies did not seem to have “a proper plan and program to
address [homelessness or] a long-term solution”. He elaborated:
When they did the raid on us and they published it in the paper, they say,
“We take these people and we train them.” They [say they improve] our
talents so one day we can stand on our own and return to a normal life. But
actually, it is a lie. Some people were there for two months but they can only
eat and sleep…. [Upon] release some received compensation… but this is not
the way to manage people.
Jaya’s frustration stems from his past experience with operations, which includes getting
picked up multiple times over the last two decades and being detained in Desa Bini Diri
in Sungai Buloh once. When I conducted research on operations in 2013, I learned
through interviews that people with experience of being caught were most critical of
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July 31, 2019 interview.

183

interventions associating them with harassment or harm (such as sleep deprivation).
Conversely, those without experience took the promise of “rescue” at face value, often
assuming government would provide housing. However, even where people are critical
of the interventions, few are critical of government agencies per se—or openly critical in
interviews, at least. Instead, most clarify that the interventions—albeit detrimental to their
interests—are evidence that government is trying to provide for them.
This practice of conducting mass arrests under a welfarist, rather than punitive,
law was developed in the early 1960s under British parliamentary draftsman, J.S.
Fiennes, who assisted in drafting Malaysia’s constitution. Between 1962 and 1965, he
used his constitutional expertise to design the DPA’s predecessor, the Vagrants Act to
serve as a public order legislation that skirts constitutional rights to freedom of
movement, on the one hand, and a social welfare legislation to justify a parens patriae
(state-initiated) model of involuntary institutionalization, on the other. In practice today,
this policy prioritizes neither detention nor rescue, but instead serves to manage the
street-level visibility of homelessness.
Statistics show that even though only around 400 people are admitted to Desa
Bina Diri each year, roundups affect growing numbers of people. That is, more people
are being captured, interrogated, and released each year (see Table 5, page 171) for two
purposes. One is to facilitate drug, immigration, and police arrests while conducting
welfarist interventions under Social Welfare or, stated differently, to reduce the number
of non-Malaysians, drug users, women, children, and persons with disabilities or mental
or physical illness from the homeless population. The other is to compel people to leave
the areas regularly patrolled, all generally located in the city center near commercial and
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tourist districts. In previous research, I learned that people who stayed in areas subject to
operations were forced to either take on the financial burden of staying in restaurants or
night-time accommodations, or the physical burden of stress and lower quality sleep
(Rusenko 2013).
Even though roundups have been halted and the atmosphere at Hang Lekiu Street
is more relaxed, people remain prone to interpreting certain events as indications of a
coming raid. Once, I sat with Helmi and Badi at the center of Hang Lekiu Street, where a
small lane cuts through the road and becomes a parking space where CSOs usually
distribute materials. Badi was telling stories of his army service during Malaysia’s 2014
floods, when suddenly Helmi stood up and began packing his things. Surprised by the
sudden movement, I asked Helmi what happened. He looked down at the ground and said
very quietly under his breath, “That man’s a scout. I’m not sleeping here tonight.” Just 30
feet away in the parking area, one man in a red shirt was sitting on his motor bike and
fiddling with his phone. I wouldn’t have noticed otherwise, but once Helmi directed my
attention to him, I agreed something seemed unnerving. Eventually, about eight people
caught word of Helmi’s concerns and left to sleep elsewhere that evening. There was no
raid that night, but I was reminded that many, like Helmi, who’ve experienced seeing
them—if not getting caught in them—do not yet feel fully at ease.

Discussion
Imperiality—or democracy in socio-spatial governance
Prior to the public sector’s uptake of social work at the turn of the twentieth
century, charitable organizations like Salvation Army single-handedly produced
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programs for addressing poverty, disseminated globally, including in Japan and Malaya.
As the material and ideological basis of these organizations—along with their political
legitimacy—were rooted in upper-class (imperialist capitalist) imperatives, they generally
sought to remedy poverty in ways profitable to the transnational capitalist ambitions of
the imperial state—and in the process made a transnational institution of themselves.
Salvation Army in Japan, for example, developed programs in conjunction with both
public- and private-sector actors designed to instill in the working classes the political,
economic, and moral values of ruling/entrepreneurial classes. Such programs, it was
argued, would eradicate poverty by creating people who created their own abundant
wealth, thereby enriching all of society. As flawed as these assertions are—especially
regarding the presumed failings of the working classes and the strengths of their
benefactors—it is important to see them for their legacy: the direction of scrutiny in
social programs. That is, systems are constructed based on a presumed need for top-down
evaluation by enlightened classes—or compassionate actors—rather than policy
processes that would allow working classes to inform systems shaping their lives
(Chapter 3). This structure insulates the false premises of such policies from critical
bottom-up examination: an uneven relation that is part of imperial legacy.
By the time the state absorbed social work into public projects, compassionate
actors remained gatekeepers in programs where they determined not only standards for
eligibility, but also what resources would be distributed and what goals would be
achieved—and how. History shows that over the next century (from the 1920s to the
present) powers held by public-, private-, and civic-sector agents over policy targets have
been used to various economic and political ends—some conventionally acceptable, and
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some not, but all determined for rather than with persons experiencing homelessness. The
propagation of these relations through law and policy illustrate the salience of Agamben’s
(1998:53) Homo Sacer: a sacred being that can be killed by anyone but not sacrificed as,
in life and death, “homo sacer is the one with respect to whom all [people] act as
sovereigns”. That is, by identifying deficiencies within people as the root of
homelessness and focus of policy imperatives of correction and care, public-, private-,
and civic-sector organizations set in motion the need for scrutiny in the discretionary
space that defines social work. Moreover, these presumed deficiencies underlie
justification of a lack of checks and balances on discretionary agents by policy users.
Hence, public officials within welfare, transportation, public infrastructure and other
agencies are endowed with the paternalistic—and imperialistic—authority to make
decisions determining the course of other people’s lives.
Today, as over history, the aims and substance of public policies are largely
determined by public and private sector actors with minimal if any consultation with,
much less critical examination by, policy targets or users. The idea of centering the
interests and wishes of people who, today, refuse a “one-room apartment” or do not
pursue “good money” in Officers Tanaka and Harada’s words, or people who otherwise
“[need to] learn something, [so] they won’t cause any trouble”, according to the Ministry
of Women's Policy Division officer has been met with resistance—even where, “they
have done nothing wrong”. For this reason, historically and today, it is presumed that
homelessness may only be addressed through the expertise of people who are not only
“normal” but also instilled with the “appropriate” values, skills, and knowledge. In other
words, as a social problem, homelessness has long been entrusted to—or even understood
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to be a burden of—the normative middle- and upper-classes, typically at the helm of
public-, private-, and civic-sector organizations. For this reason, the interests and
influence of the middle-class—as captured in CSO programs and protest as well as CSR
projects—has shaped the direction of homelessness policy in both Japan and Malaysia,
particularly since 1996 and 2014, respectively.
However, even though increased civic engagement has opened avenues to more
compassionate measures over time, including housing-first programs and shelters
featuring government-linked organizations like Yurin Association and NWF in prominent
roles, the introduction of civic groups into policy processes alone does not necessarily
improve decision-making or democratic governance—contrary even to promises
popularly made by global institutions via initiatives like Local Agenda 21. Instead, these
integrated multi-agentic projects—to the extent that they are arranged through closed
consultations, and particularly where exclusion of policy users in policy and political
processes is not explicitly addressed—are wont to have profound de-democratizing
effects. As agencies in both Tokyo and KL underscored, people experiencing
homelessness tend to cause trouble and ought to be removed—or rescued—from public
space, and rehabilitated through programs that lead them to “normal” life. Historically
and today, the targets of various homelessness-related policies have been characterized as
mismatched with modern society; Imperial logic dictates that they are not a part of
modernity but have, instead, strayed from it. Such logic suggests that modern society
itself is therefore perfected by their absence and fails to reckon with how it has
produced—and been contingent on—their presence.
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Compassion plays a key role in both cloaking and propagating the political
marginalization of its objects. The global historical circuits by which social policies have
been transmitted and produced have long held compassion to be a foundation for
intervention. Imperialist benevolence at the turn of the twentieth century turned
compassion into a global currency that led to the formal adoption of welfare—a marker
of civilized society—in post/imperial states like Japan, as well as narratives and systems
of “rescue” and benevolent charity (rather than programmatic aid) in post/colonial states
like Malaysia. Strictly speaking, while citizens of post/imperial states have been granted
rights to minimal standards of living, those belonging to post/colonial states have been
subject to the whims of benefactors. It is for this reason, perhaps, that people like Kei and
Kenta respond with indignity as their standards (albeit outside of the scope of welfare)
are rolled back, while many like Loh are “thankful to the government” for CSO meals.
Similarly, these political differences likely underlie the prevalence of CSO interest in the
restoration of rights, protections, and “minimal standards” for persons experiencing
homelessness in Tokyo, evidenced in new laws and programs, as opposed to CSO interest
in KL in offering care and comfort to the “less fortunate” by “feeding the needy”,
“empowering others”, and taking up other causes that borrow from the rhetoric of
international humanitarian organizations as they offer aid and services. Arendt’s point
about compassion as a political instrument, namely, that it necessitates suffering becomes
clear when we consider the paradigms of policy. In either case, whether they are
expressed through aims to reduce and eliminate homelessness, or rescue destitute people,
homelessness is the foundation on which compassion is possible, and compassionate
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action is the foundation on which government agencies—and other compassionate
actors—legitimate their authority.
In both Tokyo and KL, compassion for persons experiencing homelessness has
indeed provided opportunity for a pivot by which civic, public, and private actors came
together and brought resources to the table. However, state responsiveness to civic
interest does not, on its own, make a democratic system. As prior chapters illustrate,
democracy—by the grace of paternalism—has long been deliberately limited through
raced, classed, and otherwise differentiated categories of political rights. Here, the legacy
of such governance manifests itself as parties largely insulated from homelessness debate
and negotiate the liberties and needs of people who are most profoundly affected by it.
Matters of policy are determined for particular people, but without those people, based on
as-yet unexamined imperialist ideas that estimate their existence to be a public harm—
and their non-existence as the policy ideal/objective. Consequently, in Japan, while
innovative housing programs emerge, so do new modes of anti-homeless urban
engineering and policing via infrastructural agencies. Similarly, in Malaysia, while public
and civic provision of shelters and aid have been mainstreamed, so have daytime patrols
to reduce visibility of homelessness and begging. And, in both countries, NIMBY publics
rail against CSO activities because the supposedly disorderly and overly generous
support of CSOs is often said to exacerbate (if not cause) the problem.

Ultimately, public policy solutions are not solutions, because they fundamentally
misunderstand the problem as existing outside of the normal workings of society and,
hence, justify ideas and institutions that treat people in states of homelessness as needing
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enlightenment, rehabilitation, or rescue. That is, paternal—or imperialist—forms of
compassion are premised on the reformation or rebirth of the other party, and require
nothing in the way of reflection on one’s relation to them. While action is certainly
necessary, current actions fail because compassion—and its manifestation in policy—
makes people experiencing homelessness the object, rather than the subject, of social
change 73. The cynicism, as voiced by Jaya and Kei, that some people direct at public and
civic services is both well-founded and astute, based as it is on their experience with the
pitfalls and promise of normative care.

Socio-spatial security as a foundation of power
Social and spatial concerns are intertwined under capitalism, and global
capitalism’s concerns with people experiencing homelessness and public space have been
no different, in law or practice. This is evidenced in not only the history of vagrancy laws
in each city, but also in the welfarist measures that have underpinned concentrations of
homelessness and poverty in certain districts, like Sanya in Tokyo and Jalan Pahang in
KL 74. As Japanese and Malaysian agencies began formally advancing urban
redevelopment in the 1990s and 2000s, apparatuses of a social redevelopment also took
shape—in the form of innovative policies offering not only opportunities for (productive)
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This holds true in other realms where, for example, improving racist, sexist, and transphobic systems
cannot be done without the lead of the most deeply affected parties.
74

The same applies to Pusat Transit, Kuala Lumpur’s low-threshold shelter located in the historically
working-class Chow Kit district and across the street from the capital’s General Hospital, formerly its
Pauper Hospital.
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labor, but also adjusted avenues to accommodation—especially in Japan where
productive labor is of relatively less value.
When applied in welfare states like Japan, neoliberal ideology transfers
responsibility for human security from public systems to individuals as part of
mechanisms for encouraging merit, efficiency, and incentive. In Japan, this has produced
what Suzuki et al (2010) refer to as a “second modernity” of individualization, in which
individuals—and particularly young generations and single person/parent households—
experience enhanced insecurity in the face of reduced welfare income, public housing,
labor regulation, and the like (Galaiou 2018; Hirayama 2013; Kingston 2012; Ogawa
2015; Shibata 2016; Shirahase 2014). At the same time, in Tokyo the effect on people
experiencing homelessness has been a roll out of socio-spatial management through
systems of meta-governance (Jessop 2007; Willse 2015) like the 2002 Homeless SelfReliance Support Act, which operationalizes multiple policy actors and fields. Although
management began with Self-Reliance Centers, it progressively spilled into parks and
streets from 2004. KL may follow a similar trajectory, too, once new homelessness
regulation, currently under development at the Ministry of Women, is released. However,
recent events in both cities, and their histories, suggest that compassionate engagement
applied to the realm of socio-spatial regulation generates enhanced top-down, or
paternalistic, control that manifests as micro-management of people experiencing
homelessness and, especially in the case of KL, non-government-linked CSOs as well.
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Conclusion
With each era, compassionate actors are financed and re/produced through
processes that fail to reckon with, or remedy, power imbalances—founded partly in
systemic discrimination. Consequently, interventions propagate inequalities that are
detrimental to both public good and public goods. For instance, the anti-homeless
“hostile” design of benches—now common throughout Tokyo—offers little to no
positive social or spatial impact, unless one prioritizes eliminating people’s physical
presence above all else. Similarly, as has been argued in the past (Ministry of Welfare
Services 1974), rescue operations are of “little positive help” in Kuala Lumpur because
resources are concentrated in measures that, by turning a blind eye to the roots of
poverty, fail to stall its onset. As long as programming is organized undemocratically in
line with the whims and interests of agents who also, uncoincidentally, choose the
metrics by which they are evaluated, new forms of homelessness policy offer little more
than the status quo adapted to new capitalisms, new technologies, and new cultures and
rhetorics.
In this connection, recent modes of delegating power to civil society—often
through closed consultation—further unravels, rather than bolsters, democratic practice
as it merely redistributes, rather than redresses, paternalistic powers. More vigilant sociospatial management cannot and will not offer greater socio-economic security; instead, it
renders states of homelessness more repressive. In both cities, public-civic and publicprivate programs innovated through CSO cooperation include attributes that undermine
people’s ability to survive unconditionally. Hence, what may appear to be
democratization—and compassion—is opportunity for the state offer some control of the
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reins to limited private and civic actors, interested in leveraging their own power—albeit
for altruistic aims in some cases. This offers an important opportunity to consider: to
what degree do civil society organizations—and each of us in civil society—share
undemocratic power, and what do we gain?
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CHAPTER 5. PINHANE
THE SQUEEZE OF CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL OF MOBILITY

Introduction
Mobility took on new meaning in the late nineteenth century when technological
changes accelerated capitalist industrialization, the expansion of imperialism and related
ideas and institutions globally. In colonial and metropolitan societies alike, global
capitalist systems created new avenues for geographic and social mobility as wealth
offered opportunity to enhance social status, and geographic movement offered
opportunity for wealth. Consequently, mobility became embedded in capitalist rhetoric,
seen in discourse of self-advancement, that popularized capitalist principles of
productivity, commercialism, resource exploitation, and consumerism as well as
imperialist principles of enlightenment and scientific/intellectual practice.
As social and geographic mobility became more fluid in societies linked into
global capitalism, public institutions for regulating the flow and distribution of economic
resources and wealth became necessary. Initially police were central to social and spatial
management as they protected mobile and immobile properties and directed uprooted
people to the appropriate institutions in nineteenth century Tokyo (Chapter 3) and Kuala
Lumpur (Chapter 2). Then, social infrastructure and related public agencies emerged
around the turn of the twentieth century to facilitate the creation of a more enlightened
social order capable of enhancing industrial production and coordinating re/distribution
of wealth through less coercive means grounded in the ethos of “self-reliance” (Chapter
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4). Ultimately, state-run social programs and related institutions in the early twentieth
century became the foundation for emergent public economies of care—thriving both
because of need among the working classes and because of interest among middle- and
upper-class agents in propagating enlightened culture, state benevolence, and ideas of
“(self-)advancement” in colonies and metropoles alike.
Foucault (1998:137) refers to this shift as one marking the emergence of
biopower, which ‘exerts a positive influence on life [and] endeavors to administer,
optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive
regulations”. While biopower, as envisioned by Foucault, addresses a transformation in
governance occurring in metropoles—one that scales down repressive control and
enhances caring, or benevolent, “positive influence on life”—a similar calculus of
biopolitics was applied to European colonies including Malaya where British and
Japanese experts also consulted with each other (Wellington 1927) as Japan made similar
changes across its own metropole and colonial territories (Baxstrom 2000; Fujitani 2011;
Lynteris 2011; Manderson 1999; Park 2014). Over this same span, as governments
sought to “[locate] skilled and unskilled labor where it was most needed” (Wallis
1902:773) at the turn of the twentieth century, social policies were also calibrated to
bolster and extend life in accordance with raced, classed, gendered, and abled systems of
valuation—both within metropoles and across empires (i.e. globally- and locally-ordered
stratification). Consequently, resulting systems effectively cultivated biopolitical divides
between insured and non-insured lives, which also served as instruments of socio-spatial
control (Duffield 2008).
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In this chapter, I explore how social policy systems and related institutions of
welfare, labor, and care in Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur continue to be used in socio-spatial
control today, based on interviews with people with first-hand experience of
homelessness. In this connection, I introduce and discuss the concept of pinhane, or
exploitation by bosses and brokers. Historically and today, the concept of pinhane has
been widely used by people experiencing (and adjacent to) homelessness in Tokyo, but is
also evident in narratives in Kuala Lumpur. In my discussion, I illustrate how pinhane
reveals the foundation of socio-spatial control, i.e. uneven relations of power, or imperial
formations, and why it exists. Ultimately, this chapter asks, how do socio-spatial controls
inhibit exits from homelessness, and what advantages do they offer to non-homeless
people?

Between a Rock and a Hard Place
Japan
I was introduced to Keisuke by a coordinator for Tsukuroi Fund, a housing-first
program run independently of recent metropolitan government pilot (2018-2019)
programs. The coordinator had explained to me that Keisuke, a young athletic-looking
man in his early 30s, had just moved from Tsukuroi’s transitional shelter into his own
apartment one year prior. When I met Keisuke, we chatted for a few minutes before I
asked about his experiences with Livelihood Protection. He explained 75 somewhat selfconsciously that he had first visited a welfare office about ten years ago when he was
sleeping in Shinjuku Central Park. He said that a man had approached him and asked
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197

whether he would like a room at a privately-run facility near Tokyo. The man took
Keisuke to a welfare office in Saitama where they filed his first application for
Livelihood Protection. The facility had Keisuke settle in as soon as he arrived. The
process took one month and, Keisuke noted, the facility directly handled all contact with
the welfare office. Keisuke saw this as a relief because, as he explained, “I was sure the
business would do what they needed to settle everything, like telling the office how much
I needed help. I knew they’d stick up for me because they wanted me to stay.”
Keisuke also stated early in our interview that the business, unlike Tsukuroi,
“pretty much did a trick (pinhane) on me for meals 76”. From his overall monthly welfare
allocation of approximately 120,000 yen ($1100 USD), the facility provided him with a
500 yen ($4.60) daily allowance and a 5000 yen ($46) monthly supplement, or 20,000
yen ($185) in cash. The facility was entitled to the remainder by way of a contract he
signed in exchange for a private room, canteen meals, and utilities. On the other hand,
Tsukuroi, which helped Keisuke locate his new apartment, takes none of his public
benefits. 77 Keisuke stayed only for a few months before he decided to leave—largely
because of harassment he experienced from staff and residents. I asked if he had
mentioned this harassment to the welfare office, and he responded that he was unable to
broach it with them, explaining “it seemed like the business had some ties to the welfare
office and so… I was scared. The facility would send us to the welfare office for
appointments in their cars [so I knew people from the facility were there with
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In Japanese, "Shokuhi de kanzen pinhane sareta toiuka".
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The housing allowance from Keisuke’s benefits was used to cover his stay in the transitional shelter.
However, this portion of welfare assistance is as a rule transferred to landlords, rather than recipients.
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me.]…Therefore, I figured I just had to deal with it (the harassment), even if I was
unhappy.”
After leaving the house in Saitama, Keisuke estimates he stayed in about 10 other
facilities before finding his current apartment with Tsukuroi. As he talked about a decade
of his experience, he described a process of acclimating, or acquiescing, to living
conditions in the institutions he himself admits were hinkon bijinesu (lit. “poverty
businesses”; companies that deliberately capitalize on homelessness and poverty).
Keisuke said:
I’m grateful for what I had. I was able to eat… Around me, people would
give lip to how bad the food was and how terrible things were, but I wasn’t
working so I figured I couldn’t complain. I learned how to live off [my
allowance] and began to accept that this was all I had. I wasn’t miserable….
Even though I didn’t like it, I was grateful. I’d been homeless and knew I was
better off indoors when it’s raining.
His reflection offers a glimpse into his feelings regarding how “bad”, “terrible”,
“miserable”, and “unhappy” his situation was—or not. His repeated attention to these
elements over the course of our conversation seemed to underscore an underlying desire
to retain optimism and shelter in the face of challenging circumstances. While he
expresses gratitude for having an alternative to street homelessness, his inclination to feel
gratitude also underscores the dearth of choice he perceives in his situation more
generally. He went on to elaborate:
I had to go….I had only this option, and I wanted to make it work. I knew
they were taking advantage of me but, still, I think I did a good job getting
through it and coming this far… Even with everything I was [grateful for],
though, I know now that I wasn’t happy. [To be happy is] having freedom.
To wake up and make your own breakfast and decide what to do for yourself.
It’s doing what you want with your time and your life. Some facility can't do
that for us, it’s something we do for ourselves.
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While Keisuke’s stays at facilities across Tokyo, Saitama, and Aichi are evidence of his
resilience and determination to stay housed, the housing itself did not resolve the
economic, social, and even personal insecurities at the root of his troubles; these were, at
best, suspended and, as Keisuke noted, reemerged periodically—often threatening his
housed status. Because his root problems relating to family, addiction, and economic
insecurity were not addressed, Keisuke explained that every time he left a facility, he
would find himself back in Shinjuku Park. However, it was only after entering Tsukuroi,
where life was less structured and enhanced by access to guidance and peer support,
among other things, he experienced substantial progress. Ultimately, he attributes his
happiness to having more control over his life.
As I spent more time in Shibuya and Sanya, I found that it was not unusual to hear
people talk of spending time moving between multiple facilities to avoid the streets. In
Ueno Park, I met Tetchan, a man in his early 70s—much older than Keisuke, who had
spent the last six years moving between at least four hinkon bijinesu in Tokyo and
Yokohama. He recalled—with indignity—that the last facility he was in, in Chiba, had
asked him to leave because he insisted on taking evening walks. He explained 78 that the
neighborhood had been hostile to the facility because it was known for bringing
“homeless people” and he sensed early on that neighbors followed him with their eyes
whenever he went out. Eventually complaints about his evening walks prompted the
facility to ask that he stop and, when he refused, they had him leave for good. As he saw
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it, there was no point in staying if it meant giving up certain things, and so he decided to
go.
When I interviewed Toya, a former day laborer in his mid-70s sleeping rough in
Sanya, he spoke at length about how hinkon bijinesu have multiplied as Livelihood
Protection has become more accessible. He also expressed distaste—or maybe
annoyance—at how facilities send agents to pick up clients from the streets, and how
welfare offices turn to turn a blind eye to the problems inside. Over the last two decades,
he says 79, he has “been approached so many times…[by agents who] say there’s no point
in being on the street and I should consider welfare.” He remarked that, especially in the
last ten years, people sleeping rough in Sanya have new attitudes around welfare: “it used
to be that no one wanted it, and now it’s hard to find someone who doesn’t!” He
attributes this change to how “you never hear of people getting turned away anymore”,
which he himself found to be true. He explained that several years ago he went to the
welfare office with some friends to ask about moving into a doya. However, they were
told that only rooms at SSS were available so Toya refused because, as he says, he did
not want to stay at a hinkon bijinesu. He added that some friends went but they “all ran
away” within weeks. Toya says he’s not yet interested in going because he is skeptical:
“Places like SSS constantly bring people in and put them on welfare, and welfare offices
go along with anything because they keep rent costs down.” While these facilities may
not keep rent costs down per se, Toya is right to note that welfare offices benefit from the
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use of these facilities as they reduce logistic trouble experienced by caseworkers—known
to carry heavy caseloads—in visiting numerous clients.
Daisuke, a man I met in Ueno Park in his early 40s, said that he became interested
in Livelihood Protection when he first became homeless in 2010. He went on his own to
the Sumida Ward welfare office but said that the officer at the front instructed him to
enter a Self-Reliance Support Center. As he told his story 80, he stressed his surprise that
the public officer had arranged for his transportation before Daisuke could even ask for a
welfare consultation. Daisuke succeeded in finding work at the Center and
simultaneously secured a transitional apartment run by the metropolitan government.
However, after one year, he decided to leave both the job and his apartment after
conditions at work became unbearable for him. Before leaving, he had considered
consulting with the welfare office so that he could keep the apartment but ultimately
decided against it as he was unsure of whether he should trouble his caseworker and felt
that he might have better chances if he returned to Tokyo anyway.
Near Sanya, I also spoke with three men who cycled between hanba, the SelfReliance Center, and earning money through public work and odd jobs while on the
streets. One of them, Takeda, told me 81 that he spent two years after first becoming
homeless at a hanba after a labor broker approached him in Ueno Park to offer him a job.
He said he was in his early 50s and had no experience in casual labor but, as hard as it
was, he said he enjoyed learning working in construction. At the same time, though, his
employer instituted wage penalties for poor performance, so that he earned less while he
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January 17, 2019 interview.
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December 18, 2018 interview.
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was starting. In Shibuya, one woman in her late 30s told me about nearby cafes that
young women in need of a place to stay, or money or food, would go. The cafes provide
them with snacks and drinks for free and, in exchange, they are expected to talk to male
customers. She said that while the cafes do not ask or in any way obligate women to
leave with customers, some will—either with the right offer or without feasible
alternatives.
I met Yanagi towards the end of my stay in Tokyo, walking home one winter
evening at 8pm. I lived in an old apartment in a gentrifying neighborhood along Sumida
River, just a 20-minute (1.5km) walk from the Sanya drop-in center. Each day, a mix of
young families with strollers, sociable yet stern “grannies”, aging day laborers, and police
officers crossed paths at the local park beside my neighborhood’s library. I was walking
in this direction on my way back from the supermarket, when I saw figures walking
towards me in the dark. From a distance, they appeared to be two policemen half-carrying
and half-dragging an elderly man by his arms towards the main road. I intuitively thought
the man might be homeless based on how they manhandled him, and how they didn’t
allow him the dignity of fixing his pants, which were undone and falling. When I asked,
the two officers insisted he was drunk, but Yanagi denied it. He said he did not feel well
and that he wanted to go to a hospital, so we had the police call an ambulance.
Yanagi was hospitalized that evening at Kosei Central Hospital in Meguro, one of
the few hospitals that readily accepts people known, or thought, to be homeless. Yanagi
ended up staying nearly two months. He recovered almost fully in the first three weeks
and then spent another three weeks waiting for the welfare office to process his release.
As I visited, I slowly came to realize that the ward was dedicated to in-patient care for
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people who had been homeless. The visitor’s log had only about four visits per week—
two being myself—despite a generally full ward of 30-40 men, all generally in their 60s
and 70s, organized 5-6 persons to a room. Moreover, supervision seemed unusually
stringent as staff kept an eye on all movement, and placed a heavy table lengthwise in
front of the elevator to prevent patients from leaving without permission.
Two weeks after his recovery, Yanagi whispered to me that most men in the ward
were generally recovered and healthy, and were merely biding time as the hospital
received money for extending their stay. Based on this, and the fact that most beds in his
room were empty, he thought his own release might be delayed, which it was. Over this
time, however, his caseworker arranged for him to move into a doya in Arakawa where
he could receive Livelihood Protection, according to his wishes. In fact, he stayed just
across the street from where I first met him, near my apartment and the neighborhood’s
small police station.

Malaysia
In Kuala Lumpur, welfare assistance has improved in recent decades—in terms of
accessibility, as seen in Tokyo, but also quantity 82. However, the system remains
piecemeal and limited in scope. On Hang Lekiu Street, I often met senior citizens who
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As civic movements have grown, along with a Malaysian middle class, Malaysia’s welfare system has
actually been beefed up slightly, albeit in a manner that underscores its piecemeal nature. For example, aid
available to seniors, persons with disabilities, and single mothers was increased from RM100 to RM350RM400 between 1980 and 1990, when movements regarding these communities gained strength. In the
subsequent decades, the number of people claiming these benefits has also increased. However, this
economic aid cannot be claimed while homeless, although some people do collect through bank transfers
set up prior to their homelessness.
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enrolled in elderly assistance 83 (RM350 per month) and then pooled incomes to share
partitioned rooms or SROs (approx. RM600 per month each) in the Chow Kit area. In
2012, the federal government began offering annual lump-sum benefits to people
qualifying as low-income, amounting to RM250 for singles (RM400-500 in 2019) and
RM500 for households (RM1000-1200 in 2019). In addition, the Federal Territories
Islamic Religious Council (MAIWP) distributes through its offices baitulmal aid to
Muslim (Muslim-born and convert) applicants, such as emergency aid for a maximum of
RM50 two to four times per month and monthly aid similar to state welfare programs,
e.g. for single mothers, seniors, and persons with disabilities. Importantly, however,
doubling up on secular and Islamic welfare aid is strictly prohibited. Also, MAIWP has
begun outreach services like meal distributions of its own in recent years. Nevertheless,
welfare aid offered by the welfare department and MAIWP are neither available to all
persons experiencing homelessness nor are they sufficient for exiting homelessness.
Considering the sparse availability of financial aid, the introduction of three
government-linked shelters and the upsurge in meal distributions by civic- and privatesector organizations has made remarkable impact. While I was on Hang Lekiu Street, I
met no more than 3 or 4 people who had stayed in a shelter within the last year. Although
this can be seen as unfortunate, it is not surprising. Research has shown that few people
staying in shelters come from the streets 84, and many people on the streets are skeptical
of shelters. For instance, non-Malay Malaysians—or approximately 40-50% of the
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This can be quite difficult, as social workers may ask for letters and other evidence that children or
relatives are unwilling to care for the applicant.
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Instead, most have been found to enter shelters to avoid street homelessness.
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homeless population (ThinkCity 2019)—generally tend to avoid government programs
due to feelings that they will be sidelined in Malay-dominated government institutions 85.
Also, many people sleeping rough remain unconvinced that shelter services offer
adequate, or unique, support. For instance, Kuala Lumpur’s shelters generally limit use to
2-8 week stays for people seeking employment, which tends to be insufficient for anyone
not ready to almost immediately begin work. Also, people who are homeless and ready to
start employment often already have access to information on jobs through social
networks and contact with NGOs. Since many such jobs include accommodation at
asrama (worker dormitories), one can technically find housing quickly regardless of
whether one enters a shelter or not. During a tour of Pusat Transit, Kuala Lumpur’s lowbarrier shelter launched in 2016, I learned that the facility limits its 200 beds to men who
are seeking work or currently employed. Anjung Singgah, on the other hand, operates at a
smaller capacity of two 40-bed rooms while referring men and women to employment,
and, where possible, also connects senior citizens, children, and families to welfare
homes or other assistance.
Asri, originally from East Malaysia, came to Kuala Lumpur to find work over a
decade ago, and has been on the streets for about six years. He often works in
construction, security, or other casual labor gigs in the daytime. In the evenings, he
returns to his regular spot on Hang Lekiu Street where he and his friends congregate. The
only times I have seen him lose his cool is when we talk about work, and his frustration
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This is based on racial quotas for civil service positions, instituted in 1970 and renewed in 1990 as a form
of affirmative action to ensure Malays are no longer shut out from the modern political economy, as they
were during the British colonial era.
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becomes apparent. During our interview, he explained 86 this frustration as follows.
[At one company, sometimes] we wouldn’t get paid, or our wages would be
late, or we would work overtime with no compensation. And, when we
complained, we were told that filing a report was useless because someone
had connections to [police officers in] Bukit Aman. We were told it would be
impossible to pursue so we should just let it be. They also said we were free
to leave if we didn’t want to work… It’s maddening. 30 days pass and we get
nothing. And then, the pay, when we get it, is so small. Like RM700 or
RM800. You lose the will to work getting cheated like that. And there are so
many cheats. It’s exhausting…. Our work ethic would be better if we got
paid, but we don’t. We only get cheated and so we hate working these jobs 87.
Asri’s experience underscores an important point: the abundance of low-skill jobs
available to people experiencing homelessness is a source of anxiety, not relief, as is
popularly assumed. The failure of public agencies to advocate improved labor protections
and enforcement results in greater pressure on workers to vet employment opportunities
and advocate for themselves even though decks are stacked against them. Pusat Transit
and Anjung Singgah each have counselors that specialize in providing employment
referrals, but neither has yet developed a system for better ensuring that clients are fairly
compensated following hire 88.
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July 1, 2019 interview.
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In Malay, "sangat sakitlah. kita orang orang susah ni, kalau 30 hari begitu rasa macam pecah kan kepala.
Betul tak? Lagipun gaji bukan besar sangat. Paling banyak pun rm700, rm800 macam tu, so bila kena tipu
lagi macam tu, rasa semangat untuk kerja. Terus terpadam macam tu, malas nak kerja lagi la. Taukeh
banyak tipu macam tu kan, perasaan kita banyak fed up lah. Hate akan keluar. Benci tu akan keluar.
Walaupun tad kita punya semangat pekerjaan lebih kuat kan untuk dapat gaji untuk mengubah hidup, tapi
kalau kita kena tipu, kita akan benci pada pekerjaan tadi."
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I was informed by an officer with the Special Programs Department at the Federal Territories Ministry
(responsible for Pusat Transit accommodations) that a blacklist system based on client complaints exists at
present. This would at least prevent labor-sourcing to known violators, but processes for receiving and
honoring complaints are not clear.
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Because government-linked shelters serve primarily as employment referral89 centers,
it is easier to see why so few people who are already homeless access them. If
employment itself is of dubious efficacy for improving one’s situation, these shelters
offer little in the way of aid. Older men who generally experience more difficulty in
finding work see this as well. Rafi, a man in his late 60s with mixed Southeast Asian
roots, explained90 his views as follows.
Anjung Singgah was created over political mileage…. Corruption has been a
culture or, really, the culture of this country. To do business in Malaysia, it
doesn't matter who you are. It matters who you know. [Anjung Singgah] is
something they created so that these people [who are homeless] will become
normal. But… to me this is all rubbish. It's a failure... [because] they
(government officers) never study. It is just for their political mileage.
Rafi also sees the boom in CSO visibility—and especially meal provision—similarly.
[Among CSOs, there are] two categories: one getting funding from the
government and the other getting funds from the company that has corporate
responsibility….So now… someone [at these CSOs] is making money…
Some just give [us] simple food and make so much money… I [heard CSOs
receive] 20 ringgit [to produce each packet but] what are we getting? It is a
chicken so small and rice, which isn't a lot of money. Where does [that
money] go? [My friend] says they claim for the staff. Logistically or blah
blah blah blah blah. So, if that's the case... might as well let [us] line up and
give [us] the RM20. Or maybe 15, or 10.
I have not yet confirmed whether CSOs receive funding from government for
providing food. However, CSOs and government-linked organizations 91 absolutely do
receive private financial donations in support of their programs, including meal
distributions. Similarly, linkups between CSOs and private businesses, when reported in
media typically benefit both parties. Rafi’s insight is valuable because it illuminates how
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Although they may also refer clients to other government services, albeit limited, such as private or civic
shelters for seniors, women, and OKU or public housing for families.
90

April 24, 2019 interview.
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Like the National Welfare Foundation, which runs Anjung Singgah.
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he views the political economy that is not only built upon circumstances of homelessness,
but also designed to largely bypass people experiencing homelessness. He captures this
view by stressing that people like himself would benefit more if only meal distributions
were substituted with cash. This point, moreover, also calls into question time spent on
debating, critiquing, and praising CSO activity like meal distributions, when people
experiencing homelessness never explicitly asked for, much less demanded, them.
Scrutiny of these activities rarely, if ever, involves their point of view.
At Hang Lekiu Street, I did not precisely count the number of people I met who
had been caught in rescue operations, but there were tens of them—and most noted that
they were simply released, like Azleena, after being questioned and drug tested. I also
met a handful of people who had spent time in the DBD holding center at Sungai Buloh 92
and/or the 2017 SEA Games boot camp. However, over the course of six months,
although I heard a lot of talk about what people had heard of the DBD rehabilitation
centers in Mersing and Jerantut, I only met two people who had spent time there. One
was Sim, a young Malaysian-Chinese man with an intellectual disability in his early 40s,
and the other was Zali, a Malaysian-Malay man in his early 50s with schizophrenia. Both
men described their stays as traumatizing, especially Zali who generally refused to talk
about it with anyone, and both had made an escape after staying for two years in the
three-year program.
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People caught by welfare officers in rescue operations are, at the discretion of caseworkers and, then, by
order of a magistrate, sent to Desa Bina Diri (DBD; by law, for persons aged 18-59) for a 3-year
rehabilitation program, or Rumah Seri Kenangan (RSK; by law, for persons 60 and above) permanently.
Until the magistrate’s order is obtained, people may be held in Sugai Buloh (or an RSK facility in states
beyond Selangor) for up to a month as social welfare officers investigate the background of inmates and
produce a report).
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Stigma surrounding mental illness in Malaysia is far-reaching and breeds fear—
especially where it is discussed in conjunction with homelessness. As a result, people
managing mental health conditions while homeless have to contend with a lot of stress.
At the same time, because Malaysia’s health care system allows for people without
income to receive free medical care at public clinics and hospitals, many people like Zali
and our common friend Asmawati could regularly visit and consult with doctors or
specialists, as necessary, and continue prescriptions. Zali, in particular, seemed
comfortable disclosing and discussing mental health, including his feelings about
medication, which he preferred to not take. He and Asmawati, and some other people I
met, were comfortable discussing mental health, doctors, and medication openly with me
and their circle of friends. However, I also met several women and men in their 20s, 30s,
and 40s who became isolated because of anxiety around seeking help and fear that they
would not have and social support from friends if they shared.
I met Zali at Hang Lekiu Street where he would come to socialize and eat. A
friend of his recommended I talk to him as I was expressing interest in Desa Bina Diri.
Zali told me that he had spent nearly three years in Mersing but eventually ran off one
night. I asked a little about what the facility was like, but he declined to share for the
most part. He offered a little insight into his distress at having to live with bedbugs and
receiving rotten food. He also mentioned being upset by seeing people restrained. Later,
during my own visit to Mersing in July 2019, I saw conditions at the facility—originally
built in 1965 and largely in the same archaic condition—that verify his experience likely
was, and remains, common. Sim, on the other hand, had been sent to Jerantut, which was
built in 2006—40 years after Mersing. Consequently, Jerantut’s facilities—whether
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medical rooms, dormitory rooms, bathing spaces, dining infrastructure, and so on—were
a stark contrast to, and fortunate upgrade from, what Zali had known. I understood why
Sim reported 93 being unhappy with the bedbugs but nothing else in terms of
infrastructure. According to him, each day was almost pleasant. He started with breakfast
in the cafeteria, and chatted with friends until he would be sent to work in a garden. Then,
everyone would have lunch and spend afternoons entertaining visitors from charity or
school groups. Lastly, after dinner, they would watch TV before retiring. After two years,
he decided to leave because his stay was affecting him emotionally.
Rayna: “Did you tell the staff before you left?”
Sim: “No. I run away. … I don’t know what happened. For two years, I was
very far. I was very tired. I felt not well. After I come back to KL, I was not
well also. My friends say, why did you run away? I said I was not well. I
could not do anything.”
“When did you run away?”
“No one could see. In the night time. I was scared.”
“There is no fence?”
“Got.”
“So you climbed?”
(Nods.) “Dangerous.”
“Then you walked to Kuala Lumpur?”
(Shakes head.) “People give me money so I buy the ticket to come.”
Like Zali, Sim was doing well for himself when I met him. He stayed by a bridge with
about four other men and had multiple friends at Jalan Hang Lekiu. After we talked about
Jerantut, I asked Sim what he thought the government should do for people in his
situation.
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“I want money,” he answered. “No money, cannot do anything. Not well.”
“With money, you can find a place to stay?” I asked.
“Anywhere can. Hotel can. I can buy anything. No money, cannot do
anything. [Having money is] better.”
“You mean better than Jerantut?”
“Yeah.”
Pinhane
The expression “pinhane” has been used by day laborers in Japan since at least
the mid-twentieth century. It refers to wage stealing by labor brokers and other
middlemen—typically through debts, fees, or other forms of wage cuts—effectively
trapping or squeezing workers at their place of employment. Exploitative practices such
as these were rampant throughout Japan over the course of early industrialization and
imperial expansion, particularly in mining, manufacturing, and other industries that relied
on disproportionately burakumin, indigenous, female, colonial (e.g. Taiwanese, Korean,
Chinese, etc.), or other globally and locally marginalized labor forces. In recent decades,
the expression pinhane—still in use—often emerges as people discuss their experiences
with Livelihood Protection, just as Keisuke did when he said that businesses “pretty
much did a trick (pinhane) on me for meals”. These hinkon bijinesu have proliferated in
Japan by offering accommodations, not unlike shelters or SROs, for people experiencing
homelessness and claiming or facilitating Livelihood Protection on behalf of their clients,
in exchange. These businesses specifically target people who would otherwise experience
difficulty in receiving assistance owing to scrutiny by welfare officers.
Although yoseba are no longer serve as a central space for brokers or middlemen
to find workers, casual laborers in Japan continue to experience pinhane via today’s
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hanba 94 systems and the emergence of haken (lit. dispatch) brokers. Moreover, just as
labor brokers and middlemen profited over the course of industrialization by capitalizing
on the housing and economic insecurity of their laborers through finder’s fees,
accommodation fees, and other charges, hinkon bijinesu in Japan’s post-industrial
service-based economy saddle people mired in identical insecurities with overblown fees
for meals, utilities, and other managerial costs. For this reason, use of the concept
pinhane in the context of poverty businesses seems to naturally extend from its history in
the industrial-era yoseba. Moreover, in both contexts, conditions of exploitation tend to
be regularly, often systematically, overlooked by the state as long as the marginalized
groups targeted by middle-men are channeled into industries propping up the economy
and, thus, “integrated” into the ideal social order.
The expression pinhane necessarily captures two entangled sentiments: of being
constrained (or “caught”) and exploited. It communicates the speaker’s frustration at
having little to no alternative—and this lack of alternatives being used against them. This
practice—and experience—is not limited to Japan; Asri referred to it as he complained,
“They…said we were free to leave if we didn’t want to work… It’s maddening”. I first
heard of pinhane in reference to homelessness in 2001 in Suginami Ward, located far
from the yoseba, where local CSO volunteers active in helping people enroll in
Livelihood Protection would warn each other of SSS, an accommodation services
organization known to practice pinhane. That is, as Keisuke described, where welfare
recipients received $1400 per month, SSS would keep all but $100-200 to cover rent,
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Hanba are employer-provided accommodations—also dating back to the Meiji era (1868-1912) that
operate as spaces where employers exploit both the productive capacity and reproductive needs of laborers.
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food, and utilities—thereby charging well above the market rate for facilities that are
made even more profitable by under-serving clients. For instance, Keisuke had described
how facilities would cut costs by doubling people up in dormitory-style rooms, serving
instant noodles as a meal, and assigning mandatory chores (to save on cleaning costs).
The term hinkon bijinesu has become widely known in Japan as facilities like
these have mushroomed over the last two decades. The term is often associated with
incidents of exploitation or abuse that make the news. For instance, in March 2017 the
Saitama district court awarded two men—both of whom were scouted by brokers in
public spaces—approximately $150,000 in compensation for living conditions they were
subjected to at a hinkon bijinesu (Saitama Sōgō Hōritsu Jimusho 2017), and that same
year one woman died as a result of abuse by a facility director in Ichikawa (Resident at
Ichikawa Welfare Facility Dies 2017). While some cases are widely publicized and thus
legitimated through public and even judicial scrutiny, countless instances of harassment
or trouble are also conveyed widely through social (and “whisper”) networks that people
like Toya and CSOs volunteers rely on when considering Livelihood Protection and
accommodation providers. CSOs and welfare users have pushed for greater regulation of
accommodation providers since the early 2000s, but public agencies have dragged their
heels. As a result, many potential users like Toya, pause at the idea of welfare and/or
entering housing. In this regard, the “chronic” nature of chronic homelessness ought to be
more readily understood as fundamentally indicative of the failure of public and private
agencies to deliver acceptable levels of aid and services. However, narratives surrounding
homelessness prompt the public, including public officers, to misrecognize the problem
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as rooted in individuals who have no interest in housing or help but are, instead, hooked
on homelessness.
People faced with exploitation and/or abuse at facilities often feel they have little
choice but to discontinue their stays. This is particularly true where, like Keisuke, facility
residents are dissuaded or fearful of reporting problems because government agencies
appear visibly aligned with service providers. Moreover, exiting accommodations like
Keisuke without notifying or making pertinent arrangements with caseworkers
effectively results in the termination of livelihood protection, recorded as termination due
to “disappearance”. While numbers of “disappearances” vary across Japan, they are often
substantial proportion of all terminations, generally ranging between 10-40%
nationally 95. CSOs and legal professionals (i.e. Tokyo Bar Association 2016) have called
attention to how inaction by caseworkers and public agencies regarding “disappearances”
not only fails the immediate interests of welfare users (whose access to welfare should,
for example, be reinstituted in many cases), but also systematically undermines the
capacity of the overall welfare system to ensure human rights and securities.
In Malaysia, too, pinhane-type practices have existed since as far back as the
early nineteenth century, although varying in character and name according to whether
they fell under British, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, or post-independence Malaysian
systems of labor recruitment. As in Japan, the deliberate squeezing of laborers at global
capitalism’s margins led to disproportionate homelessness among these laborers (e.g.
yoseba laborers in Japan, and “coolie” and plantation laborers in Malaya/Malaysia) since
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the nineteenth century. To the present day, labor, land, and commodities in Malaysia,
unlike those in welfare states like Japan, have remained in largely unregulated and
underregulated shadow zones 96. These informal markets have—historically and today—
functioned as a blessing and a curse for people like Azleena, Asri, and most everyone I
met at Hang Lekiu Street. That is, the informal sector serves as a buffer zone enabling
many to earn an income or access goods 97, such as through sex work, participation in
pasar karat (black market vending), and some forms of casual labor—but such markets
are necessarily rife with abuse and exploitation, some of which constitute—as Asri
noted—the “maddening” experience of pinhane.

Offering uplift—or constraining mobility?
In Kuala Lumpur, like Tokyo, as service industries have come to dominate the
economy, new methods of pinhane have emerged alongside growing demand for
unskilled labor in security, food and beverage, hotel, and construction industries. People
experiencing homelessness—especially those under 40—are systematically channeled
into these positions through labor brokers and scouts who recruit by approaching people
in public spaces, asking CSOs to refer people looking for work, and even working with
government-linked shelters to advertise jobs, often with employer-provided
accommodation. Many people, like Asri, entering these kinds of positions find that their
wages are withheld or reduced, or that living conditions become unbearable. For
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This is not to say informal markets do not exist in Japan. As the cases of Takeda and unnamed women in
Shibuya show, informal markets are a lifeline for people globally, but their scope relative to formal markets
is much larger in so-called Third World countries.
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In many places informal markets can be used to even procure land, but not in KL.
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example, limited data available on employment referrals at Anjung Singgah shows that a
majority of shelter clients receiving placements felt compelled to leave new jobs within
the first year, if not within weeks or months (Rusenko 2014).
The income and housing insecurity and poor labor conditions usually intrinsic to
low-wage work available through these programs are not often independently identified
or addressed within homelessness policy as problematic; not at least to the same degree
that refusal on the part of policy users to accept such work is. Despite high turnover rates,
evident since 2011, government and government-linked agencies in KL have not
instituted processes for systematically following up on clients placed to verify conditions
of labor and accommodation. Similarly, Tokyo metropolitan agencies tout high
placement rates in service-sector and manufacturing jobs as evidence that Self-Reliance
Support Centers help upwards of 50% of entrants exit or avoid homelessness 98, while
being less transparent around data on turnover. In this way, government agencies and
civic groups either actively propagate or passively reinforce popular narratives that high
turnover and low uptake rates related to such jobs are rooted in policy users’ laziness,
lack of motivation, and dependency on public compassion and free meals. In both cities,
the public misrecognizes homelessness as rooted in people who are “hooked” on
homelessness and therefore eschew policy solutions like housing or income. Rarely is
there serious consideration of even the possibility of problems inherent to policy, or
policy-linked institutions.
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Yuji Yamada, Self-Reliance Support Administrator at the Bureau of Social Welfare and Public Health,
Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Interview and email correspondence, November 23, 2018

217

Narratives used to attribute policy failure to users are based on unspoken
assumptions that people in states of homelessness are resistant to social values and norms
presumably adopted by people who are not. In postindustrial Japan, for example, these
values and norms dictate that people ought to enter Self-Reliance Support Centers
wherever they (like Daisuke) may exit homelessness by finding employment—or they
ought to embrace Livelihood Protection and, where need be, residence in welfare
facilities if not (like Toya). In contemporary Malaysia, people are expected to find work,
like Asri, or enter transitional shelters to receive referrals where additional support is
needed. Additionally, DBD and RSK facilities exist to care for people who are unable to
support themselves or receive support from family. In both Japan and Malaysia, people
who defy these expectations or policy solutions—and especially those classified as
“chronically” homeless—are presumed to be incompatible with—or resistant to—modern
society, including the material relief and security it provides.
Ultimately, however, these channels to labor and channels to care meet with
resistance because they offer little in the way of socio-economic uplift or stability. More
attention ought to be paid to the actual material in/security and conditions of life that
people are subjected to when enrolled in programs designed to resolve homelessness. The
prevalence of cyclical experiences of homelessness among people who have used
policy—such as Tetchan, Keisuke, Rafi, and Sim—speaks volumes about socioeconomic immobility that programming generally reinforces. Here, pinhane plays a
central role. That is, more often than not, the quality of jobs and accommodation as well
as the economic and existential security granted to people through policy are all a far cry
from what would be deemed adequate for people if they had not been recently assigned to

218

the particular category of “homeless person”. While these labor and living conditions, as
well as the dignity that is denied to people by such disparities, are in and of themselves
problematic, I wish to emphasize that, here in this context, they are created under and
through the powers and authority of policy. This gap—and the failure of policy to ensure
even a floor for “minimal standards of living”—one that would at least prohibit
exploitation and abuse—is keenly recognized by people who have chosen to avoid public
programs like Toya and Asri.
Over ten years spent in about ten facilities, Keisuke learned that “I had only this
option, and I wanted to make it work”. Therefore, he accommodated to life in welfare
facilities like SSS as best as he could. Even still, he often found himself returning to the
proverbial “square one” in Shinjuku Park, due to conditions at facilities that were difficult
to tolerate, on the one hand, and his limited set of options, on the other. The same applies
to Zali and Sim, who stayed for years at government-prescribed programs In Jerantut and
Mersing, before deciding to escape and return to KL. Toya and Rafi have avoided
government-linked programs and manage as best as they can, while sleeping on the street
or at employer-provided accommodation.
While policy solutions in both KL and Tokyo offer opportunities that some people
choose to—or, in the case of Zali and Sim, had to—accept, these programs are not the
sweeping equalizers many non-homeless people believe them to be. In both cities,
policies and programs profoundly constrain the options of people grappling with
homelessness. Consequently, people develop a sense of the limits of their own social and
geographic mobility owing to insecurities in employment, income, and housing. The gap
that exists between what is granted to policy users versus what comprises actual social
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norms for material comfort and security is typically justified in rhetoric of individuals
needing to “earn” their status—and/or being given anything is still better than nothing
(i.e. “beggars can’t be choosers”). However, for many, the conditions endemic to entering
institutions of labor or care represent not a benefit (i.e. a “step up”) but a risk, as their
conditions fail to improve, which in and of itself (even barring outright exploitation or
abuse) places a squeeze on policy users. This squeeze is not rooted in policy users’
incapacity, but in the risks and harms of policy itself.
The welfarist aims of social policies, as shown over the last 150 years of modern
development, has effectively channeled individuals into corrective and compassionate
spaces meant to uplift, enlighten, reform, rehabilitate, and reintegrate people so that they
may be recognized as “normal”, or fully human. Ironically, although compassionate
actors argue that their objectives are inclusionary, policies governing street homelessness
are necessarily exclusionary. Socially and economically, policy users are granted only
marginal benefit—often in the form of low wages and less stigmatized (but not unstigmatized) existence. Moreover, without social or economic resources of their own,
people generally remain reliant on public- and private-sector actors for legitimized access
to these. Spatial movement does open up new opportunity, but until one has access to
social and economic resources, one’s options are extremely constrained. That is, because
access to public space—and therefore mobility—is intrinsically limited by rules around
the use of public and private property (Waldron 1992), mobility is also reliant on privateand public-sector actors (or bosses, brokers, and policy agents). Consequently, welfarist
policies become fertile ground for pinhane practices as policy users—by virtue of their
lack of resources—have little to no greater choice than whether to accept terms offered,
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or walk away, as noted by Keisuke and Asri. This squeeze deliberately plays with the
social and economic limits of some people’s survival for the benefit, or profit of others.
More specifically, it serves as a basis for the social and economic power of private and
civic sector actors involved in policy interventions, as I cover in the next section.

Mobilizing the middle and upper classes
As covered in the last chapter, while civil society often views the rise of civic
action—such as meal distribution and housing-first programs—as a win that brings
government “closer to the people”—and people closer to government, the integration of
CSOs into policy processes does not, on its own, necessarily have a democratizing effect.
As the experiences of Rafi, Toya, and other interviewees illustrate, policy users in
institutions of care and labor have few if any avenues to influence or control policy
outcomes, other than “mak[ing] it work”, as Keisuke says 99. Visible increases in these
institutions in both countries are accompanied by policies that skirt matters of
accountability with regard to policy failure—most evident in the outsourcing of
programs—in part or as a whole—to civic and private actors like NWF and SSS, thus
undercutting processes for systematically addressing micro and macro issues at the root
of homelessness.
For example, protest against eviction and CSO-based demands for expanded aid
led to new policy approaches in Tokyo—including Self-Reliance Support Centers and,
eventually, greater access to Livelihood Protection and housing. Similarly, public protests
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This is an important point for the Japanese context, considering the integral role that CSOs have played
in policy formation and implementation for over two decades already.
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against roundups and CSO-based demands for the expansion of aid in Kuala Lumpur also
led to new policy approaches—including employment referrals, transitional shelters, and
free meals and other services. However, in both cities, the greatest beneficiaries of such
systems are private and public sector actors who gain politically and economically not
only from public order measures, which effectively underwrite redevelopment, but also
from social measures such as employment referrals and housing programs—visible in the
proliferation of exploitation: either in street-level care like meal distribution and material
aid (Chapter 4), or pinhane by labor brokers and hinkon bijinesu (arguably engulfing, as
seen in Yanagi’s case, medical care providers). To the extent that policy users are denied
influence or control over policy outcomes, public order and social measures alike act as a
wedge against their interests.
In each city, private- and civic-sector actors are capitalizing not only on economic
opportunity, as referenced above, but also political interest and cultural currency related
to engagement. While these policies also offer material and social benefit to persons
experiencing homelessness, there are also limitations systematically placed on benefits
granted to clients and service users—limitations that are not so rigorously limited or
enforced for benefactors and service providers. Thus, the construction of policy tends to
benefit actors with economic and political influence over operations. Employers, for one,
gain new channels for readily procuring labor, arguably reducing the need to improve
labor conditions or otherwise prevent turnover. Stated differently, because high turnover
rates can benefit employers by keeping labor costs down, they are not generally
addressed as a policy problem until employers’ interests are threatened.
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Similarly, public agencies also benefit politically and economically from
programs, primarily in how they help to achieve an “orderly” city by placing people in
employment and accommodation, even if only tentatively as Anjung Singgah and SelfReliance Support Centers have both shown. Insecurities impacting users are generally not
addressed until their inefficacy or even failure can be traced to public- or private-sector
agencies, which occurs only rarely. For instance, historically and today, employerprovided accommodations including Japan’s hanba, and Malaysia’s asrama, have been
utilized by public agencies to resolve homelessness and unemployment in one fell swoop.
Sometimes problems traced to an employer will result in blacklisting of that employer
from public programs, but the overall system will remain the same, largely owing to what
would otherwise appear to be its success in channeling people to employment.
However, from the view of individuals seeking income or shelter, employerprovided accommodation is the most insecure of possible options. This is not only
because one is prone to losing both as quickly as they were gained, but also because such
conditions expand opportunity for pinhane, or profiteering through exploitation. Just as
public agencies have failed to bring an end to pinhane as it occurred in hanba over
Japan’s modern history, little is being done to address hinkon bijinesu, or pinhane as
experienced today. The recent shift towards the provision of housing in Tokyo, and
shelter in Kuala Lumpur, has created greater opportunity for private- and civic-sector
groups to build new economies premised on labor, welfare, housing, and care (e.g. meal
distributions) that are, indeed, founded on fundamental social and economic insecurities
underlying homelessness. In this regard, although welfarist measures have historically
and today claimed to act as a platform for uplift, in truth, uplift often constitutes little
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more than systematically treating users as surplus labor or surplus life, which means users
benefit the least from these systems (Willse 2015).
For some, like Daisuke and Asri, having housing and/or employment is far more
desirable than not having them—and access can therefore be life-changing. However, as
their experiences reveal, access alone does not necessarily guarantee any advantage—
particularly where protections either do not exist, or systematically fail. On a macroscale, privatization, devolution, and state practices of inaction (e.g. failing to prevent
pinhane through regulation) and passive action (e.g. selectively blacklisting actors
suspected of pinhane after it occurs) that, together, characterize neoliberal-era welfarist
policy offer little assurance to persons experiencing homelessness. While many people
may gain short-, medium-, and even long-term security through such measures—as
Daisuke, Keisuke, Sim, and Zali each have to varying degrees—success relies too much
on people “mak[ing] it work” and not enough on processes that ensure that policy will
work, in their interest and for their sake. The security that Keisuke has gained at Tsukuroi
stands as evidence of the importance of weeding out pinhane if we are to provide more
effective support to people seeking housing, employment, and other forms of assistance.
Policy users should not have to gamble on whether or not any given service provider or
employer is sufficiently responsible, respectful, or kind. Ensuring exits from
homelessness, as well as greater livelihood and housing security, requires enough
political will to ensure that institutions “make it happen”.
Just as importantly, political will cannot—and must not—be framed as essential
to providing assistance for people experiencing homelessness, but rather as essential to
providing assistance more democratically according to and with people. Widely held
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skepticism regarding programs, as articulated by Rafi and Toya, for instance, and
problems like “disappearances” stemming from negative experiences with programs are
products of the failure to adequately consider the experiences and interests of policy
users. For this reason, it is imperative that public agencies recognize these problems as
indicative of trouble in policy (rather than policy users) and remedy them by ensuring
people like Sim, Toya, Tetchan, and Mohammad have greater influence and control over
the formation of policy and the determination of policy outcomes. Otherwise, people
experiencing homelessness are left with little recourse but to ensure their own security,
such as by conducting their lives in public spaces wherever alternatives are not available
or not tolerable. Similarly, to the extent that broader society fails to ensure livelihood
security, many people will feel they have little recourse but to enter low-paying or illicit
vocations, such as collecting recycling, panhandling, or engaging in black market
vending or sex work. These choices occur not because people reject social values and
norms, but because social values and norms deny particular people adequate humanity.

Conclusion
Social policy emerged in the early twentieth century to provide “uplift” to the
working classes at a time where governments sought to locate “skilled and unskilled
labor where it was most needed” (Wallis 1902:773).While many programs did indeed
improve quality of life, they nonetheless prioritized aims that reflected the political and
economic interests of the middle- and upper-classes as, in a limited democracy, only the
latter had platforms for shaping policy. Consequently, institutions of welfare, labor, and
care—developed in the interest of extending capitalist productivity, that is, bolstering and
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extending life in accordance with raced, classed, gendered, and abled systems of
valuation—offered only limited socio-spatial mobility, much as democracy itself was
limited.
Although policy systems were recalibrated over the post-WWII era, this process,
largely overseen by American and British agencies, generally replicated prewar
institutions, practices, and norms (Garon 1998; Harper 2001; also, Chapters 2 and 3),
though it was organized into new systems that rhetorically foregrounded welfare ideals of
egalitarianism in Japan and developmentalism and philanthropy in Malay(si)a.
Consequently, although postwar policies were upheld by international institutions as
infrastructure for leveling the playing field on both global and local scales, results have
been uneven. While some policy users indubitably benefit from policy, positive outcomes
should not overshadow the injustice inherent to programs that systematically consign
people to conditions of social and economic insecurity and even fail to protect them from
exploitation and harm.
This is not to say that welfarist institutions of care are inherently exploitative or
abusive. However, they have accommodated practices of pinhane, or labor exploitation,
in both Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and this
relationality between pinhane and public institutions is not often enough directly
addressed. Scholarship has explored the limits of social and spatial mobility imposed by
homelessness and homelessness policy through conceptualization of the medicalization
(Lyon-Callo 2004) and value of homelessness (Willse 2015). More research is needed to
better identify how and why the socio-spatial mobility, or liberty, of resourced actors has
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been historically and today founded on the political, social, and geographic
immobilization of others through policy.
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CONCLUSION
Lessons from History
Neoliberal transformations
Neoliberal shifts have altered distributions of wealth and perceived need for state
programs in both Japan and Malaysia. Moreover, from among these changes, two in
particular have shaped homelessness regulation in each country's capital. One is the
transnationalization of labor markets and production processes over the last half-century
as this underpinned deindustrialization, economic restructuring, and labor deregulation in
Japan (Hasegawa 2005; Simeon and Ikeda 2003) and the concentration of transnational
service 100 and manufacturing industries and migration corridors in Kuala Lumpur and
Southeast Asia (Kaur 2010). The other key factor is the international financialization of
municipal debt and redevelopment, which has spurred accelerated growth in urban
infrastructure—including through transfer of public assets to the private sector
(GlobalCapital 2007; Jessop 2015; Kirkpatrick 2017; Rutland 2010). Together, these
shifts have altered avenues by which individuals and households may achieve socioeconomic security directly through employment and social services and indirectly
through public- and private-sector investment in urban infrastructure.
These shifts have also shaped the tone and form of civic action and political
movements in both cities. In Tokyo, for instance, increased collective insecurity in
housing and employment has led to new kinds of poverty, identified through neologisms
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like freeters, net café refugees, and the precariat (Allison 2014; Amamiya 2007; Obinger
2009; Ronald and Hirayama 2009). In Japan, where publics had identified
overwhelmingly as middle-class through the late twentieth century, these changes have
fueled public demand for the reinforcement and strengthening of socio-legal protections:
while left-leaning publics call for the fortification of welfare-state programs and civic
rights right-leaning publics turn to so-called traditional systems of patriarchal (and ethnonationalist) protection. Moreover, although many civic actors from various political
camps openly critique neoliberal shifts, they also tend to view past welfare-state and/or
other patriarchal systems with nostalgic rose-colored lenses. This nostalgia reduces
attention to the intrinsically exclusionary—rather than inclusionary—nature of these
historic models, thus enabling their propagation.
Conversely, in Kuala Lumpur, predominantly middle-class civic movements
seeking to reduce the social and economic tensions of a highly unequal society has
claimed active interest in philanthropic interventions—ranging from welfarist measures
like financial relief to neoliberal remedies prescribing employment-based “self-reliance”
and the prohibition of life-sustaining activities. While civic movements have gained
democratic strength, they also overwhelmingly choose apolitical approaches to aid that
sidestep critique of prevailing political-economic systems of distribution 101, which are
now weighed in the favor of the middle class. Consequently, civic groups tend to support
or endorse solutions that align with—and even strengthen—dominant global capitalist
systems, including those that assign responsibility for public well-being to individuals,
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households, and (ethnic) communities as opposed to public- or private-sector institutions.
These dynamics exacerbate problems for working-class communities and households not
only because labor and welfare protections remain weak—thus, prolonging livelihood
insecurity—but also because accelerating urban development necessarily suspends and
invalidates informal markets, resulting in greater dispossession and impoverishment—
amidst fewer avenues to security.
These transformations underscore the past and present role of formal labor and
housing markets—and, in advanced capitalist countries, welfare-state systems—in
ensuring generally uniform standards of living for normative households. Conversely, the
piecemeal nature of markets and social policies has long complicated livelihood security
for people in post/colonial countries, which have uncoincidentally served as global
capitalism’s reserve pools of labor and land. In Malaysia, community, family, and
informal markets have been critical buffers for reproduction, and survival, in lieu of the
welfare state. Concurrently, the role of police and other agencies concerned with social
and spatial security have been, across both contexts, deployed to bring order to areas
beset by insecurity. In post/imperial Tokyo, the welfare state has insulated large swathes
of the population from homelessness and other forms of socio-economic insecurity, thus
making it seem like a much more exceptional problem—more easily attributable to
individual fault. Hence, security measures like Sanya Taisaku were adopted only on a
smaller scale. In both countries, the scope of security measures has little to do with the
people thrust into insecurity, and everything to do with the globally circulating capitalist
ethos surrounding social and spatial disorder itself.
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Hence, political-economic shifts have also stirred a resurgence in historically
entrenched ideas that cast poverty as contrary to modernity. In Kuala Lumpur (Chapter
2), economic growth and the ever-increasing visibility of affluence has reinforced an
Other-ing of urban poverty and stoked interest in erasing evidence of such so-called
"backwardness" from view. In Tokyo (Chapter 3), the neoliberal abandonment of
welfare-state ideals—once viewed as evidence of a "civilized" society—amidst the
Global North's race to the bottom has triggered longstanding anxieties surrounding
(racialized) “idle” persons prone to "deviance" and “dependency”. Consequently, in each
country, civic compassion is necessarily tempered by defensive concerns that
"uncivilized”—or anti-social—marauders seek to prey on generosity (also see Kaika
2017). The neoliberal state has largely benefited from these rising insecurities and
tensions by offering civil society the mantle of “civilized” welfarist action, while public
agencies dedicate themselves to the marketization of public space and the rational
management of public order, designed to minimize the physical presence of people on the
streets (Chapter 4) and relocate and rehabilitate people through housing-first and workfirst programming (Chapter 5). Against this background, many middle-class
organizations have welcomed the devolution, or responsibilization, of welfare as they are
granted greater “leadership” over clients, as well as greater material resources and
political influence.

Imperial legacy
Understanding continuities and changes across time requires knowing the origins
and structure of welfarist aid. The advance of social policy in the early twentieth century,
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particularly within democratizing imperialist states like Japan, offered enhanced
protections but only to the extent permitted under locally and globally raced, gendered,
classed, and abled divisions of labor, modified across time but fundamentally sustained.
Consequently, the distribution of welfare aid for people deemed unproductive (and,
conversely, labor protections for those deemed productive) did not then, nor does it now,
protect all people equally. Hence, while particular forms and degrees of inequality may
shift over time, the uneven nature of the landscape remains fundamentally unchanged.
For instance, historically and today, people who are born into marginalized positions—
and especially those who defy gendered, abled, raced, and/or classed conventions 102
reinforced via socio-legal norms—experience reduced access to education, employment,
housing, and social support by virtue of their social position. This uneven terrain not only
underlies specific vulnerabilities to becoming homeless but also guides exclusionary
tendencies in homelessness regulation as policy targets are scrutinized in programs
designed to rehabilitate them in line with the same unevenly determined conventions and
norms.
Consequently, historically and today, the process of providing people
experiencing homelessness with assistance typically involves granting facilities the
authority—via implicit or explicit approval by state institutions—to unilaterally impose
on residents certain standards of living (such as those determining privacy and diet)
and/or regulations of conduct. Historical examples include early twentieth century
workcamps or mid-twentieth century arranged marriages for homeless women and girls,
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and postwar institutionalization of persons with disabilities and mental health needs.
Today, uneven standards and practices—illustrative of a systematically-reinforced gap in
material security between people who are raced, classed, gendered, and abled in varying
ways persist in both Japan and Malaysia. For instance, just as men who did not fulfill
breadwinning norms were historically segregated within employment-centric disciplinary
institutions (including Japan's yoseba), similarly labor-capable men today are expected to
make use of Self-Reliance Support Centers and transitional shelters like Pusat Transit.
Other people such as single mothers, people with disabilities, and foreign citizens, are
also managed using particular disciplinary institutions (Foucault 1977, 1998) that offer
users limited choices, thereby compelling conformity or bearing the risk of unprotected
existence like homelessness.
Institutions of labor and care are, thus, shaped by patriarchal relations of power
that guide the social and economic prospects—and future course—of most individuals in
society. These relations of power between ostensibly normative and non-normative actors
explain how policy users are systematically subjected to not only institutionalization
(forced detention), “medicalization,” and “pathologization” (Lyon-Callo 2004; Mills
2015; Willse 2015) but also pinhane, or exploitation too. However, it is also worth
considering why public- and private-sector actors have for so long actively or passively
condoned these and other practices violating the rights and dignities of policy users. As
discussed in Chapter 4, these practices are not only undemocratic, but anti-democratic, as
they manifest indifference to the will and the well-being of policy targets and users. So
why would they prevail for over a century of modern policy, including over a halfcentury of ostensibly democratic rule?
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These institutions appear paradoxical because of how they deliberately limit, and
even undermine, the material security and socio-political rights of policy users, all while
asserting that such limitations are in users' best interests. But this structure lies at the root
of the imperial formation borne from Lockean ideas of liberal citizenship determined
through litmus tests that bar inclusion to people viewed as insufficiently civilized or
capable of reason. This template for social order fundamentally functions to affirm the
social and political claims to power of people—predominantly in the middle and upper
classes—who view themselves (despite their own individual nonconformities 103) as a
normative modern public. That is, in both post-imperial countries like Japan and
postcolonial countries like Malaysia, people presumed to embody social values and
norms—often merely by virtue of their race, class, gender, and ability—have much to
gain from homelessness regulation in terms of political and economic protections and
benefits, including those shaping democratic systems.

Global capitalism, Compassion, and Paternalism
In Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur alike, avenues provided under policy for
ameliorating homelessness generally prioritize the provision of employment and/or
accommodation. Historically, these were offered in each country through public sector
institutions like welfare homes (kōsei shisetsu) and yoseba in Japan, and Desa Bina Diri
in Malaysia. The scope and range of supportive aid in Tokyo prior to the 1990s was far
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more extensive than that in Kuala Lumpur, owing to the welfare state’s financial and
institutional resources, on one hand, and political will invested in achieving full
employment, on the other. Both stemmed in large part from the global importance of
welfare and full employment as markers of advanced status and national stability.
However, while welfare-state infrastructure has been gradually dismantled in advanced
post/imperial states globally, access to welfare has grown in Malaysia, particularly since
the 1990s. That said, welfare aid remains as a rule piecemeal and meagre; however, its
expansion in the regulation of homelessness does spotlight avenues to labor, as seen in
government-established Anjung Singgah shelters.
In Kuala Lumpur, policy approaches to resolving homelessness have shifted
considerably over the last decade. Where mass roundups, compulsory detention, and
rehabilitation programming once constituted the core of policy solutions 104, direct and
voluntary avenues to temporary accommodation and private-sector employment are now
treated as most favorable. This work-first approach has been instituted into policy
through the proliferation of government-established Anjung Singgah shelters and the
newer men’s facility, Pusat Transit. In addition, officers at Anjung Singgah are also
responsible for accepting and referring users to existing public- or civic-sector services,
where possible, such as those for women escaping domestic violence, pregnant women,
senior citizens, and persons with disabilities. These changes stem from recent decades of
economic growth, which have led to extensive demand for low-wage labor in service
industries like hospitality and security, on one hand, as well as the rise of a Malaysian
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middle class interested in further advancing in socio-economic status via
entrepreneurship relying on low-wage labor or philanthropic expressions of compassion.
This model of differentiated service coordination in Kuala Lumpur's shelters
effectively functions to “sort” through people experiencing homelessness, much like
rescue operations still do. However, while shelters generally link individuals to aid that
splits them between productive and reproductive realms, rescue operations are designed
to reduce the public presence of particular populations—such as non-citizens, drug users,
and persons with disabilities as detained by Immigration, the Anti-Drug Agency, and
Social Welfare Department, respectively. Stated differently, local homelessness
regulation in particular, and welfare policy systems in general, have come to resemble
those once considered archetypical in industrialized welfare-state systems, except for
their distinct: a) lack of rights to and guarantees for protection, and b) more devolved and
privatized form. Labor-capable persons—predominantly men—are channeled to privatesector employers, while non-labor-capable others are directed to public- and civic-sector
spaces of care.
Sustained national growth may underlie increasing public, private, and civic
sector generosity but poor enforcement of labor regulations, where regulations exist at all,
and a lack of secure, regularized access to public aid means that most people
experiencing homelessness have few options besides seeking refuge in spaces like Hang
Lekiu Street, where Kuala Lumpur's non-profit industrial complex (Willse 2015) is
arguably taking shape. Consequently, as compassionate actors from all sectors converge
on Hang Lekiu Street to provide direct aid, so do opportunistic agents of pinhane
exploitation. That is, both compassionate and exploitative agents are necessarily drawn to
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these spaces because of their social and economic disparities. Moreover, while
compassionate acts are not necessarily deliberate acts of exploitation, they nonetheless
benefit actors in myriad ways.
At the same time, as shelter infrastructure has been maintained and slightly
expanded through the late twentieth and early twenty-first century in advanced capitalist
countries, policy innovations have tended to gravitate towards housing. In Japan,
homelessness policy increasingly centers housing security above that for employment.
This partial shift, akin to Kuala Lumpur's partial shift from "rescue" to shelters, is
generally credited to the advance of more caring and constructive approaches by
voluntary and civic agents. However, the diffusion and continuation of these policies also
rests on the political and economic interests of resourced actors—and especially those in
the public sector tasked with the redistribution of public accountability, public cost, and
public assets amidst rising urbanization and austerity (Peck 2015).
Hence, in Tokyo, for example, wherever public sector programs direct people in
need to housing or employment, not only do pinhane agents emerge to profit from policy,
but the political will necessary to stop them fails to surface. This inaction directly results
in harm to policy users. Moreover, it inspires and sustains their reluctance to consider
public aid. An identical pattern is visible in Kuala Lumpur where companies and labor
brokers seek potential workers for low-wage and/or outright exploitative work at
government-established shelters, CSO activities, and parks and other public spaces.
Government refusal to address problems such as these underpins reduced interest in
public shelters, one way in which people may protect themselves from the negative
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ramifications of policies that fail to honor their interests 105. However, the uneven, topdown nature of governance means that responses tend to paternalistically treat this
resistance to programs as evidence of the "uncivilized" or unruly character of policy
targets, thereby justifying measures aimed at bolstering public order and coercing welfare
uptake rather than improving programs in line with input from prospective and current
users.

Institutions of care and control
Since the twentieth century, both welfare and public order measures have had
profound effect on the mobility of people experiencing homelessness, especially in light
of their socio-economic circumstance. Public order measures, for one, render people
experiencing homelessness a target and thereby limit their ability to move through public
space, such as where quality-of-life rules or other regulations require reproductive
(survival) activities be conducted in private space (Skolnik 2018; Waldron 1991).
Second, social policy effectually controls mobility by regulating both opportunity for
movement and its terms. This can be seen in how it facilitated Keisuke's move from
Shinjuku Central Park to multiple facilities around Tokyo, each accessible only through
gatekeeping agents at the welfare office and accommodation facilities alike. Similarly,
Lim moved between Kuala Lumpur and Desa Bina Diri in Jerantut, initially under the
authority of law and later in contravention of it. That is, by obligating or offering
accommodation, social programs and policies facilitate relocation but always contingent
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on conditions that tend to deliberately guide movement to or from particular centrally and
remotely located regions.
Controls on mobility constitute another legacy of empire, formed in the image of
global imperialist networks for procuring human resources. That is, the movements of
policy users facilitated through welfare and public order interventions illustrate how the
socio-legal delegitimization of homelessness has served—historically and today—to
mobilize people (human resources) across globally-formed public- and private-sector
networks. Functionally, public- and private-sector agents of these networks offer social
and economic support only on the condition that people agree to geographic relocation.
Moreover, despite claims that it stands as an opportunity for social and economic
advance, geographic mobility has long been fraught with risk—even where facilitated
through public sector institutions. Seen in this light, the dubious past and present
outcomes of social policies governing homelessness are indeed systemic.
Social policy and public order regulation also control social, in addition to
geographic, mobility. This is achieved through legal limits on material and economic
benefits, as well as through pinhane exploitation. For instance, historically and today,
supportive facilities have deliberately incorporated penalties like discomfort to
discourage extended use. Similarly, economic aid has long been limited, ostensibly to
prevent dependency. These controls constrain social mobility to varying degrees, but are
regularly justified as essential for incentivizing independence and self-reliance. Control
of both social and geographic mobility enforced in public space (Chapter 4; also Column
A of Table 6) and related welfare institutions (Chapter 5; also Column B of Table 6) have
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been replicated over generations because of how they necessarily benefit resourced
groups, from public and private sector actors to the public at large.

Policy-based
A. Street Homelessness
Governance of
…
Malaysia Public Multi-agency
operations (Antibegging; Antivagrancy)

Japan

B. Shelters and other
C. Channels of Labor
Rehabilitative or Custodial Spaces

Anjung Singgah (Welfare & Labor) Employer-provided
Pusat Transit (Men only; Labor)
Accommodation
(e.g. Restaurants,
Desa Bina Diri (Persons with
Construction,
disabilities, mental health
Security,
conditions, etc.)
Manufacturing,
BR1M (One-off welfare; Rumah Seri Kanangan (Seniors)
etc.)
national)
Baitulmal (One-off
welfare; Muslim
only)
Civic CSO meal services,
CSO shelters addressing homelessness Skills training
clothing distribution,
among specific demographic
programs
medical care,
groups, i.e. women, children,
Internships
counts/surveys, etc.
persons living with AIDS
Etc.
Public Multi-agency outreach Livelihood Assistance
Employer-provided
(initiated under
(Apartment/Doya/SRO/etc)
accommodation,
Transition-toi.e. Asrama/Hanba
Community-Life
(Construction,
Self-Reliance Center + Transitional
Program)
Manufacturing)
Housing (Labor)
Housing-First Pilots (Not reviewed)
Extra-legal assistance
(One-off welfare)
Civic CSO meal services,
CSO shelter and
Big Issue – Japan
clothing distribution, Housing-first programs
medical care,
addressing homelessness among
counts/surveys, etc
non-specific and specific
demographic groups

Table 6. Institutions involved in public order and social welfare measures.

The addition of multiple agencies—and multi-agency teams—to outreach and
rescue operations in Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur, respectively, has served to maximize the
efficacy of interventionary objectives—and especially those related to public order
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enforcement: the reduction of inappropriate use of public space, or visible street
homelessness. These interventions undermine the ability of people experiencing
homelessness to claim their basic rights to public space—and the free exercise of rights in
such space (Waldron 1992). This is made clear in instances where Kei was regularly
photographed and disciplined by public officers in Yoyogi Park, Yanagi was physically
removed from a residential park near Sanya, and Azleena and Sim were taken into
custody during rescue operations in Kuala Lumpur. Exclusionary public order measures
are designed to incentivize and compel the uptake of social programs, or self-reliance
more generally, while also protecting public property from perceived disorder or harm.
Such measures benefit the non-homeless public in subtle ways by, for example,
leveraging the latter's claims to public property. In Tokyo, this advantage is founded on
the supposedly “appropriate” or law-abiding nature of their public space use, whereas in
Kuala Lumpur it is founded on the distinction of not being a "destitute person".

Capitalist divisions of labor and global homelessness
Moreover, social and geographic mobility in each city has also been controlled
according to globally and locally determined divisions of labor. That is, a review of each
city's policy landscape reveals that the direction, or outcome, of street-level interventions
generally hinge on a target's gender, class, race, and ability because these factors are
taken to be indicators under capitalism of individual propensity for reproductive and
productive labor and, by extension, the trajectory of modern life. More specifically, as
shown in transhistorical analyses of policy in Kuala Lumpur (Chapter 2) and Tokyo
(Chapter 3), consideration of physical and mental health, citizenship, (perceived) gender,
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linguistic ability, age, ethnic background, and state of dress, among other things, are
considered key factors for determining assistance, whether through institutions of care or
control such as employment referral services, hospitals, immigration officers, or police.
While individuals have some degree of agency and choice, disproportionate power is
granted to gatekeeping public- and private-sector policy agents including bureaucrats
determining policy and implementation.
Historically, within institutions of care such as hospitals and shelters, aid has been
allocated paternalistically in line with what policy agents deem to be necessary or
deserved. For instance, in Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo in the 1930s, girls and women
experiencing homelessness were provided shelter where they were trained as wives for
marriage. Today too protection offered to women and girls both reflects and reinforces
their ties to the reproductive realm as aid and accommodation concentrate on protecting
them from domestic abuse, supporting single mothers, and generally keeping them off the
streets and apart from men. Similarly, welfare programs offering immediate aid for
children, persons with disabilities, senior citizens, and other protected groups have also
existed in both cities. However, access to aid or shelter in and of itself guarantees neither
the quality nor sufficiency of assistance. Moreover, target groups are generally granted
only limited right to refuse such care—as illustrated by Zali and Sim’s experience with
Desa Bina Diri and Kei's explanation of how elderly and ill persons in Yoyogi Park are
targeted for discipline, or advice, by patrols.
Historical analysis shows that in each city across time, particularly from the early
twentieth century, policies addressing the homelessness of labor-capable men offered
substantial material support and enabled greater mobility—but limited economic aid to
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prevent so-called dependency; together, these measures were designed to bolster men's
self-governance. As recognized by Isomura Eiichi in 1959 (Iwata 1992:21), this also
ultimately resulted in their positioning "outside the scope of modern welfare". Moreover,
the disproportionate social and political influence of heterosexual men in patriarchal
society, cutting across social institutions, resulted in a privileging of their voices and
interests and, consequently, the power of their claims—as long as these aligned with
dominant notions of respectability. Concurrently, organizations centered or sidelined the
voice and interests of people according to perceived status via considerations beyond
gender alone, such as race, ethnicity, age, citizenship, and ability. Hence, public and civic
institutions alike, when working with homelessness policy, have historically tended to
invest more political urgency and economic resources in resolving homelessness as it
relates to, for instance, cis heterosexual male unemployment—albeit tempered by a
modicum of investment in persons with disabilities, women, senior citizens, and other
groups wherever they are perceived as deserving of aid. Today, these tendencies are
expressed in the quick provision of shelters and other facilities for employable persons,
and especially men, as seen in Tokyo’s Self-Reliance Center and Kuala Lumpur’s
Anjung Singgah and Pusat Transit.
Gendered norms—and masculinist demands for breadwinning and “self-reliance”
in postwar Japan were instrumental in producing a masculine stigma against accepting
welfare, viewed as dependency on the state, and a feminine stigma against refusing
paternalist care from partners, birth family, or the state. In postcolonial countries like
Malaysia, on the other hand, the state insisted that all members of the public had to take
care of themselves; hence, self-reliance is more generally applied to all of society. Seen
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in this light, it becomes clear that neoliberalism reintroduces norms once imposed by
imperial countries on their former colonies (Halperin 2015). As industries grew more
globally mobile in the 1970s and 1980s, and the emergent neoliberal economy took
shape, it gained its footing by reducing expenses incurred in the procurement of human
and natural resources, much like the industrial economy that preceded it. This manifested
in the feminization and transnationalization of labor from the 1970s, the automation of
labor from the 1980s, and widespread labor deregulation from the 1990s.

Socio-spatial Governance: The Relation between Public Order and Welfare
The social and spatial management of street homelessness in Tokyo and Kuala
Lumpur falls under more than just penal and welfare arrangements. Non-welfare agencies
managing transportation, sanitation, parks, and immigration enforcement at national and
municipal levels of government also have clear and concrete protocol for engaging with
persons experiencing homelessness, as seen in policy, protocol, and practice in both cities
under Japan’s MLIT, Malaysia’s Immigration Bureau, the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government, and KL City Hall, among others. This co-integrated multi-agency approach
has advanced rapidly over the last thirty years, gaining ground with each new wave of
law and policy. In the case of Tokyo, it was formally instituted in national law 106 in 2002
with the enshrinement of powers to "enforce appropriate use” of public facilities in
Article 11 of the Self-Reliance Support Act. These powers were then systematically
operationalized in 2004 through the establishment of new institutions and protocols for
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enforcement in Tokyo’s Transition-to-Community-Life Program. In Malaysia, changes
took shape sooner as, initially, immigration and anti-drug agencies were incorporated into
frontline operations in the 1980s and 1990s. Then, over the last decade, City Hall and the
Federal Territories City Planning Department (both non-welfare agencies) have taken
increasingly active and dominant roles in the management of Kuala Lumpur’s
homelessness programming—both in terms of street (rescue) operations and transitional
(welfare) shelters.

Neoliberalization of the Janus face
This broader landscape of Janus-faced compassionate and corrective ambitions in
law and practice carries two distinguishing characteristics animatedly differently through
Japan's welfare-state and Malaysia's non-welfare-state infrastructure. The first
characteristic is that contemporary policies necessarily fuse public order and welfare
measures. As detailed in each of Kuala Lumpur’s and Tokyo’s policy histories, this
fusion of caring and controlling structures and functions traces back to the incorporation
of welfarist measures into public order governance at the turn of the twentieth century.
Today, the neoliberal expression of these policy aims is realized in Japan’s dual focus on
individual socio-economic self-reliance and "appropriate use" of public assets, while
Malaysia’s dual concern centers on imperatives of care and control—for the sake of
rescue and image. In each country, policy narratives surrounding these dual focuses tend
to imply that failure in one regard, namely, social or spatial development, necessarily
threatens the other.
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The second characteristic of Janus-faced regulation is the pairing of overbroad
and vague public order statutes with welfare provisions that narrowly define targets and
are commonly operationalized in an extra-legal sphere. In practice, this is seen in Kuala
Lumpur in application of the Destitute Persons Act as a means to clear the streets, and
how this is offset by the practice of providing shelter or welfare assistance to only limited
categories of persons, where contemporary modes of the former is administered by civic,
private, or quasi-government organizations. In Tokyo, it is found in the practice of
overbroad prohibitions against "inappropriate use" balanced by welfare assistance limited
to either extra-legal support (hōgai enjō) channels outside of Livelihood Protection, or
channels within Livelihood Protection where extra-legal consideration of an applicant's
unsheltered status results in their referral to specific institutions, facilities, or treatment.
This distinct trend in law and practice has emerged from increased public sector
prioritization of urban redevelopment, investment markets, and the devolution of social
protections.
On one hand, the public order measures in this pairing enable government to
incorporate increasing numbers of agencies 107 into measures like Tokyo's park patrols or
Kuala Lumpur's rescue operations, while also adjusting target groups or actions over
time. For instance, although enforcement in Tokyo initially focused on five park
encampments, it has since expanded to include new geographic regions, management
agencies, and "inappropriate" uses of public space such as sleeping on benches, resting on
sidewalks, and leaving bags unattended. Similarly, in Kuala Lumpur, new multi-agency
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teams now tackle begging, rather than vagrancy, in an expansion of prior multi-agentic
applications of the Destitute Persons Act. On the other hand, welfare measures targeting
people experiencing homelessness limit the scope of persons eligible for aid, and the
number of public agencies responsible for such aid. For instance, assistance through the
Transition-to-Community-Life Program (2004-2009) was offered only to tent residents in
five select parks, and only under particular terms and conditions. Similarly, Taito Ward’s
Housing First pilot program (2019) grants aid only to persons identified as chronically
homeless. In Malaysia, shelter programs revolve around linking people to employment
or, to a lesser degree, already-limited public and civic resources. As a result of overbroad
public order directives and narrowed welfarist protections, new policies propagate social
and spatial insecurities by facilitating clearance and limiting access to aid. Moreover,
implementation in each case may well bypass civic rights.
This Janus-faced structure is itself a legacy of imperial governance. It renders
unsheltered existence illegitimate through the enforcement of broad public order
regulation and restricted welfare measures. That is, while public order measures may
more perceptibly delegitimize street homelessness, welfarist measures achieving the same
ends more subtly by foreclosing access to aid and other modes of protection to people in
states of homelessness. That is, while distributions of emergency aid such as meals or
clothing may reach people lacking housing, long-term forms of supportive assistance
require applicants enter state-mandated or approved rehabilitative accommodation. Stated
differently, substantive aid is rarely granted to people in states of homelessness because
welfare has historically served to incentivize compliance with social divisions of labor
and, where one does not work, subordination to paternalistic care, all organized spatially.
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As Chapter 4 shows, people approached by policy agents today are systematically
pointed towards available public resources or aid, such as Tokyo's self-reliance and
housing-first programs or Kuala Lumpur's rehabilitation centers and shelters. Yet, as
illustrated in Chapter 5, aid is typically conditional on entry to institutions that have
authority to unilaterally determine what is best for policy users. As reported by Jaya in
Kuala Lumpur and Officer Tanaka in Tokyo, policy agents are responsible for
prescribing how to "be normal”. Moreover, in many instances, people who refuse
avenues to aid—such as Kei, Jaya, and Toya—will experience reproach. Ultimately, both
public order and welfare aims are designed to meet the prerogatives of state agents—
often focused on urban redevelopment and the financialization of markets—rather than
the unconditional strengthening of human security. This bias is reflected in policy
objectives that, for example, prioritize the reduction of tents above all else in Tokyo or
the integration of CSO actors into Kuala Lumpur's “proper [government] channels” for
aid.

Animation across welfare-state and non-welfare-state infrastructure
Neoliberal era shifts in homelessness regulation necessarily differ across Tokyo
and Kuala Lumpur in line with each capital's developmental context and, more
specifically, its historically entrenched public order and welfare systems. In Japan, where
the welfare state is presumed to serve as a floor for managing social protections and
public needs, including those pertaining to homelessness, the question of public order has
also fallen to separate, specialized agencies such as those charged with responsibility for
ensuring “appropriate use” today. As a result, even though management of homelessness
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itself is both social and spatial (as epitomized in patrols by welfare agents and social
outreach by non-welfare agents), agencies must nevertheless ultimately align their
objectives with either public order or welfare goals. However, in Malaysia, the lack of a
welfare state has meant that welfare and public order ambitions relating to homelessness
have long been fused within a single policy 108—and, for the most part, the only policy to
address homelessness. Hence, narratives produced by agencies in Kuala Lumpur are
simultaneously concerned with security- and welfare-oriented aims of clearance and
rescue as a means to justify actions (like the SEA Games two-month “boot camp”) that
resolve both in one fell swoop. New shelters too are expected to help clear the streets, as
evidenced by government insistence that not only people experiencing homelessness but
also CSOs offer services in government facilities rather than on the streets.
Interestingly, government data collection methods in both cities suggest that
between welfare and public order measures, the latter rank as a higher priority among
public agencies 109. For instance, data tabulated and publicly released regarding entrants
in Tokyo's Transition-to-Community-Life Program seems to end in 2009, the Program's
final year of registration, making it difficult to determine the effectiveness and long-term
outcomes of assistance. However, annual counts of tents throughout Tokyo, first
collected in 2004, are easily found, regularly updated, and actively utilized by multiple
agencies today, as are yearly street counts and surveys. In Kuala Lumpur, the state has
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Meta-governance of social services (Willse, 2010) may be taking shape in Japan, and public order
controls would certainly support its aims. However, the effect of recent regulation on case management and
facilities themselves is beyond the scope of my research.
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yet to develop a system for following up on former shelter clients at Anjung Singgah (est
2011) or Pusat Transit (est 2015) to measure the short-, medium-, or long-term impacts of
employment referrals, but GIS maps of “hotspots” and other geographic and demographic
data on street homelessness is produced and updated regularly using PIT counts. Hence,
qualitative or quantitative data illustrating whether and how supportive programs may
succeed in either Tokyo or Kuala Lumpur is sparse, contrasting ample quantitative charts
of street homeless populations.
Moreover, because public-, civic-, and private-sector organizations carry
disproportionate power in controlling narratives about services, failure tends to be
attributed to the shortcomings of policy users. That is, imbalances in power mean that the
effects of policy are woefully misunderstood. Policy narratives reveal these imbalances as
they advance misunderstandings often rooted in the whims and fancies of compassionate
actors. For instance, the idea advanced in Kuala Lumpur that someone can be “rescued”
from the streets is, as Sim and Zali's experiences suggest, a profound misrepresentation of
how homelessness is experienced and what could be done to reduce it, not to mention a
misrepresentation of policy action itself, as Azleena would point out. Similarly, the idea
of self-reliance as a solution, popularized in policy in Tokyo, is equally problematic
considering that surviving street homelessness, on the one hand, requires remarkable
capacity for self-reliance and, on the other, that the roots of policy failure lies less in
moral or disciplinary failing and more in how users are compelled to sacrifice individual
liberty, socio-economic security, and/or psychological well-being to "make [programs]
work", as Keisuke found.
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Similarly, the recent proliferation of concepts like “chronic homelessness” and
“service resistance” in Japanese and Malaysian literature and programming are more
telling of a relatively global ubiquity of problems inherent to policy responses and ways
of thinking about homelessness, than qualities inherent to people grappling with
homelessness itself. These trends—often borrowing from conceptual frames that relate
homelessness to addiction, disease, and non-conformity—speak volumes about scientific
ignorance of problems ingrained in institutions delivering services, which profoundly and
repeatedly shapes policy knowledge transnationally. Attention I have given to users'
experiences underscores how institutional problems are often at the root of resistance to
services (see also Willse 2010), rather than any inherent failing of people experiencing
homelessness. The blind eye directed at the institutional roots of policy failure reflect and
reinforce compassion that, as (Arendt 1965:79) warned, may be "enjoyed for [its] own
sake, and almost automatically lead to a glorification of its cause, which is the suffering
of others". That is, compassion rooted in uneven power relations and imperial legacies
inspires governance that cannot but see people as needing rescuing, guidance, and
reform.
This is because compassion plays out in policy in ways that necessarily defer to
the wishes of the more resourced actors: policy agents. In Japan, the introduction of the
Self-Reliance Support Act as well as the subsequent shift to subsidized housing and
housing-first programs each prioritizes the agenda of public actors in their focus on
particular solutions, such as employment or the use of aging and devalued housing
stocks. Similarly, in an era where public agencies seek to minimize accountability for
welfare programming, integrating civic- and private-sector organizations in policy
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formation and implementation processes has served their interests. Uncoincidentally,
these shifts reflect globally-mobile ideas advanced in the most resourced—and, like the
US and UK, racially stratified—of countries, and are thus part of a global offloading of
public responsibility for poverty onto private and voluntary actors.
Historically, the prominence of any given solution—whether it be marriage,
employment, housing, or reconciliation with family—has been more telling of the agenda
of the state, than with actual needs of individuals experiencing homelessness. This has
been substantiated by social science in the US, UK, and Japan 110 on homelessness
regulation illustrating that rigid top-down approaches and gatekeeping practices
associated with standardized measures like involuntary commitment (Failer 2002;
Feldman 2004), warehousing people in shelters (Hopper and Baumohl 1994; Iwata 1985,
1995), the medicalization (Lyon-Callo 2004) and pathologization (Mills 2015) of
homelessness and poverty, and the non-profit industrial complex (Willse 20015) tend to
exacerbate problems rather than solve them (also Bretherton et al 2013; Collin 1984;.
Cowan 2019; Iwata 2007; Kawano 1999; Shima 1999; Wasserman and Clair 2010;
Yamada 2009). Against this background, policy narratives that imagine public, private,
and civic sector agents as compassionate actors, in fact, justify and deflect critical
analysis of social and political power imbalances that make these and other unilaterallyorganized actions and misrepresentations of policy need and effect possible.
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In Malaysia, little academic work has been done on federal approaches to addressing homelessness,
much less critical work. However, an unpublished report by the Ministry of Welfare Services (1976)
contains numerous critiques regarding the inefficacy of sweeps and detention as a solution to destitution,
particularly in light of Malaysia's lack of preventative measures. Similarly, journalistic work critiquing
government approaches, dating as far back as Dregs of Society (1981) have appeared from time to time.
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Less consideration is given to the interests and ideas of the least resourced—and
most experientially knowledgeable—actors: policy users. Instead, the posture of
compassion stands as both cause and effect of the non-responsive—and even antidemocratic nature—of homelessness regulation. It explains frustration and fatalism, as
well as passive gratitude, expressed by people faced with policy in/action like Azleena,
Kei, Thomas, and Taka as they have little choice but to carefully accommodate or resist
policy approaches and goals set by the state. Moreover, policy designs that
delegitimize—in welfare and public order measures—states of homelessness such that
people are shut out from rights and protections mean only one thing: policy success
necessarily complicates lives conducted while still homeless, including (but not limited
to) those of the people that policy has already failed. This underscores how democratic
systems and political rights are tied to survival, particularly where people cannot shape
policies determining the course of their lives. Fukui, my one interviewee eager to see his
actions shape policy through the process of a lawsuit, also stands as evidence of the
paucity of options available to people interested in responsive, democratic governance.
One of the many effects of homelessness is lacking access to the material and social
resources necessary to pursue advance recognition and justice so often denied.
The truth is, as Willse (2015) has covered, in spite of many of their stated ideals
and intentions, compassionate actors benefit from both security and insecurity, order and
disorder. In neoliberal Japan, where universal protections and insurance programs are
increasingly rolled back, security has been gradually commoditized for younger
generations marketed today in the form of housing, for instance. Consequently, while
middle- and upper-class households secure space in centrally located high-rise residential
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buildings, often found near commercial and leisure properties produced through
redevelopment, persons experiencing homelessness are transferred to devalued housing
stocks and properties through subsidized programs and livelihood assistance. That is,
social programs benefit people seeking housing but also housing markets and propertyowners that would otherwise be disrupted by emergent trends.
In Malaysia, where foreign investment and work opportunities have expanded
since the new international division of labor, swelling middle classes equating security
with material wealth and health take on roles as compassionate actors re/distributing
food, clothing, and services. These projects are funded, moreover, by upper classes
interested in capitalizing on “social responsibility”. Stated differently, insecurity and
disorder are addressed only in contexts that affect middle- and upper-class interests,
rendering moot the experiences of people who are working-class or experiencing
homelessness. Ultimately, austerity and the dismantling of social programs in Global
North contexts like Japan, not only benefit compassionate actors economically, but also
socially and politically through the powers it grants them over the insecure. Similarly, as
disinvestment in Global North publics has led to increased flows of wealth to middle- and
upper-class networks in the Global South, compassionate actors there, too, have become
invested in these new global austerity economies.

The Unevenness of Democratic Power in the Present
Neoliberal-era regulation in both Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur has been profoundly
shaped by the growing influence of middle-class social movements desirous of a more
compassionate and just society—one reproduced in their image. Consequently,
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homelessness policies and programs in postindustrial Japan—and in Tokyo, in
particular—have gradually shifted to housing-centric rather than employment-centric
solutions in addition to rights-based protections like access to welfare assistance.
However, at the same time, policy reform has also foregrounded public- and privatesector interest in market-based urban redevelopment, as seen in the widely heralded
advance of public-private projects, and the integration of CSOs into infrastructure for
policy implementation. Against this background, the government response to problems
like everyday resistance to welfare uptake and the recurring "disappearances" of welfare
recipients, as recorded in data, has tended towards public order measures that compel
“homeless persons”, defined in law as people living in public spaces, to accept welfare
policies rather than directly address pinhane exploitation, abuse by service providers, and
other factors underlying policy failure.
Homelessness policies and programs in Malaysia, a middle-income country, have
increased access to practical protections and assistance—both in terms of liberties and
aid—for persons experiencing homelessness, though these remain far from what would
be considered a floor for social and economic security or an exit from homelessness.
Nowhere has change in policy been more pronounced than in Malaysia's federally
administered capital city, Kuala Lumpur. Here, as in Tokyo, new waves of public and
civic assistance have emerged in a responsive but piecemeal fashion alongside attention
to civic rights. Moreover, here too political will favors market-oriented urban planning, a
programmatic reorganization of public order measures, and improved CSO participation
in policy processes, rather than addressing extant gaps in assistance visible in resistance
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to shelters and high levels of flight from Desa Bina Diri, employment referral programs,
and related institutions.
This restructuring of social infrastructure and urban management has profound
implications for democracy in both countries. First, state propensity for directly
integrating CSOs into policy formation and implementation processes has enabled not
only an outsourcing of government accountability but also a sidelining of democratic
processes that could or would otherwise be part of policy formation and oversight. In
other words, a de-democratization of controls over public good (read: welfare) is taking
place. Second, the marketization of public spaces—or public goods—also diminishes
their democratic potential. That is, as private actors have enhanced claims to public
space, the possibility of social and political representation shrinks. Such effects can be
seen in the redevelopment of Miyashita Park in Tokyo and the configuration of a twomonth "boot camp" for people from Kuala Lumpur during the SEA Games. Relocation of
Miyashita Park to the top of a 5-story mall not only undercuts open access to the park,
particularly by non-consumer publics, but also the possibility of public assemblies,
political protests, and other forms of democratic expression as parks serve as crucial
venues for such events. In Kuala Lumpur, deference to private actors affiliated with the
SEA Games (and, to a lesser degree, CSOs interested in providing aid) manifested in the
one-off federal boot camp project, which sets yet another precedent for diminishing the
constitutional rights of people experiencing homelessness in favor of programs advancing
clearance in exchange for limited material and economic aid.
Cross-country studies of democratization across the twentieth century show that
political stability and democratic potential are impossible without inclusionary political
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and social programs to address and reduce inequalities (Boix 2003; Hicks et al 1995).
While programmatic governance contributes to long-term state stability, this alone cannot
produce a functional democracy because wherever exclusionary political and social
programs or processes emerge, these reduce democratic prospects and tip the scales
towards inequitable, authoritarian regimes (Tilly 2007; Tudor and Slater 2015).
Conventional liberal principles have limited democratic practice throughout the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries by justifying the establishment and propagation of legal
limitations on political participation, thereby preserving inequalities (Sigman and
Lindberg 2019). In the case of homelessness regulation, too, policy structures have
granted social, political, and economic rights only on a limited, conditional basis—
justified as a means for ensuring conformity to contemporary socio-spatial codes, orders,
and ideals. History reveals how these conditions, rather than serve the true interests of
beneficiaries, undergird uneven power relations—and the foundation for pinhane
exploitation and abuse—as policy agents are granted authority by law over persons with
first-hand experience of homelessness.
Neoliberal welfare and public order measures—like their pre-neoliberal
predecessors—work together to maximize social and spatial control in the interest of the
economy. In the case of Tokyo, this has spurred the creation of new multi-agentic modes
of micro-managing street homelessness under aims of clearing public space and filling
underutilized housing stocks. In Kuala Lumpur, at present, management of street
homelessness directs people into casual and low-income labor markets and props up an
emergent non-profit industrial complex. These policies are intertwined with the
neoliberal austerity politics of community and corporate social responsibility and
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compassion, which justify enclosures of collective space, a toughening of urban security,
and the transfer of social infrastructure administration to voluntary, corporate, and quasigovernmental actors, all with negligible positive effect, if not dire consequences, for
people who grapple with a lack of access to adequate protections and aid.
Inequalities that emerge from contemporary policy are just as much the product of
exclusionary mechanisms inherent to policy and liberal governance, designed as it was
amidst regimes of imperial rule, as they are distinctly neoliberal. Effectively reducing and
eliminating inequalities and injustices that endanger the survival of marginalized social
groups requires a reorganization of welfare and public order systems that also
simultaneously resists implicit or explicit romanticization of pre-neoliberal imperial or
postwar models. Regulation cannot be improved without undoing the socio-legal
entanglements, and legacies of empire, that deprive people experiencing homelessness of
“full personhood” (Feldman 2004) and social and political autonomy. True democratic
governance and effective solutions to homelessness both require that people have
unconditional access political and social space and voice while they are homeless.
Historically and today, homelessness has been (re)constructed as a problem of
social and spatial disorder threatening spiritual and material modernity. While particular
policy ideas and institutions reflecting the post/colonial and post/imperial political
economy of Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo, respectively, have changed over time, the
fundamental delegitimization of homelessness across multiple policy fields stands as the
primary legacy of vagrancy laws: effectively rendering homelessness grounds for
criminalization, eviction and sweeps, public assistance disqualification, and political
disenfranchisement, among other things. Recent policy innovations have relied heavily
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on legal frameworks that classify homelessness as an illegitimate—and, hence,
unprotected—state of existence. The problems posed by these policy systems hamper our
collective ability to resolve homelessness and weaken democratic governance itself.
To resolve homelessness, there is a critical need for better democratic systems,
and not just technical fixes, in policy solutions. In light of this, addressing homelessness
in a democratic and humane manner requires its full legalization and formal public
recognition as not an aberration but an unexceptional variation in modern distributions of
wealth and power. There is an urgent need for a reckoning with the role of homelessness
regulation in processes underlying dispossession and urbanization, along with clear
interventions to ensure that the political and social rights, dignity, and human securities
of persons with experience of homelessness are recognized and restored so that, by
extension, they are no longer barred from contributing to authentic change.
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